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1.1 Background and motivation 
In the wake of the recent global financial turmoil, the subject of financial crises has 
come to the forefront of academic and policy discussions. Research on the causes of 
financial crises is booming (see Claessens et al., 2010; Rose and Spiegel, 2011 for 
overviews). One feature of the recent crisis is that it is widely spread and is 
characterized by huge and volatile capital flows (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). A 
second feature is that the crisis occurred in countries with different exchange rate 
regimes (Frankel and Saravelos, 2012).  
Chinese capital flows received much attention recently as well. On the one hand, 
capital flows from China contributed to the United States’ ability to borrow cheaply 
abroad and thereby to finance its unsustainable external imbalance (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 2009; Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Bertaut et al., 2012). On the other hand, the 
increase of capital flows to China is widely considered to have generated financial 
instability in China (Glick and Hutchison, 2009; Prasad, et. al., 2005). Given China’s 
status as the largest emerging economy, identifying the determinants of China’s 
capital flows is of considerable interest. In this respect, a distinction is made between 
short-term and long-term capital flows (Claessens et al., 1995). The short-term capital 
flows are deemed speculative and reversible, i.e. they are “hot money” flows. The 
long-term capital flows are deemed reversible only when the fundamentals change, i.e. 
they are “cold money” flows. The hot money flows usually are explained on the basis 
of the current accounts of balance of payments or foreign direct investments. We will 
specifically pay attention to the Chinese hot money flows. 
Sudden stops have become one of the characteristics of several financial crises in 
recent decades (Calvo, 1998; Mendoza, 2000). A sudden stop is an episode with a 
sharp contraction in international capital inflows (Calvo et al., 2004). An important 
issue that has attracted less attention is the joint occurrence of sudden stops and 
currency crises as, for example, in Argentina in 1980 and in Mexico in 1981. There 
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are also situations when sudden stops do not occur jointly with currency crises, such 
as in Sri Lanka in 2000 and Jordan in 1991. Since output declines are higher when 
both crises occur simultaneously (Efremidze et al., 2011), it is crucial to distinguish 
the precursors of these two types of crisis.  
One controversial issue in international economics is the probability of currency 
crises under different exchange rate regimes (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 2003; Rogoff 
et al., 2004). Frankel (1999) poses that no single currency regime is right for all 
countries or at all times. Every exchange regime is fragile and prone to crisis in some 
aspects (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). Thus, the focus should not be on “which 
exchange regime is most prone to currency crises?” but “under what circumstances 
are economies with different exchange rate regimes are more prone to crisis?” 
Up to now, only a few studies have examined the relationship between the spot 
exchange rate and the forward exchange rate during crisis periods; especially crises in 
emerging markets have not been thoroughly studied (the study by Frankel and 
Poonawala (2010) being an exception). China offers a very interesting case not only 
because it is the largest emerging economy but also because there are differences in 
the exchange rate regime even after its currency reform in 2005. 
In this thesis, I will present research about international capital flows, currency 
crises and exchange rate regimes, and will in particular focus on the case of China. 
1.2 International capital flows 
It is widely accepted that international capital flows played an important role in the 
emergence of the US housing bubble and the global financial crisis that followed the 
bursting of that bubble (see e.g. Bertaut et al., 2012). The crisis had been preceded for 
many years by a widening of the global current account imbalances. The underlying 
capital flows to finance these imbalances would ultimately require a revaluation of 
currencies (Fratzscher, 2009; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti. 2012). Figure 1.1 shows that 
global net capital flows were 1.56 trillion US Dollars in 2008, which is about 3 times 
their (nominal) value compared to ten years before. In 2009, it suddenly dropped to 
0.97 trillion US Dollars. After three years of adjustment, net capital flows in 2012 
amounted to 1.27 trillion US Dollars. 
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Figure 1.1 Volume and growth of global net capital flows 
 
 
Note: The unit of the volume of global capital flow is trillion US Dollars. The unit of the growth of 
global capital flows is percent. Source: World Economic Outlook Database April 2013. 
 
Figure 1.1 shows that there are three years with a negative growth rate of global 
net capital flows since 1980 (1982, 2001 and 2009). In all three years financial crises 
occurred. In the early 1980s several Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina, had a deep financial crisis. In 2001, the Dot-com bubble bursted with a 
world-wide impact. The recent global financial crisis is considered by many scholars 
(e.g. Reinhart, 2012) to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 
1930s. After Lehman collapsed in September 2008, investors all over the world 
repatriated foreign investments, which resulted in a massive retrenchment of capital 
flows. After 2009, when central banks around the globe started to flood financial 
markets with liquidity, international capital flows revived quickly (see Figure 1.1). 
Bertaut et al. (2012) present a picture of how capital flows contributed to the financial 
crisis. Notably if the composition of capital inflows is skewed toward non-FDI and 
non-trade flows, such as bank lending and portfolio flows, capital flows contribute to 
instability since these investments are more likely to be reversed in the event of a 
crisis (Wei, 2006; Levchenko and Mauro 2007). A large literature analyzes the drivers 
of international capital flows (Fratzscher, 2012).  
This dissertation studies net hot money flows in China using four alternative 







Volume of Global Capital Flows Growth of Global Capital Flows
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related to the trade balance or foreign direct investments (Tung and Baker, 2004; 
Martin and Morrison, 2008; Guo and Huang, 2010a). Net hot money is the difference 
between capital inflows and capital outflows. While Chinese hot money flows have 
attracted significant attention (for example, Guo and Huang, 2010a and Shi and Xiao, 
2011), the influence of structural reforms, new regulations and the financial crisis on 
the determinants of hot money flows has not been examined. Yet, understanding the 
dynamic behavior of hot money flows seems crucial for policy makers, especially 
given that hot money flows have become very volatile and are possibly driven by 
different factors in different periods. For example, foreign agents are allowed to invest 
in the Chinese stock market since the introduction of the qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) system, which may strengthen the association between hot money 
and stock market developments (Ma and McCauley, 2007). Another example is the 
launch of regulations restricting foreign investment in the real estate market. These 
regulations may reduce the association between hot money and real estate market 
developments (He et al., 2011). Furthermore, financial crises are associated with more 
volatility in net hot money inflows (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). But are these 
volatilities due to internal factors, such as developments at the stock market, the real 
estate market or the foreign exchange market, or external factors, such as interest rate 
differentials vis-à-vis the US and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index (VIX) or both? In addition, are the results sensitive to the 
measurement of hot money?  
Over the last three decades, both advanced and less advanced economies 
experienced boom-bust cycles in international capital flows. In the past, some less 
advanced economies (e.g. Chile and Argentina) suffered from a massive inflow that 
was followed by a sudden stop. Recently, more advanced economies like Iceland and 
Greece also encountered sudden stops. Sudden stops refer to a collapse of capital 
inflows. The adjustment of relative prices followed by sudden stops often leads to 
significant losses on public and private balance sheets. These losses can spread 
throughout the financial system, triggering a broader financial crisis. A financial crisis 
is typically followed by a substantial growth slowdown or a contraction. Since sudden 
stops with currency crashes are more destructive than sudden stops without currency 
crashes (Hutchison and Noy, 2006), the topic of why some of the sudden stops are 
accompanied by a currency crash while others are not is important. As suggested by 
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Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), we analyze whether the exchange rate regime in 
place matters here. 
1.3 Currency crises 
There are five “varieties” of financial crises: external default, domestic default, 
banking crises, currency crises, and inflation outbursts (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
A large number of studies concentrate on currency crises; some studies, such as 
Corsetti et al. (1999) and Corbett and Vines (1999), even use currency crisis and 
financial crisis interchangeably. The main currency crisis periods since 1980 are 
shown in Table 1.1.  
 




1992 Sweden, Finland 
1992–93 Europe (Ireland, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom) 
1994–95 Mexico 
1997–98 Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) 




Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and Wikipedia. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis 
 
The financial collapse in the US in 2008 quickly spread throughout the world, 
causing economic recessions in much of the EU, Turkey, and many other countries 
(Hausman and Johnston, 2012). Later on, some EU economies (Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain) faced a sovereign debt crisis. Currencies in several emerging 
economies depreciated sharply against the US dollar and the euro after the global 
financial crisis (Arduini et al., 2012). For instance, in September and October 2008 
Iceland and South Africa experienced large depreciations (about 26% and 23% 
against US dollar within one month), while in November 2008 the Korean won lost 
20% of its value vis-à-vis the US dollar. These large currency swings stimulated 
research on early warning indicators of currency crises. The recent financial crisis, 
which erupted in countries having different exchange rate regimes, has made it clear 
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that no exchange rate regime is a ‘safe haven’ in terms of crisis. As the first- and 
second-generation currency crises models from Krugman (1979) and Obstfeld (1994) 
show, currency crises may occur in a fixed exchange rate regime. Yet currency crises 
can also occur in countries with floating exchange rates or other regimes (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2004). There are several third-generation currency crisis models (such as 
McKinnon and Pill, 1999; Hausmann et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2001) which link 
financial intermediaries and asset prices with the emergence of a currency crisis. 
These models explain the mechanism of currency crises irrespective of the exchange 
regime. Our aim is to gauge whether currency crises have different macro-economic 
causes under alternative exchange rate regimes. 
1.4 Exchange rate regimes 
After the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, it was widely believed that only extreme 
regimes, i.e. either hard pegs or floating regimes, would be sustainable since most 
crisis-hit economies had an intermediate foreign exchange rate regime before the 
crisis (Fischer, 2001). There is a lifely debate on the pros and cons of different 
regimes (Rose, 2011; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; Chang and Velasco, 2000; 
Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Mishkin, 1999; Williamson, 1998). The pros of 
fixed regimes include the significant and positive effect of fixed exchange rates on 
trade (Klein and Shambaugh, 2006) and lower inflation due to imposing policy 
discipline (Ghosh et al, 1996). The cons include the lack of monetary autonomy 
(Shambaugh, 2004, and Obstfeld et al., 2005), the detrimental effects on the 
transmission of terms of trade shocks (Broda, 2004; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005), 
and the over-accumulation of foreign currency debt due to moral hazard (Radelet and 
Sachs 1999). The main advantage of flexible regimes is its role as a ‘shock absorber’ 
in a small open economy (Friedman, 1953; Mundell, 1961). The main disadvantage of 
floating regimes is the unpredictable volatility of the exchange rate, which reduces 
international trade and discourages investment (Hoffman, 2007). Although 
intermediate regimes can combine both the merits of fixed and floating regimes, the 
weakness of intermediate regimes is that they are less likely to revoke credibility 
(Frankel et al., 2000).  
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The IMF´s official classification of exchange rate regimes is widely used.1 
However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) find that countries that say they allow their 
exchange rate to float mostly do not. This phenomenon stimulated authors to come up 
with de facto exchange rate regime classifications. Three well-known classifications 
are those developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), and Shambaugh (2004).2 We use the classification of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) since this classification has been updated to 2010.3 Figure 1.2 shows the 
yearly share of different exchange rate regimes between 1980 and 2010. It appears 
that the shares of de facto hard pegs and intermediate regimes have increased during 
the most recent two decades. The proportion of hard pegs is 48.9% in 2010 compared 
to 32.9% in 1991. The proportion of intermediate regimes is 21.5% in 2010 compared 
to 11.7% in 1994. A number of countries have switched their exchange regimes. 
Some of them were forced to abandon their exchange rate regimes in the crisis period, 
such as Thailand in July 1997 and Argentina in January 2002. Some others adjusted 
their exchange rate regimes for other reasons (e.g., China in July 2005 and Canada in 
January 2002).   
                                                 
 
1
 IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
2
 See Rose (2011) for a detailed discussion. 
3
 See Ilzetzki et al. (2011). 
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Figure 1.2 The share of six different exchange rate regimes since 1980 
  
Note: Hard peg = No separate legal tender +  Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement + Pre 
announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% + De facto peg; Other peg =  Pre 
announced crawling peg + Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% + De 
factor crawling peg + De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; Intermediate =  
Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% + De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-5% + Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for 
both appreciation and depreciation over time) + Managed floating;  Freely floating; Freely falling = 
Freely falling. Source: Ilzetzki et al. (2011).  
 
The economies that were adversely affected by the 2008–2009 global financial 
crises have different exchange rate regimes: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
have a hard peg; Chile and Russia belong to the category of other pegs; Brazil, 
Iceland, Korea and Romania have an intermediate regime, while Australia, South 
Africa, and Turkey have a floating exchange rate.  
China implemented several economic measures to fight the global crisis, 
including changes in its exchange rate policy. The hard peg was reintroduced after the 
global financial crisis. So far, few papers have investigated the impact of the financial 
crisis on the forward exchange market. Arguably, this impact is related to 
(expectations about) the exchange rate policy. In addition, there is hardly any research 
examining the unbiased forward exchange rate hypothesis in transition economies. 
Under this hypothesis, given rational expectations and risk neutrality, the forward 
exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate. The Chinese 
currency offers a very interesting case to examine the unbiasedness hypothesis, as 
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policy reform in 2005. In July 2008, the People´s Bank of China (PBOC) returned to 
pegging the Renminbi to the US dollar. On June 19, 2010 the PBOC announced the 
return to a managed floating exchange rate regime under which the spot exchange rate 
can move intraday with at most 0.5 percent from the central parity. 
1.5 Research questions 
This dissertation focuses on international capital flows, currency crises and exchange 
rate regimes. We examine the following four research questions: 
(1) Are Chinese hot money flows related to developments in the real estate and 
the stock markets, the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the US, the expected exchange 
rate appreciation, and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index 
(VIX)? Does their effect depend on structural reforms and new regulations as well as 
the recent financial crisis? Are results affected by the choice of a particular measure 
for hot money? 
(2) Which factors determine whether a sudden stop is followed by a currency 
crisis or not? Does the exchange rate regime play a role here? 
(3) Are leading indicators of currency crises different in different exchange rate 
regimes? If so, which indicators are useful for different exchange rate regimes? 
(4) What is the relationship between the Renminbi future spot return and the 
forward discount rate? Does the unbiased forward exchange rate hypothesis hold in 
China? What is the influence of the recent financial crisis on this relationship? 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
In chapter 2, we investigate the determinants of hot money in China. We construct 
four measures of hot money for the January 2000 to December 2012 period. We use 
the Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model which can be used regardless of 
whether variables are I(0) or I(1). Our main findings are the following: (i) The 
magnitude and the volatility of hot money flows are quite substantial over the last 
decade. (ii) Hot money flows appear to be consistently related to the expected 
appreciation of the Renminbi, independent of ways in which hot money is measured. 
However, the significance of the stock market index, the real estate climate index and 
the VIX depends on the way in which hot money is measured. (iii) The level of hot 
10 Chapter 1 
 
money flows appears to be sensitive to the global financial crisis as we find that the 
volume of hot money significantly increased after the financial crisis. (iv) Reforms 
and regulations considered, including QFII and the exchange rate policy reforms, do 
not affect hot money flows. The regulation on foreign investment in the real estate 
market was effective. Our findings are consistent with previous studies concluding 
that the expected appreciation is a significant driver of hot money flows in China 
(Zhang and Shen, 2008; Shi and Xiao, 2011; Zhao et al., 2011).  
In chapter 3, we distinguish different precursors for sudden stops with currency 
crashes and for sudden stops without currency crashes, with a special emphasis on the 
exchange rate regime in place. The literature suggests that not all countries respond to 
sudden stops in the same way (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). Using both an event study 
and a probit model approach for 85 economies in the 1980-2012 periods, we find that 
economies with higher trade openness, deeper financial markets and with a surplus on 
their current account are more likely to maintain currency stability in the turmoil of 
sudden stops. In addition, economies with different exchange rate regimes behave 
differently. More specifically, the current account plays a role in the three types of 
exchange rate regime that we distinguish (i.e. hard pegs, other pegs and intermediate 
regimes). Budget deficits are significant in countries with hard pegs, while trade 
openness plays a role in both countries with a hard peg and in countries with other 
pegs. Financial development is a key factor in both other pegs and intermediate 
regimes.  
In chapter 4, we examine the impact of the exchange rate regime in place on the 
significance of early warning indicators of currency crises. In attempting to provide 
an explanation for currency crises in alternative exchange rate regimes, we first 
review the currency crisis literature. We use both probit models and an approach 
based on Kaminsky et al. (1998). Following Frankel and Rose (1996), a currency 
crisis occurs if a currency depreciates by at least 25 percent annually while there is 
also at least a 10 percent-point increase in the rate of depreciation. Using data for 88 
economies with different exchange rate regimes in the 1980-2010 periods, we find 
that external economic indicators, such as deviations of the real exchange rate from its 
trend and the growth of international reserves, have the strongest predictive power in 
fixed exchange rate regimes. In floating exchange rate regimes, macroeconomic 
policy indicators and credibility indicators, such as domestic credit growth and 
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inflation, are the best leading indicators of currency crises. Both external economic 
indicators and credibility indicators have predictive power in intermediate exchange 
rate regimes.  
In chapter 5, we discuss the relationship between the Renminbi daily future spot 
return and the forward discount rate for the period after the Chinese authorities 
abandoned the US dollar peg (July 2005). We use break point tests from Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) as well as rolling cointegration tests 
to examine the time-varying relationship. We find that there were different regimes 
after this reform and that the financial crisis has affected the relationship between the 
future spot return and the forward discount rate in China. Four different sub-periods 
can be identified on the basis of our rolling cointegration analysis regarding the future 
spot return and the forward discount rate. First, there is cointegration before the 
financial crisis (July 2005–Spring 2008). Second, there is no cointegration in the early 
stages of the crisis (Spring 2008–Spring 2009). Arguably, the cointegration 
relationship is weak in the early stages of the crisis because at that time the trend of 
the Renminbi with respect to the dollar was very hard to predict. Third, there again is 
a cointegration relationship in the later stages of the global crisis (Spring 2009–Spring 
2010). Apparently, when the financial crisis spread, the expectations from market 
participants became more uniform, namely that the Renminbi-dollar rate would stop 
appreciating for a while. It became easier for market participants to anticipate the 
exchange rate in the later stages of the crisis. Fourth, there is no cointegration after the 
Chinese government continued its policy of gradual appreciation (Summer 
2010–Winter 2010) as the trend of the Renminbi with respect to the dollar again 
became hard to predict. Furthermore, we conclude that the unbiased forward rate 
hypothesis only holds when the spot exchange rate was almost invariant because the 
Chinese authorities had returned to pegging the Renminbi to the US dollar to 
overcome the turmoil caused by the global financial crisis. Our analysis shows a 
time-varying relationship between the Renminbi future spot return and the forward 
discount rate in the period after exchange rate regime reform. 
Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of our analyses. 
In addition, we discuss some limitations of our work and provide suggestions for 




The Dynamics of Hot Money in China 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Emerging economies have been confronted with financial instability for decades. 
China, currently the biggest emerging market, is no exception. The recent increase in 
the level and volatility of hot money flows is widely considered to have generated 
financial instability in China (Martin and Morrison, 2008; Ljungwall and Wang, 
2008). Hot money can be defined as capital flows that are not related to the trade 
surplus or foreign direct investment.4 Although China has taken some measures to 
restrict hot money flows, several authors argue that these have not been very effective 
(Martin and Morrison, 2008; Tsuyuguchi, 2009; Guo and Huang, 2010b).  
Both the expansion and the volatility of hot money flows have raised concerns 
about their impact on financial stability. Given the sensitivity of hot money flows, 
even a small shock to the economy can lead to large fluctuations in hot money flows, 
which in turn may exacerbate the shock and further destabilize the financial system 
and the domestic economy (Sarno and Taylor, 2003; Bouvatier, 2010). Furthermore, 
hot money flows may reduce the effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policies 
(Glick and Hutchison, 2009; Guo and Huang, 2010a). It has also been argued that hot 
money inflows have fueled inflation, driven up stock prices and accelerated a 
worrisome bubble in the real estate market in China (Guo and Huang, 2010a). 
Therefore, it is of great importance to study the drivers of hot money flows.  
Several studies have already analyzed the determinants of hot money flows.5 
However, a major limitation of these studies is that the techniques employed only 
allow testing long-run relationships under the restrictive assumption that all the 
variables in the system are I(0) or all variables are I(1) (stationary or first difference 
                                                 
 
4
 See Tung and Baker (2004), Zhang and Fung (2006), Martin and Morrison (2008), and Guo and 
Huang (2010a). 
5
 Relevant references include: Shi and Xiao (2011); Zhao et al. (2011); Cheung and Xian (2010b); 
Ljungwall and Wang (2008); Sicular (1998); and Gunter (1996, 2004).  
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stationary). But, as will be shown in Section 2.5, this is not the case in China probably 
due to structural changes, such as the exchange rate policy reform, the launch of the 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) system and regulations which restrict 
foreign investment in the real estate market, and major shocks, such as the recent 
financial crisis. The only study which takes structural changes into account is Cheung 
and Qian (2010b), who use several China-specific institutional factors—including a 
political risk index, a dummy variable allowing the effect of the US–China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue, a dummy variable for exchange rate policy reform, and a dummy 
variable tracking the evolution of China’s capital control policy. They find that the 
relevance of the selected institutional factors depends on both data frequency and 
regression specification. 
A second limitation of previous studies is that they generally do not examine to 
what extent their findings depend on a specific measure of hot money. As will be 
shown in Section 2.2, several methods have been used to measure hot money, which 
may lead to different results. We therefore employ several measures of hot money. 
In addition, we intend to test for the institutional factors related to hot money 
flows in China. Are hot money flows related to developments in the real estate and the 
stock markets, the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the US, the expected exchange 
rate appreciation, and market volatility? And is their effect depending on structural 
reforms, new regulations and the financial crisis? We use Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) models introduced by Pesaran et al. (1999), which can be used to 
examine long-run relationships regardless of whether the underlying variables are I(0), 
I(1), or fractionally integrated. Furthermore, ARDL models are applicable even when 
the explanatory variables are endogenous. We will use four alternative measures of 
hot money. 
This chapter contributes to the literature as follows. First, we investigate the 
determinants of hot money flows in China. Our sample includes the recent financial 
crisis, so that we can analyze its impact. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) report an 
unprecedented collapse in international capital flows during the recent crisis 
suggesting that hot money may have become more volatile during the crisis period. 
Second, we test for the impact of reforms and new regulations, such as the 
introduction of the qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in July 2003, the 
exchange rate policy reform in July 2005, and new regulations on foreign investment 
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in real estate in July 2006. The impact of driving factors of hot money flows, for 
example exchange rate expectations, can be time varying because of these reforms 
and regulations although their direction is uncertain. For instance, Corbo and 
Hernandez (1996) argue that a more flexible exchange rate system may lead to 
excessive volatility in hot money, whereas Ghosh et al. (2012) argue that a fixed 
exchange rate may encourage greater cross-border borrowing and lending. Finally, we 
construct four measures of hot money. The first one is found by subtracting the trade 
surplus and net foreign direct investment (FDI) from the change in official foreign 
reserves. The second measure uses adjusted foreign reserves instead of official foreign 
reserves. The third one adds a rough estimation of hot money flows in trade invoicing 
to the second measure. The final proxy uses data of the current account instead of net 
exports of goods. In constructing these measures we employ the new balance of 
payments (BOP) statistics issued on April 1, 2011.6 
Our main findings are as follows. First, over the last decade, hot money flows in 
China have been large and increasing. In line with the findings of previous studies, 
our results suggest that the expected appreciation of the RMB is significantly related 
to hot money flows in China. The interest rate differential vis-à-vis the US turns out to 
be insignificant. The significance of the real estate and stock markets, and of market 
volatility differs across measures of hot money. Second, the recent global financial 
crisis significantly increased the levels of hot money flows in China but only when we 
use the second and the third measures of hot money. Third, most of the regulations 
and reforms we consider do not affect the drivers of hot money. An exception is the 
regulation of foreign investment in the real estate market. 
The remainder of the chapters structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
definitions of hot money and provides an overview of hot money in China since 2000. 
Section 2.3 discusses the factors which could be associated with hot money flows. 
Section 2.4 explains the estimation techniques employed, while Section 2.5 reports 
the empirical results. Section 2.6 considers the influences from reforms, new 
regulations and the financial crisis. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes. 
                                                 
 
6
 The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued BOP statistics using a new format on 
April 1, 2011, in which retained profits on foreign direct investment (FDI) are taken into account.  
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2.2 Background 
In this section, we first review the definition of hot money, and then we analyze hot 
money flows to China since 2000.  
Corbo and Hernandez (1996) define hot money as short-term, highly volatile 
capital inflows usually attracted by market imperfections or policy mistakes that 
create a large gap between domestic and foreign interest rates, adjusted for exchange 
rate expectations. Kim and Singal (2000) characterize hot money as international 
capital flows that are not only highly sensitive to differences in interest rates, but also 
to expectations of future economic growth, and expected returns on holding securities. 
In the view of Glick and Hutchison (2000), hot money is particularly footloose, 
seeking the highest global return, and is quite speculative in nature. Hence, funds are 
likely to flow out of a country just as quickly as they flow in, often without any 
fundamental cause. Martin and Morrison (2008) use the term ‘hot money’ in financial 
markets to refer to the flow of capital from one country to another in order to earn a 
short-term profit on interest rate differentials and/or anticipated exchange rate shifts. 
Glick and Hutchison (2009) interpret non-FDI capital inflows that could potentially 
switch direction within a short horizon as hot money. Sula (2010) considers portfolio 
flows and private loans as hot money flows. In sum, the most distinguishing feature of 
hot money is that it can be reversed quickly. 
Scholars use either a direct or an indirect way to measure hot money (see Table 
2.1 for a summary). The direct method uses data for specific variables that constitute 
hot money. The indirect method captures hot money as a residual of other variables.7  
  
                                                 
 
7
 See Kant (1996) for a detailed description of various hot money measures and their limitations. 
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Table 2.1 Hot money measurement 
Direct way Indirect way 





Errors and omissions 
portfolio flows 
Zhang and Fung (2006)  
Martin and Morrison 
(2008) 
Tung and Baker (2004) 
Guo and Huang (2010a 
& 2010b) 
Subtract trade surplus 
(or deficit) and net flow 
of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from 





Net errors and omissions (1) 
Net flows of non-FDI, 
non-portfolio investment assets 
and liabilities held by entities 
other than the monetary 
authorities, general 





(1) and (2) plus net flows of 
non-FDI, non-portfolio 
investment assets and liabilities 
held by banks 
  
 
 A limitation of the direct method is that the errors and omissions in the BOP 
statistics includes not only unrecorded capital flows but also measurement and 
rounding errors, unreported imports, and registration delays. These items not 
necessarily need to be hot money. A drawback of the indirect method is that it 
assumes that there is no hot money in net exports and FDI. This is also not the case. In 
sum, neither the direct method nor the indirect method is able to record hot money 
flows precisely. We therefore use four alternative measures of hot money based on the 
indirect method as shown in Table 2.1. Our motivation for using the indirect method 
is that it is applicable to monthly data, whereas the direct ways can only be used on 
quarterly or yearly bases. Our first proxy is found by subtracting the trade surplus and 
FDI from the change in official foreign reserves. We construct a second measure by 
using adjusted foreign reserves instead of official reserves, following Zhang and Xu 
(2008). The reason for using adjusted foreign reserves is that foreign reserves may 
change even when there are no capital flows. First, foreign reserves in China mainly 
consist of US dollars, Euros and Japanese Yen. If the Euro appreciates vis-à-vis the 
US dollar, the stock of foreign reserves of China increases even though there is no 
capital flow. Second, when the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was founded in 
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September 2007, some official foreign reserves were shifted to CIC.8 These funds 
should be added to foreign reserves in the corresponding period. Third, state-owned 
banks received capital injections coming from foreign reserves. These injections 
should also be added to foreign reserves. Fourth, deposit reserve requirements in 
foreign currency were imposed on major banks. The amounts of frozen foreign 
currency should be added to the stock of foreign reserves accordingly. Finally, 
foreign-exchange swap transactions between the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and 
major commercial banks in China took place. Unfortunately, these transactions are 
hard to track since the PBOC does not announce them. We therefore only adjust 
foreign reserves for the first four factors outlined above.9  
Our third proxy adds to the second measure a rough estimation of hot money in 
trade invoicing.10 The trade surplus in China suddenly increased following the 
exchange rate regime reform in July 2005. We assume that the structure of imports 
and exports is stable since 2000. The ratio of trade surplus to total trade should 
fluctuate around a baseline, which we calculate as the ratio of trade surplus to total 
trade between January 2000 and June 2005. The difference from this baseline is 
considered as hot money in trade invoicing (Zhang and Xu, 2008).11 To construct the 
final measure we use the current account instead of net exports of goods.  
We calculate hot money for the period from January 2000 to December 2012. 
The quarterly data on FDI comes from BOP. We construct monthly FDI and current 
account data from quarterly FDI and current account following Cheung and Qian 
(2010b).12 The monthly data for exports of goods, imports of goods and foreign 
reserves come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
 
  
                                                 
 
8
 CIC is a sovereign-wealth fund aiming to make profits using foreign exchange assets held by the 
Chinese government. 
9
 See Appendix 2.A for a detailed description of adjusted foreign reserves.  
10
 We also considered tracking hot money in FDI, but it is hard to get data on a monthly basis. 
11
 See Appendix 2.B for more details. 
12
 See Chow and Lin (1971) for more details. Net FDI is derived using data on inward FDI from the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. 
18                                                                                   Chapter 2 
 
Figure 2.1 Hot money flows in China 
 
 
Note: Unit: Billion US Dollars. HM1: Change in foreign exchange reserves - Net exports of goods - 
Net foreign direct investments. HM2: Change in adjusted foreign exchange reserves - Net exports of 
goods - Net foreign direct investments. HM3: Change in adjusted foreign exchange reserves - Net 
exports of goods - Net foreign direct investments + Hot money in trade invoicing. HM4: Change in 
adjusted foreign exchange reserves - Net current account - Net foreign direct investments + Hot money 
in trade invoicing. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that the four alternative measures of hot money have a very 
similar trend. Hot money generally flew out of China before 2002, while thereafter it 
flew into China until the start of the global financial crisis in 2008. Between 2002 and 
2008, net inflows of hot money in China amounted to at least 207 billion US dollars 
according to our first measure (HM1). The amount is 626 billion US dollars according 
to the third measure (HM3). On July 21, 2005, China announced the abolition of its 
fixed nominal exchange rate to the US dollar. Since then, hot money flows became 
more volatile. McKinnon et al. (2010) argue that between July 2005 and July 2008, a 
“one-way bet on appreciation of RMB” stimulated hot money inflows to China. In 
July 2008, when the global financial crisis provoked an unwinding of the dollar carry 
trade with a sharp appreciation of the dollar against most other currencies, the PBOC 
returned to pegging the RMB to the US dollar (see Zhao et al., 2013 for details). The 

















































































































































































































































The Dynamics of Hot Money in China                                                    19 
 
temporary interruption of the reform process that was caused by the global financial 
crisis. On June 19, 2010 the PBOC announced the return to a managed floating 
exchange rate regime under which the spot exchange rate can move intraday by at 
most 0.5 percent from the central parity. The RMB started appreciating again 
(Eichengreen and Rose, 2010) and hot money inflows into China grew dramatically as 
illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
There are three periods with net hot money outflows in China as shown in Figure 
2.1. The first period started in October 2008, when the global financial crisis 
intensified due to the fall of Lehman Brothers. The hot money flows out of China 
amounted to about 200 billion US dollars from October 2008 to February 2009 
according to our four measures. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) indicate that this 
period was characterized by a reversal of capital flows, with investors across the globe 
liquidating holdings abroad. In addition, the State Council in China announced a new 
regulation on foreign exchange management on August 2008. This regulation 
required that all cross-border flows of foreign exchange recorded as entries in the 
trade account must be truly the results of trade transactions and those recorded as 
entries of investment income must be truly investment income (Yu, 2009). Authorities 
had to approve the use of RMB funds originating from selling foreign exchange to the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).13 The second period of capital 
outflows started from the intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis, which 
is dated as March 2010 in Fratzscher (2012). The third period with outflows started in 
September 2011 and intensified in May 2012. The annual outflow of hot money was 
about 300-400 billion US dollars in 2012 according to our measures. This was the 
largest outflow in one year.  
2.3 Factors associated with hot money 
There is a small but rapidly growing literature on the factors associated with hot 
money flows. Kim and Singal (2000) argue that hot money flows are highly sensitive 
to differences in interest rates, expectations of future economic growth, and expected 
                                                 
 
13
 Foreign currency is not allowed to circulate in China. Foreign currency has to be sold to banks to get 
RMB and the purpose of this transaction has to be approved by SAFE.  
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returns from holding securities. According to Bouvatier (2010), the US interest rate 
and exchange rate revaluation are important factors in explaining hot money inflows. 
McCauley (2010) poses that prospects for strong performance of Asian economies 
and currency appreciation (or at least relative stability of Asian currencies) have led to 
an acceleration of equity inflows, debt inflows, bond market inflows, bank flows and 
carry trades in Asia.  
Studies on hot money in China emphasize different factors. Martin and Morrison 
(2008) point to two key factors: the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the United States 
and expectations of an appreciation of the RMB. Zhang and Fung (2006) and Guo and 
Huang (2010a) argue that hot money mainly flows to the stock and real estate markets 
in China. Zhang and Shen (2008) show that the appreciation of the RMB and rising 
stock prices are determinants of hot money flows in China. Likewise, Yu (2010) 
poses that market participants were betting on an increase in the RMB exchange rate 
and rising property and equity prices. Similarly, Shi and Xiao (2011) find that the 
main incentives for hot money flows in China are revenues from investments in stock 
and real estate markets. The expected appreciation of the RMB also has driven hot 
money in China according to this study, but the interest differential vis-à-vis the US 
seems to have had no effect. Zhao et al. (2011) find that rising house prices were the 
most significant factor related to hot money flows in China, followed by the exchange 
rate and interest rate differentials; stock prices had the weakest impact. In sum, 
although previous studies focus on similar drivers of hot money flows, they do not 
come to the same conclusion as to the factors associated with the expansion of hot 
money flows in China. A possible reason for these diverse findings is that the studies 
use different sample periods and different methods for measuring hot money. In 
addition, the methods used, either OLS or VAR models, require that all variables are 
I(0) or all are I(1), and this may not be true in China which is in a process of financial 
reform.  
We use two groups of explanatory factors based on previous studies: global and 
domestic macroeconomic variables. We use interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the US 
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as well as the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index14 (VIX) to 
capture the global factor. If Chinese interest rates are higher than those in the US there 
arguably will be more hot money inflows to China. A higher VIX is expected to cause 
more hot money inflows to China. We consider three domestic macroeconomic 
variables, namely the stock market index, the real estate climate index and 
expectations for the future RMB exchange rate. The stock market index and the real 
estate climate index15 are included to capture flows aiming at acquiring profits from 
rising asset prices. Expectations for the future RMB exchange rate are included to 
take up exchange rate speculation. There will be hot money inflows when the stock 
and real estate index rise, and when the RMB is expected to appreciate. We use the 
monthly Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index and VIX (both from 
DataStream). The interest rate differential between China and the United States equals 
the one-month interbank offering rate difference between China and the United States; 
both interest rates come from Reuters. The real estate climate index comes from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. The expected depreciation of the RMB (EE) 
can be derived using the following equation:  ൌ ୉౛ି୉బ୉బ . Non-deliverable forward 
(NDF) is a proxy for the expected exchange rate Ee, which originates from Bloomberg. 
The RMB offshore non-deliverable forwards are not officially subject to China’s 
jurisdiction and, thus, could be viewed as a market indicator of expected currency 




Pesaran et al. (1999) propose the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. 
This method can be used regardless of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) 
                                                 
 
14
 VIX is a measure of expected volatility of S&P 500 index options. It represents the market's 
expectation of stock market volatility over the next 30 days. It is often referred to as the fear index or 
the fear gauge. A rise in the VIX caused capital to flow into emerging markets. However, this effect 
reversed during the crisis, when the sharp increase in global risk induced capital outflows (Fratzscher, 
2012) due to flight-to-safety. Other papers including VIX as a determinant of capital flow are Forbes 
and Warnock (2012) and Bruno and Shin (2012). 
15
 The real estate climate index shows the same trend as the real estate price index. The latter is only 
available on a monthly basis from June 2005 to December 2010. 
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(stationary or first difference stationary). Another merit of ARDL models is that they 
are applicable even when the explanatory variables are endogenous (Fedderke and Liu, 
2002 ). The ARDL procedure consists of two steps. First, it tests the existence of a 
long-run relationship between the variables in the system using the so-called bound 
test, which is an F-test. The model is shown as: 
 
ο௧ ൌן଴൅ןଵ ݐ ൅ σ ןଶ οܪܯ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ןଷ οܧܧ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ןସ οܫܦ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅
σ ןହ οܵܫ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ן଺ οܴܥ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ן଻ οܸܫܺ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ן଼ ܪܯ௧ି௜ ൅ןଽ ܧܧ௧ି௜ ൅
ןଵ଴ ܫܦ௧ି௜ ൅ןଵଵ ܵܫ௧ି௜ ൅ןଵଶ ܴܥ௧ି௜ ൅ןଵଷ ܸܫܺ௧ି௜ ൅ ߝ௧  
(2.1)  
 
where p is the lag order, t is time trend, İ is error term, HM is hot money, EE is 
expected depreciation, ID is interest rate differential, SI is the stock market index, RC 
is the real estate climate index and VIX is Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index. In our model, as shown in equation (2.1), the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration as defined by H0: Į8 = Į9 = Į10 = Į11= Į12= Į13= 0 is tested against the 
alternative H1: Į8 0, Į9 0, Į10 0, Į11 0, Į12 0, Į13 0 using F-statistics. The 
critical values of the F-statistics for this test are available in Pesaran et al. (2001). 
They provide two sets of critical values in which one set is computed under the 
assumption that all variables in the ARDL model are I(1), and the other under the 
assumption that they are all I(0). For each application, the two sets provide the bands 
covering all the possible classifications of the variables into I(0) or I(1), or even 
fractionally integrated ones. If the computed F-statistic is higher than the upper bound 
of the critical value, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. If it is below 
the lower bound, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. If it lies within the lower and 
upper bounds, the result is inconclusive. 
If the results of the F-test in the first step suggest cointegration, we move to the 
second step of the ARDL approach. The following long term model (2.2) is estimated: 
 
௧ ൌ Ⱦଵ ൅ɀଵ௜ σ ܪܯ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅Ɂଵ௜ σ ܧܧ௧ି௜௣௜ୀ଴ ൅ ߝଵ௜ σ ܫܦ௧ି௜ ൅ ߞଵ௜ σ ܵܫ௧ି௜௣௜ୀ଴ ൅௣௜ୀ଴
ߟଵ௜ σ ܴܥ௧ି௜௣௜ୀ଴ ൅ ߠଵ௜ σ ܸܫܺ௧ି௜ ൅ ߤ௧௣௜ୀ଴                                              
(2.2)
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In this step, the lag order of the variables is chosen according to the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC).  
2.5 Results 
In this section, we first perform ADF unit root tests for each variable to see whether 
all variables are either I(0) or I(1). Secondly, we perform bound tests using model (2.1) 
to see whether there are long-term cointegrating relationships among variables. 
Thirdly, we estimate the ARDL model using the SBC criterion to determine the 
optimal lag order of each variable in the system. The long-run parameters of the 
ARDL model and error correction representation of the selected ARDL model are 
followed by. 
First we perform ADF unit root tests for each variable.16 The tests are conducted 
against three alternatives: stationary fluctuations around zero, stationary fluctuations 
around a constant term and stationary fluctuations around a constant term and a time 
trend. Table 2.2 reports the results and shows that all variables are either I(0) or I(1). 
 
  
                                                 
 
16
 We also performed alternative unit root tests developed by Elliott et al. (1996) and Phillips and 
Perron (1998). These tests give the same outcomes as the ADF tests (results available on request). 
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Table 2.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
  
 Level First difference 
Lag length t-statistic Lag length t-statistic 
Hot Money 1 (0,0) 0 -9.4792***     
(c,0) 0 -9.4481***     
(c,t) 0 -9.4736***     
Hot Money 2 (0,0) 2 -3.1990***     
(c,0) 2 -3.2089**     
(c,t) 2 -3.1616*     
Hot Money 3 (0,0) 2 -3.1412***     
(c,0) 2 -3.1597***     
(c,t) 2 -3.1075***     
Hot Money 4 (0,0) 2 -3.4329***   
(c,0) 2 -3.4285**   
(c,t) 2 -3.3963*   
Expected depreciation  (0,0) 1 -2.7222***     
(c,0) 1 -2.7411*     
(c,t) 1 -2.6909 0 -17.3559*** 
Interest rate differential (0,0) 0 -0.9746 0 -11.5605*** 
(c,0) 0 -1.2443 0 -11.6027*** 
(c,t) 0 -1.6770 0 -11.5644*** 
Stock market index (0,0) 2 -0.7173 1 -6.5283*** 
(c,0) 6 -2.4850 1 -6.5078*** 
(c,t) 6 -2.9273 1 -6.4819*** 
Real estate climate index (0,0) 1 -0.2508 0 -5.3595*** 
(c,0) 1 -2.6296*     
(c,t) 1 -3.2917*     
VIX (0,0) 2 -1.1500 1 -10.2140*** 
(c,0) 1 -3.8523***     
(c,t) 1 -3.8395**     
Notes: This table shows the outcomes of the ADF test. The lag length is based on the SBC criterion. (0, 
0) refers to the model without constant and without time trend. (c, 0) refers to the model with constant 
but without time trend. (0, t) refers to the model without constant but with time trend. (c, t) refers to the 
model with constant and time trend. *** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level; ** Rejection 
of the null hypothesis at the 5% level; * Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level.  
         
In the second step, we perform bound tests using model (2.1) to see whether there 
are long-term cointegrating relationships among the variables. The results for the 
F-tests are given in Table 2.3, showing whether the values of the F-statistics are above 
the critical values (CV) provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) using different lag orders p. 
These tests generally support the existence of a long-run relationship between hot 
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money flows and the five factors we investigated, irrespective of their order of 
integration. Only a few cases where exclude the constant items reject the existence of 
a long-run relationship between hot money flows and the factors. 
 
Table 2.3 Results of bound tests (F-statistics) 
Lag order (p) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
HM1 (0,0) 8.7476*** 4.1413*** 5.5856*** 4.3692*** 2.7725** 2.6759** 
HM1 (c,0) 8.8467*** 4.2709*** 5.7517*** 5.6122*** 3.4465*** 3.3350*** 
HM1 (0,t) 8.6349*** 4.1273*** 5.4575*** 4.1094*** 2.5273** 2.5735** 
HM1 (c,t) 8.7378*** 4.2005*** 5.7284*** 5.7523*** 3.6007*** 3.8981*** 
HM2 (0,0) 5.1952*** 2.4603** 2.9325** 1.9243* 1.5204 1.5954 
HM2 (c,0) 5.7248*** 2.6723** 3.2723*** 3.0734*** 2.4589** 2.4620** 
HM2 (0,t) 5.2779*** 2.4498** 2.8535** 1.7371 1.3780 1.5237 
HM2 (c,t) 5.6103*** 2.6059** 3.4271*** 3.3333*** 2.8386** 3.1713*** 
HM3 (0,0) 5.2732*** 2.4313** 2.8829** 1.8981* 1.4970 1.5723 
HM3 (c,0) 5.7919*** 2.6155** 3.1948*** 3.0060*** 2.4139** 2.4232** 
HM3 (0,t) 5.3319*** 2.4094** 2.8115** 1.7142 1.3590 1.5052 
HM3 (c,t) 5.6809*** 2.5550** 3.3780*** 3.2999*** 2.8213** 3.1652*** 
HM4 (0,0) 5.1579*** 2.3278** 2.7939** 1.9192* 1.6007 1.7289 
HM4 (c,0) 5.4637*** 2.4112** 2.9307** 2.7797** 2.3555** 2.5021** 
HM4 (0,t) 5.2502*** 2.3199** 2.7360** 1.7540 1.4766 1.6754 
HM4 (c,t) 5.3735*** 2.3562** 3.0331*** 3.0243*** 2.7380** 3.1657*** 
Notes: This table shows F tests using model (2.1) using different lag orders shown in the first row. The 
asterisk denotes test statistics above upper bound critical value. *, **, and *** means significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. HM (0, 0) gives F statistic for models without constant and 
without time trend t. HM (c, 0) gives F statistic for models with constant without time trend t. HM (0, t) 
gives F statistic for models without constant with time trend t. HM (c, t) gives F statistic for models 
with constant and time trend t. 
 
In the third step, we estimate the ARDL model using the SBC criterion to 
determine the optimal lag order of each variable in the system. The maximum lag is 
set at 4 so that the sample period for analysis becomes 2000M5 to 2012M12. Using 
Microfit 4.1, the optimal models for our four measurements of hot money are: ARDL 
(1,0,0,0,0,4), ARDL (1,0,0,0,1,0), ARDL (3,0,0,0,1,0) and ARDL (1,0,0,0,1,0) for our 
different measures of hot money. The results of these ARDL models are summarized 
in Table 2.4.  
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Hot money (-1) 0.1639** 0.2222*** 0.2134*** 0.1231 
  
(0.0750) (0.0796) (0.0798) (0.0804) 
Hot money (-2)    0.1275 
 
   (0.0805) 
Hot money (-3)    0.1907** 
 
   (0.0808) 
Expected depreciation  -0.2085*** -0.2359*** -0.2325*** -0.2023*** 
  
(0.0714) (0.0801) (0.0800) (0.0766) 
Interest differential  -0.0462 0.2002 0.1833 0.2120 
  
(0.1279) (0.1329) (0.1327) (0.1284) 
Stock market index  0.0252 0.5699* 0.5877* 0.4696 
  
(0.2855) (0.3277) (0.3278) (0.3134) 
Real estate climate index 16.5885 109.7165*** 108.3947** 98.7407** 
  
(10.3324) (41.3042) (41.2611) (40.0626) 
Real estate climate index (-1)  -90.5439** -88.6685** -96.3275** 
  
 (39.2860) (39.2543) (37.6866) 
VIX -1.4998*** -0.0882 -0.0744 -0.1768 
  
(0.4856) (0.2914) (0.2911) (0.2795) 
VIX(-1) 0.4038    
  
(0.4856)    
VIX(-2) 2.2370***    
  
(0.7369)    
VIX(-3) -3.1427***    
  
(0.7422)    
VIX(-4) 2.5803***    
  
(0.4847)    
Constant -18.5671* -20.4321* -21.0929* -2.6635 
  
(11.0072) (11.4803) (11.4808) (11.6339) 
Trend 0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0081 
  
(0.0090) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0092) 
R-Squared 0.3850 0.3861 0.3806 0.3850 
R-Bar-Squared 0.3506 0.3378 0.3459 0.3414 
F-stat.  11.1896*** 8.0032*** 10.9816*** 8.8276*** 
Serial Correlation 3.1054*** 2.2766** 3.2795*** 2.8878*** 
Functional Form 1.1649 0.8891 1.3741 0.7498 
White Heteroscedasticity 4.9095** 0.2933 4.5466** 3.2487* 
Notes: The dependent variable is hot money flows. Hot money (-1), Hot money (-2) and Hot money (-3) 
are the first, second and third lag of hot money, respectively. The ARDL (1,0,0,0,0,4), ARDL 
(1,0,0,0,1,0), ARDL (3,0,0,0,1,0) and ARDL (1,0,0,0,1,0) are selected based on Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% 
level; ** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level; * Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 2.4 indicates that the overall goodness of fit of the estimated equations is 
reasonably good (R2=0.39 or 0.38). The diagnostic test results show that our models 
pass the tests for functional form. However, the results indicate that there exists serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity when we use our hot money measures 1, 2 and 4. 
But this does not affect the parameter estimates (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003; 
Shrestha and Chowdhury, 2007). Estimates of the long-run coefficients based on the 
ARDL model are reported in Table 2.5, while the Error Correction Model is shown in 
Table 2.6. 
 











Expected depreciation  -0.2494*** -0.3033*** -0.2956*** -0.3620** 
  
(0.0877) (0.1050) (0.1037) (0.1509) 
Interest differential  -0.0553 0.2574 0.2330 0.3795 
  
(0.1528) (0.1709) (0.1689) (0.2291) 
Stock market index  0.0301 0.7326* 0.7471* 0.8405 
  
(0.3413) (0.4135) (0.4087) (0.5578) 
Real estate climate index 19.8400 24.6484* 25.0766* 4.3187 
  
(12.1381) (13.4968) (13.3345) (19.4385) 
VIX 0.6921* -0.1133 -0.0946 -0.3164 
  
(0.3804) (0.3739) (0.3695) (0.5013) 
Constant -22.2064* -26.2675* -26.8140* -4.7668 
  
(12.9317) (14.1911) (14.0208) (20.4192) 
Trend 0.0014 -0.0034 -0.0020 -0.0144 
  
(0.0108) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0169) 
Notes: The dependent variable is hot money flows. This table shows the long-run parameters based on 
the estimates shown in Table 2.4. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** means 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The coefficients of the expected exchange rate and VIX are significant when we 
use our first measure of hot money as the dependent variable (column 2 in Table 2.5). 
A higher volatility of the S&P 500 index options and an exchange rate appreciation 
lead to higher capital inflows. The coefficients of the expected exchange rate change, 
the stock market index, and the real estate climate index are significant with the 
expected sign when we use the second and third measures of hot money as the 
dependent variable (columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.5). An expected appreciation of the 
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RMB exchange rate, a rising stock market and a rising real estate index induce hot 
money inflows. The expected exchange rate is the only significant variable when we 
use our fourth measure of hot money. Our finding of a significant impact of the 
expected appreciation is in line with the findings of previous studies (Zhang and Shen, 
2008; Shi and Xiao, 2011; Zhao et al., 2011). The coefficient of the interest rate 
differential is always insignificant. Also this finding is in line with those of several 
earlier studies. Although theoretically the interest rate differential is a trigger of hot 
money, few empirical studies find it to be significant in China (Cheung and Qian, 
2010b; Shi and Xiao, 2011). This is probably reflecting that interest rates in China are 
regulated by the central bank and are not determined by market forces (Goldstein and 
Lardy, 2006). In addition, Chinese money markets are not accessible to everyone 
(Cheung and Qian, 2010b). We find that the significance of the stock market index, 
the real estate climate index, and the VIX depends on the choice for a particular 
measure of hot money. 
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D(Hot money (-1))    -0.3182*** 
 
   (0.1033) 
D(Hot money (-2))    -0.1907** 
 
   (0.0808) 
D(Expected depreciation) -0.2085*** -0.2359*** -0.2325*** -0.2023*** 
 
(0.0714) (0.0801) (0.0800) (0.0766) 
D(Interest differential) -0.0462 0.2002 0.1833 0.2120 
 
(0.1279) (0.1329) (0.1327) (0.1284) 
D(Stock market index) 0.0252 0.5699* 0.5877* 0.4696 
 
(0.2855) (0.3277) (0.3278) (0.3134) 
D(Real estate climate index) 16.5885 109.7165*** 108.3947** 98.7407** 
 
(10.3324) (41.3042) (41.2611) (40.0626) 
D(VIX) -1.4998*** -0.0882 -0.0744 -0.1768 
 
(0.4856) (0.2914) (0.2911) (0.2795) 
D(VIX(-1)) -1.6746***    
 
(0.5282)    
D(VIX(-2)) 0.5624    
 
(0.4957)    
D(VIX(-3)) -2.5803***    
 
(0.4847)    
D(Constant) -18.5671* -20.4321* -21.0929* -2.6635 
 
(11.0072) (11.4803) (11.4808) (11.6339) 
D(Trend) 0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0081 
 
(0.0090) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0092) 
ECM (-1) -0.8361*** -0.7779*** -0.7866*** -0.5588*** 
 
(0.0750) (0.0796) (0.0798) (0.1136) 
R-Squared 0.4179 0.5857 0.4211 0.4733 
R-Bar-Squared 0.3853 0.5532 0.3888 0.4359 
F-stat.  14.6643*** 19.7935*** 14.8621*** 14.0779*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference of hot money flows. ECM denotes error correction 
term obtained from the long-run relationship. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** means significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The results in Table 2.6 provide further evidence of cointegration among the 
variables in the model. The error correction term (i.e. ECM (−1)) has the right sign 
(negative) and is statistically significant. The estimated values of ECM (-1), which 
indicates the speed of adjustment to equilibrium following short-run shocks, are 
-0.8361, -0.7779, -0.7866 and -0.5588 respectively. So about 56%-84% of the 
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disequilibrium, caused by shocks, is corrected in each period in the converge process 
to the long-run equilibrium. The ECM models are as follows: 
 
ECM1 = HM1 + 0.2494*EE + 0.0553*ID - 0.0301*SI - 19.8400 *RC - 
0.6921*VIX + 22.2064*C -0.0014*T 
ECM2 = HM2 + 0.3033 *EE - 0.2574*ID - 0.7326*SI - 24.6484*RC + 
0.1133*VIX + 26.2675 *C + 0.0034*T 
ECM3 = HM3 + 0.2956 *EE – 0.2330*ID – 0.7471*SI – 25.0766*RC + 
0.0946*VIX + 26.8140*C + 0.0020*T 
ECM4 = HM4 + 0.3620 *EE – 0.3795*ID – 0.8405*SI – 4.3187*RC + 
0.3164*VIX + 4.7668*C + 0.0144*T 
 
Overall, our results suggest that the selected variables are quite appropriate. We 
conclude that the evidence so far shows that the expected exchange rate appreciation 
is a robust factor driving hot money flows, independent of how we measure hot 
money flows. However, the significance of our indicators of the real estate and stock 
markets, and the VIX depends on the choice for a particular measure of hot money. 
2.6 Are the determinants of hot money time varying? 
The introduction of several regulations and reforms as described in Section 2.2, may 
have affected the determinants of hot money flows. We consider the influence of the 
QFII system (July, 2003), the exchange rate policy reform (July, 2005), the regulation 
on foreign investment in the real estate market (July, 2006), as well as the global 
financial crisis (September, 2008). Table 2.7 provides the estimated long-run 
coefficients based on selected ARDL models in which we add interaction terms of 
dummies for the launch of QFII system, the reform of the exchange rate policy, the 
regulation on foreign investment in the real estate market, and the start of the global 
financial crisis and the determinants possibly affected by these reforms. The dummies 
are one after the reform, and zero before. 
Columns (2)-(4) in Table 2.7 introduce an interaction term of the dummy for the 
introduction of the QFII system and the stock market index (Dummy1=0 before June 
2003, Dummy1=1 after July 2003). The dummy tests for the influence of the launch 
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of the QFII system which relaxed foreign exchange controls for China’s stock market 
on the relationship between hot money flows and the change of the stock market 
index. Under the QFII scheme, foreign investors are allowed to invest in ‘A’ shares17, 
bonds and warrants listed on China’s domestic stock exchanges, securities investment 
funds and other instruments permitted by the China Securities Regulation 
Commission. The scheme allows a single QFII to hold up to 10 per cent of the ‘A’ 
shares in one listed company while the total foreign shareholding held by a QFII in 
any one listed company cannot exceed 20 per cent. The accumulated investment quota 
for a single QFII is currently capped at US$1 billion. The results show that the 
coefficient of the interaction term of Dummy1*Change of stock market index and the 
coefficient of the Dummy1 are not significant when we use the last three measures, 
suggesting that the launch of QFII did not affect the relationship between hot money 
flows and the stock market index. We drop the first measure since the bound tests 
show that these those variables we considered which could drive hot money flows do 
not have a long-run relationship. QFII requires foreign investors to get approval by 
State Administration of Foreign Exhange before entering the securities market in 
China. Only the approved amount of foreign asset can be converted to Reminbi, 
which can be invested in Chinese stock market through strict supervision18. The strict 
regulation of QFII has not affect the relationship between hot money flows and the 
stock market index. 
Columns (5)-(8) provide the results for testing the effect of the exchange rate 
policy reform in July 2005 on the relationship between hot money flows and expected 
depreciation. An interaction term of the dummy and the change of the expected 
depreciation is introduced (Dummy2=0 before June 2005, Dummy2=1 after July 
2005). Again, the coefficients of the interaction term and the dummy are not 
significant, irrespective of the hot money measure used. Our results therefore do not 
confirm that the impact of speculating on an exchange rate appreciation on hot money 
flows changed after the exchange rate became more flexible, thereby not providing 
support for the views of Ghosh et al. (2012). Our results also do not support the view 
                                                 
 
17
 ‘A’ shares are specialized shares that are traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
18
 Acoording to Management of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors published by China securities 
regulatory commission, the people’s bank of China and state of Administration of foreign exchange. 
32                                                                                   Chapter 2 
 
of Corbo and Hernandez (1996), who argue that a more flexible exchange rate system 
may lead to excessive volatility in hot money. 
Columns (9) and (10) give the results for testing the influence of the regulation on 
foreign investment in the real estate market in 2006M7 on the relationship between 
the change of house prices and hot money flows. We incorporate an interaction term 
of the dummy and the real estate climate index (Dummy3=0 before June 2006, 
Dummy3=1 after July 2006). It is clear from the results that the dummy terms and the 
interaction term are significant when we use the second and third measures of hot 
money as the dependent variable. We drop the first and the fourth measure since the 
bound tests show that those variables we considered which could drive hot money 
flows do not have a long-term relationship. So our results suggest that the regulation 
which aimed at restricting hot money inflows to the real estate market is effective. 
The hot money inflows significantly decreased after the regulation. 
The results for testing the influence from the global financial crisis (2008M9) are 
presented in columns (11) and (12) of Table 2.7. A dummy (Dummy4=0 before 
August 2008, Dummy4=1 after September 2008) is included. The bound tests for our 
first and fourth measures of hot money suggest that there is no long-run relationship 
among the variables we investigated. The results for the other measures show that the 
dummy term is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that hot money inflows 
significantly increased after the start of the global financial crisis. 
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Table 2.7 Estimated long-run coefficients  
























-0.2932** -0.2827** -0.357** -0.1896 -0.3901 -0.3964 -0.3220 
 (0.1122) (0.1107) (0.1592) (0.2127) (0.2423) (0.2392) (0.2272) 
Interest rate 
differential 
0.2706 0.2480 0.3778 0.0836 0.5457* 0.5277* 0.5694** 
 (0.1897) (0.1873) (0.2542) (0.2650) (0.2875) (0.2838) (0.2696) 
Stock market 
index 
0.4422 0.3421 0.4762 0.1339 0.7064 0.7312* 0.6143 
 (2.5019) (2.4712) (3.3328) (0.3979) (0.4438) (0.4381) (0.4162) 
Real estate climate 
index 
23.3948 23.5409* 3.8536 22.5687* 21.6781 21.9733 15.9324 
 (14.3593) (14.1777) (20.6731) (13.1791) (13.7049) (13.5238) (12.8629) 
VIX -0.1049 -0.0855 -0.3210 0.3830 -0.2109 -0.1941 -0.2696 
 (0.3831) (0.3784) (0.5148) (0.4203) (0.3780) (0.3732) (0.3545) 
Dummy1*Stock 
market index 
0.3408 0.4681 0.3888     
 (2.5771) (2.5455) (3.4413)     
Dummy2*Expecte
d depreciation 
   0.0957 0.1124 0.1306 0.0764 
    (0.2616) (0.2817) (0.2781) (0.2642) 
Constant -24.4515 -24.4994 -3.6218 -23.8786* -21.8526 -22.2449 -15.7901 
 (16.0672) (15.8655) (23.0863) (14.2279) (14.6273) (14.4341) (13.7285) 
Trend -0.0073 -0.0068 -0.0155 -0.0180 -0.0401 -0.0398 -0.0372 
 (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0264) (0.0302) (0.0331) (0.0326) (0.0310) 
Dummy1 -0.2611 -0.4120 -0.5969     
 (4.5155) (4.4601) (6.0233)     
Dummy2    1.6263 2.7871 2.8681 2.3405 
    (2.0738) (2.3051) (2.2754) (2.1616) 
Note: The dependent variable is hot money flows. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** means significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Expected depreciation -0.303*** -0.2960*** -0.3718*** -0.3615*** 
 (0.1040) (0.1028) (-3.4764) (0.1060) 
Interest rate differential 0.4714** 0.4451** 0.1084 0.0901 
 (0.2053) (0.2030) (0.6412) (0.1676) 
Stock market index 0.3943 0.4074 1.0783* 1.0816*** 
 (0.5334) (0.5276) (2.8193) (0.3793) 
Real estate climate index -20.8882 -19.7598 28.1206** 28.3598** 
 (28.5596) (28.2496) (2.1603) (12.9055) 
VIX -0.1779 -0.1600 -0.7276* -0.6855* 
 (0.3755) (0.3714) (-1.9186) (0.3761) 
Dummy3*Real estate climate index 55.4565* 54.5607*   
 (30.9685) (30.6347)   
Dummy4*VIX     
     
Constant 22.1278 20.8625 -27.8343** -28.2656** 
 (29.9974) (29.6716) (-2.0410) (13.5204) 
Trend -0.0205 -0.0192 -0.0375** -0.0348** 
 (0.0207) (0.0205) (-2.3476) (0.0158) 
Dummy3 -55.5879* -54.6550*   
 (31.6304) (31.2892)   
Dummy4   3.9124*** 3.7528*** 
    (2.7440) (1.4137) 
Note: The dependent variable is hot money flows. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** means significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
The error correction terms have the right sign (negative) and are statistically 
significant, which confirms the evidence of cointegration among the variables in the 
model.  
2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we apply Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models to establish 
which factors are related to hot money flows from January 2000 to December 2012 to 
China. Our findings suggest that hot money flows are related to the expected 
appreciation of the Renminbi, independent of our measurement of hot money. 
Likewise, the interest differential always turns out to be insignificant. However, the 
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significance of the stock market index, the real estate climate index and the VIX 
depends on our measurement of hot money. In all, the choice of the measure for hot 
money does matter for the significance of its determinants. 
The expected depreciation of the RMB was a crucial factor driving hot money 
flows in China. Its coefficient is consistently significant with a negative sign. The 
exchange rate policy reform in 2005 had no significant impact on this relationship. 
The relationship between the stock market index and hot money flows are positive, 
and have not significantly been affected by the QFII system. The regulation of foreign 
investment in the real estate market had a significant effect on hot money flows. Our 
results suggest that the levels of China’s hot money flows are sensitive to the financial 
crisis. The hot moneys flow to China were significantly higher after the global 
financial crisis for two of our measures of hot money. This result is in accordance 
with the findings of Fratzscher (2012) who reports that external factors were overall 
the main drivers of capital flows during the crisis.  
The ARDL model is a more appropriate methodology when investigating the 
determinants of capital flow since it does not require all variables to be either I(0) or 
I(1). Our results complement those of Cheung and Qian (2010b) and show that the 
relevance of the drivers of hot money in China to some extent depends on the precise 
definition of hot money. We expect this result to be generalized. It is recommended 
that an explicit measurement of hot money should be given while using the expression 
“hot money”.  
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Appendix 
2.A Calculating adjusted foreign reserves 
1. China’s foreign exchange reserves mainly consist of assets denominated in US 
dollar, euro and yen. Foreign reserves are published in US dollars. In case the US 
dollar depreciates, the dollar value of assets denominated in other currencies will 
appreciate, so the stock of foreign reserves in dollars will increase. We assume that 
since 2000, China's foreign exchange reserve currency structure remains the same, i.e. 
the US dollar, euro and yen assets account for 70%, 20% and 10%, respectively 
(Zhang and Xu, 2008) and we adjust the stock of foreign reserves for currency 
fluctuations accordingly. The adjustment of the foreign exchange reserves is shown in 
Figure 2.A.1. 
 




2. China Investment Corporation (CIC) is a sovereign-wealth fund which was 
established in September 2007. CIC received 200 billion USD, funded by special 
government bonds. These were recorded as capital account outflow transactions in the 
BOP statistics. From August 2007 to December 2007, the Ministry of Finance issued 
eight special treasury bonds with a total amount of 15 trillion RMB. We assume that 
the Ministry of Finance buys foreign currency on the day when they issue special 
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totally 207.9 billion US dollars from foreign exchange reserves. Taking into account 
that the CIC has paid 67 billion US dollars to the Chinese central bank in the 
acquisition of Central Huijin, the net amount CIC obtained from the central bank’s 
foreign exchange reserves is 140.9 billion US dollars. We add these special bonds to 
the foreign reserves, and subtract the amount the CIC paid to the central bank. 
 
Table 2.A.1 Special bonds issued from Ministry of Finance 
Number Time Amount in RMB Exchange rate Amount in US dollar  
(billion) 
1 Aug  2007 6000.0 7.5505 79.47 
2 Sep  2007 1033.8 7.5050 ~ 7.5230 13.76 
3 Nov 2007 705.3 7.4336 ~ 7.4624 9.47 
4 Dec 2007 7763.5 7.3790 ~ 7.3797 105.20 
     Source: Zhang and Xu (2008). 
 
3. The Chinese central bank injected funds through Central Huijin to state-owned 
commercial banks and securities companies in order to assist reforms of these banks 
and companies. Central Huijin is an investment company owned by the government 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In order to improve corporate governance 
and initiate reforms of the banking sector, the PRC government operate Huijin as a 
shareholder for the large "big four" state owned banks (Zhang and He, 2009). Most of 
these funds are in foreign currency. Central Huijin was established in December 2003. 
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Table 2.A.2 Injected funds by Central Huijin 
Institution Date Amount Note 
Bank of China Dec, 2003 22.5 billion US dollars  
China Construction Bank  Dec, 2003 20 billion US dollars  
China Jianyin Investment Dec, 2003 2.5 billion US dollars  
Bank of Communications Jun, 2004 3 billion Chinese Yuan 0.36 billion US dollars 
 On loan 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China 
Apr, 2005 15 billion US dollars  
China Galaxy Securities Jun, 2005 10 billion Chinese 
Yuan 
1.21 billion US dollars 
The Export-Import Bank 
of China 
Jul, 2005 5 billion US dollars  
Shenyin & Wanguo 
Securities 
Aug, 2005 2.5 billion Chinese 
Yuan 
0.31 billion US dollars 
+1.5 billion loan in 
Chinese Yuan 
Guotai Junan Securities Aug, 2005 1 billion Chinese Yuan 0.12 billion US dollars 
+1.5 billion loan in 
Chinese Yuan 
China Galaxy Financial 
Holdings   
Aug, 2005 5.5 billion Chinese 
Yuan 
0.68 billion US dollars 
China Everbright Bank Sep, 2005 10 billion Chinese 
Yuan 
1.24 billion US dollars 
China Investment 
Securities 
Sep, 2005 0.35 billion Chinese 
Yuan 
0.04 billion US dollars 
Restructure Nanfang 
Securities, rename as 
CIS 
+8.7 billion loan in 
Chinese Yuan 
China Everbright Bank Nov, 2007 20 billion US dollars  
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China 
China Construction Bank 
Bank of China 






Buy 2 million share in each 
bank 
25.8 million Chinese 
Yuan=3.77 million US 
dollars 
Agriculture Bank of China Nov, 2008 130 billion Chinese 
Yuan 
19.04 billion US dollars 
China Construction Bank From 23, Sep, 
2008 to 28, 
Nov, 2008  
4.55*5.08=23.1 
million Chinese Yuan 
Totally 7.08 million share 
minus 2 million on 23, 
Sep, 2008  
3.37 million US dollars 
China Development Bank Dec, 2008 20 billion US Dollars Restructure 
China Export & Credit 
Insurance Corporation 
Dec, 2012 20 billion Chinese 
Yuan 





4. The People’s Bank of China started requesting major banks to submit deposit 
reserves in US dollars since August 2007. On the balance sheet of the PBOC, foreign 
currency deposits from banks were recorded under “other foreign assets”, rather than 
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“foreign exchange reserves”. We first calculate the amount of the funds which have 
been frozen/released when the reserve ratio changes. Since not every commercial 
bank was subject to the requirements of deposit reserve in US dollars, we use the ratio 
of 70% as suggested by Zhang and Xu (2008). We convert these frozen/released 
amounts into US dollars and add/abstract the amounts to the foreign reserves. 
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(RBM to US 
dollars) 





377415.9 0.12 1887.080 1320.956 7.576 17.436 
2007 
Sep 
382981.2 0.125 1914.906 1340.434 7.516 17.834 
2007 
Oct 
378483.7 0.13 1892.419 1324.693 7.513 17.633 
2007 
Nov 
385507.2 0.135 1927.536 1349.275 7.425 18.171 
2007 
Dec 
389371.1 0.145 3893.711 2725.598 7.372 36.975 
2008 
Jan 
391551.5 0.15 1957.757 1370.430 7.252 18.898 
2008 
Mar 
415693.1 0.155 2078.466 1454.926 7.089 20.523 
2008 
Apr 
422275 0.16 2111.375 1477.963 6.999 21.117 
2008 
May 
431274 0.165 2156.370 1509.459 7.003 21.554 
2008 
Jun 
438989.3 0.175 4389.893 3072.925 6.902 44.524 
2008 
Oct 
458331.5 0.17 -2291.657 -1604.160 6.839 -23.456 
2008 
Dec 
466203.3 0.155 -6993.050 -4895.135 6.843 -71.538 
2010 
Jan 
612877.3 0.16 3064.386 2145.070 6.827 31.419 
2010 
Feb 
622436.8 0.165 3112.184 2178.529 6.833 31.882 
2010 
May 
660756.8 0.17 3303.784 2312.649 6.827 33.876 
2010 
Nov 
708784.3 0.18 7087.843 4961.490 6.637 74.755 
2010 
Dec 
718237.9 0.185 3591.190 2513.833 6.655 37.773 
2011 
Jan 
712828.1 0.19 3564.140 2494.898 6.590 37.859 
2011 
Feb 
726017.6 0.195 3630.088 2541.062 6.597 38.521 
2011 
Mar 
752838.4 0.2 3764.192 2634.934 6.570 40.107 
2011 
Apr 
756262.4 0.205 3781.312 2646.918 6.532 40.525 
2011 
May 
767339 0.21 3836.695 2685.687 6.498 41.333 
2011 
Jun 
786432.6 0.215 3932.163 2752.514 6.480 42.475 
2011 
Dec 
809368.3 0.21 -4046.842 -2832.789 6.371 -44.467 
2012 
Feb 
817398.1 0.205 -4086.990 -2860.893 6.300 -45.414 
2012 
May 
854499.7 0.2 -4272.498 -2990.749 6.322 -47.311 
Source: The People’s Bank of China.  
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2.B Hot money in trade invoicing 
Figure 2.B The ratio of trade surplus to total trade in China 
 
Note: Trade surplus is calculated from substracting Goods, Value of Imports from Goods, Value of 
Exports. Total trade is calculated from summing Goods, Value of Imports and Goods, Value of Exports. 
The average ratio of trade surplus to total trade in the period January 2000 to July 2005 is 0.0413. If the 
ratio in a month is higher than this baseline, the hot money in trade invocing flows in China. If the ratio 
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2.C Error correction representation of the selected ARDL model 
(with interaction terms of reform and crisis dummies and 
determinants) 
 HM2 HM3 HM4 HM1 HM2 HM3 HM4 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
D(Hot money (-1))   -0.3189***     
   (0.1042)     
D(Hot money (-2))   -0.1914**     
   (0.0816)     
D(Expected depreciation) -0.2282*** -0.2226** -0.1993** -0.1486 -0.3067 -0.3154* -0.2644 
 (0.0858) (0.0857) (0.0822) (0.1666) (0.1902) (0.1901) (0.1861) 
D(Interest differential) 0.2106 0.1953 0.2109 0.0655 0.4290* 0.4199* 0.4676** 
 (0.1475) (0.1473) (0.1422) (0.2073) (0.2266) (0.2264) (0.2225) 
D(Stock market index) 0.3442 0.2694 0.2658 0.1049 0.5553 0.5818 0.5045 
 (1.9470) (1.9457) (1.8631) (0.3118) (0.3545) (0.3547) (0.3461) 
D(Real estate climate index) 109.8051*** 108.5057** 98.6328** 17.6832* 112.6728*** 111.5457*** 120.4446*** 
 (41.5936) (41.5439) (40.3632) (10.4637) (41.4576) (41.4041) (40.8259) 
D(VIX) -0.0817 -0.0673 -0.1792 -1.815*** -0.1658 -0.1545 -0.2214 
 (0.2987) (0.2984) (0.2867) (0.4934) (0.2982) (0.2979) (0.2924) 
D(VIX(-1))    -1.3592**    
    (0.5338)    
D(VIX(-2))    0.5242    
    (0.4897)    
D(VIX(-3))    -2.4801***    
    (0.4801)    
D(DM1) 0.2652 0.3686 0.2170     
 (2.0063) (2.0053) (1.9188)     
D(DM2)    -0.2020 0.0883 0.1039 0.0627 
    (0.2018) (0.2216) (0.2215) (0.2171) 
D(Constant) -19.0301 -19.2916 -2.0217 -18.7095 -17.1783 -17.6993 -12.9682 
 (12.8619) (12.8481) (13.0504) (11.2979) (11.8456) (11.8366) (11.5098) 
D(Trend) -0.0057 -0.0054 -0.0087 -0.0141 -0.0315 -0.0317 -0.0306 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0145) (0.0236) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0255) 
D(M1) -0.2032 -0.3244 -0.3332     
 (3.5148) (3.5129) (3.3595)     
D(M2)    1.2743 2.1910 2.2820 1.9222 
    (1.6161) (1.8165) (1.8160) (1.7782) 
ECM (-1) -0.7783*** -0.7874*** -0.5582*** -0.7835*** -0.7861*** -0.7957*** -0.8213*** 
 (0.0801) (0.0804) (0.1145) (0.0765) (0.0799) (0.0802) (0.0802) 
R-Squared 0.4182 0.4216 0.4734 0.6068 0.4245 0.4280 0.4423 
The Dynamics of Hot Money in China                                                    43 
 
R-Bar-Squared 0.3769 0.3806 0.4279 0.5666 0.3836 0.3875 0.4028 
F-stat.  11.2606*** 11.4209*** 11.3573*** 17.6174*** 11.5539*** 11.7242*** 12.4264*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference of hot money flows. ECM denotes error correction 
term obtained from the long-run relationship. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and 




 HM2 HM3 HM2 HM3 
 (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
D(Expected depreciation) -0.2435*** -0.2403*** -0.2992*** -0.2934*** 
 (0.0815) (0.0815) (0.0850) (0.0850) 
D(Interest differential) 0.3787** 0.3613** 0.0872 0.0731 
 (0.1659) (0.1656) (0.1359) (0.1359) 
D(Stock market index) 0.3168 0.3308 0.8677*** 0.8779* 
 (0.4322) (0.4321) (0.3165) (0.3169) 
D(Real estate climate index) 82.5293* 81.4077* 22.6284** 23.0188** 
 (44.7887) (44.7616) (10.9689) (10.9723) 
D(VIX) -0.1429 -0.1299 -0.5855* -0.5564* 
 (0.3022) (0.3020) (0.3093) (0.3088) 
D(DM3) 44.5549* 44.296*   
 (25.3711) (25.3499)   
D(Constant) 17.7779 16.9375 -22.3980* -22.9424** 
 (24.0869) (24.0754) (11.4573) (11.4652) 
D(Trend) -0.0164 -0.0156 -0.0302** -0.0283** 
 (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
D(M3) -44.6603 -44.3725*   
 (25.9230) (25.9004)   
D(M4)   3.1483*** 3.0460** 
   (1.1646) (1.1633) 
ECM (-1) -0.8034*** -0.8119*** -0.8047*** -0.8117*** 
 (0.0809) (0.0811) (0.0802) (0.0805) 
R-Squared 0.4316 0.4348 0.4256 0.4279 
R-Bar-Squared 0.3913 0.3947 0.3935 0.3959 
F-stat.  11.8964*** 12.0495*** 13.2449*** 13.3702*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first difference of hot money flows. ECM denotes error correction 
term obtained from the long-run relationship. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** means significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Chapter 3 
Sudden Stops and Currency Crashes 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In a world with high capital mobility, the threat of sudden stops and currency 
crashes is a key issue in international finance and economics (Obstfeld and Taylor, 
2004; Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011). A sudden stop refers to an episode with a 
sharp contraction in international capital inflows (Calvo et al., 2004). A currency 
crash refers to a period with a large drop of the nominal exchange rate that is 
accompanied by a substantial increase in the rate of depreciation (Frankel and Rose, 
1996). Although some studies (e.g. Radelet et al., 1998; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 
2000) use sudden stops and currency crises interchangeably, it should be clear from 
these definitions that sudden stops and currency crashes are not identical.  
Sometimes sudden stops occur simultaneously with currency crashes. Prominent 
examples are the crises in Mexico (1994), Brazil (1998), and Argentina (2001). 
According to Calvo and Mishkin (2003), between 1992 and 2001 twelve sudden stops 
in emerging economies were associated with devaluations. In eight cases, a sudden 
stop occurred first and was followed by devaluation, while in four cases devaluation 
was followed by a sudden stop. Likewise, Calvo et al. (2004) provide evidence that 
capital flow reversals mostly precede depreciations. Their sample includes 15 
emerging economies and 17 advanced economies during the 1990-2001 period. Using 
a dataset on capital inflows spanning 16 economies from 1870 to 1914, Catão (2007) 
concludes that currency crashes are either concomitant with sudden stops or follow 
sudden stops with a one- or two-year lag. However, in other circumstances, 
currencies can be invariant to the turmoil of sudden stops. Hutchison and Noy (2006) 
find that it is not uncommon to have capital flow reversals without currency crashes. 
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Efremidze et al. (2011) examine several sudden stops and currency crises from 1990 
to 2003 for 25 emerging markets. They find that less than half of the sudden stops are 
accompanied by currency crises, while less than 60 percent of the currency crises 
coincide with sudden stops. In general, sudden stops appear to precede currency 
crises. Using a sample from 1880 to 1913, Bordo et al. (2010) report that about 40 
percent of the sudden stops are followed by a financial crisis (debt, currency or 
banking crisis) within three years. These results suggest that several economies have 
gone through sudden stops without facing currency crashes. In sum, sharp reductions 
in international capital inflows are not automatically followed by severe 
depreciations.  
The current international financial crisis saw an unprecedented collapse in 
international capital flows (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). Several economies, such 
as Iceland, Russia, Romania, and the Ukraine, suffered severely from sudden stops. 
Since sudden stops followed by currency crashes lead to higher output losses than 
sudden stops without devaluations (Shankar, 2007; Sula and Willett, 2009; Efremidze 
et al. 2011), it is important to identify the factors that determine whether sudden stops 
are concomitant with or followed by currency crashes. That is the first purpose of our 
research. To this extent, we identify sudden stops on the basis of Calvo et al. (2004) 
and group them in two major categories: sudden stops followed by a currency crash 
and those not followed by a currency crash.  
We employ two complementary methodologies to explore the data. First, we use 
an event study approach inspired by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). Secondly, we 
estimate a logit model inspired by Frankel and Rose (1996). We examine whether the 
two types of crisis are driven by different factors. The second purpose of this chapter 
is to investigate the role of the exchange rate regime in place. The latter is motivated 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) who argue that the impact of a sudden stop differs 
across exchange rate regimes, because a country with a fixed exchange rate regime is 
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unable to offset the domestic demand shock through expansionary monetary policy 
and/or accomplish real exchange rate adjustment through nominal depreciation. We 
examine whether the drivers of both types of crisis differ across different exchange 
rate regimes.  
Our results suggest that low trade openness, shallow financial development, and 
current account imbalances increase the likelihood that a sudden stop will be 
followed by a currency crash. In addition, our results suggest that the exchange rate 
regime in place matters. More specifically, the current account plays a role in the 
three types of exchange rate regime that we distinguish (i.e. hard pegs, other pegs and 
intermediate regimes). Budget deficits are significant in hard pegs, while trade 
openness plays a role in both hard and other pegs. The first generation currency crisis 
models (Krugman, 1979) explains the channels through which fiscal imbalances 
affect the exchange rate. Countries are prone to currency crisis when government 
expenditures grow faster than the government revenue during reserve losses and real 
exchange rate appreciations, the latter is more serious when the trade openness is less. 
Financial development is essential in both other pegs and intermediate regimes. This 
evidence verifies the findings of Whale (1937) and Ford (1962) regarding the 
importance of the domestic financial imperfections in propagating capital account 
shocks and accounting for cross-country differences in macroeconomic adjustment. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents a 
review of the literature review on how sudden stops are related to currency crashes. 
Section3.3 defines and analyzes the variables used in our analysis. Sections 3.4 and 
3.5 present the empirical results, while Section 3.6 analyses the role of the exchange 
rate regime. Section 3.7 concludes. 
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3.2 How are sudden stops related to currency crashes? 
There is an impressive amount of literature on currency crashes (see Frankel and 
George (2010) for a recent overview) but only a few studies relate to both sudden 
stops and currency crashes. We will discuss these studies to identify variables to be 
included in our empirical analysis.  
Calvo (1998) studies the mechanisms through which a sudden stop in 
international credit flows may bring about financial and balance of payment crises. A 
slowdown in capital inflows is typically associated with an increase in domestic 
interest rates. If the central bank tries to cushion the increase in interest rates, the 
stock of high-powered money will increase, which, in turn may cause downward 
pressure on the exchange rate.  
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) argue that unless the country can draw on 
official foreign exchange reserves or relatively liquid assets held abroad by the 
private sector, sudden stops typically will be associated with currency crashes. 
However, there is a difference between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, 
because the exchange rate interventions by the central bank differ. Under a hard peg, 
the central bank will defend the exchange rate when capital inflows reverse. The 
defense mechanisms used include running down on its reserves and increasing the 
short-term interest rate (Eichengreen et al., 1995). If an economy has a high level of 
reserves, a reversal in capital inflows will not induce devaluation because the central 
bank can defend the currency successfully by running down the country’s reserves (cf. 
Lucas, 1990 and Drazen, 1999). By increasing the short-term interest rates, the 
reversal of capital flows may be stopped. However, Radelet et al. (1998) doubt the 
effectiveness of increasing interest rates for stabilizing the currency in case of a panic. 
As shown by Flood and Jeanne (2005), interest rate increases can be successful only 
if fiscal policy is sustainable, as the increase of the interest rate will increase the 
government’s budget deficit. In all, it appears that the level of international currency 
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reserves is one of the factors that may determine whether sudden stops are followed 
by currency crashes in hard pegs (Cowan et al., 2008). Furthermore, the effectiveness 
of increasing the short-term interest rate depends on whether the country’s fiscal 
policy is sustainable. If the government has a large fiscal deficit, there is no room to 
use fiscal policy to combat external shocks (Catão, 2007). 
In contrast to fixed exchange rate regimes, a sudden stop is a contractionary 
shock in freely floating exchange rate regimes. Here, a sudden stop immediately 
drives down the exchange rate because the government is not obliged to stabilize the 
currency in freely floating regimes. An economy’s ability to absorb a sudden decline 
in capital inflows depends on its level of financial development (Cowan et al., 2008). 
Catão (2007) gives the following explanation: Firstly, in case of shallow domestic 
bond markets a decline in capital inflow reduces firms’ access to finance. Secondly, 
illiquid domestic markets exacerbate the risk of fire sales and bank runs in the wake 
of sudden stops. Catão (2007) finds that economies with seemingly better-regulated 
banks and deeper financial markets are better able to successfully manage a sudden 
stop while keeping their currency pegs.  
In sum, the determinants of sudden stops leading to currency crashes can be 
classified as: trade openness (Calvo, 1998; Cowan et al., 2008), financial sector 
development (Catão, 2007; Cowan et al., 2008), current account imbalances 
(Milesi-Ferretti, 2000), level of foreign reserves (Catão, 2007; Cowan et al., 2008), 
and monetary and fiscal policies (Flood and Jeanne, 2005; Catão, 2007). In addition, 
the exchange rate regime plays a role. In the following sections, we define proxies for 
these variables and use both the event study approach and logit models to determine 
whether the impact of the variables affecting sudden stops followed by a currency 
crash differs across exchange rate regimes.  




Several approaches have been used to define sudden stops. As the definitions 
suggested by Edwards (2004a, 2004b, 2005), Efremidze and Tomohara (2011), Sula 
(2010) and Guidotti et al. (2004) are only applicable to annual data, we follow Calvo 
et al. (2004) and identify a sudden stop as a phase that meets the following conditions. 
First, it contains at least one observation where the year-on-year fall in capital inflows 
is at least two standard deviations below the sample mean. Second, the sudden stop 
phase ends once the annual change in capital inflows exceeds one standard deviation 
below the sample mean. For the sake of symmetry, the start of a sudden stop phase is 
determined by the first time the annual change in capital inflows falls one standard 
deviation below the mean. In addition, Calvo et al. (2004) apply a requirement for 
output contraction to identify sudden stops, which is also widely used (Calvo et al. 
2008; Durdu et al. 2009; Bordo et al. 2010). Since we intend to capture episodes of 
net capital inflow contractions, we do not require GDP contractions to characterize 
sudden stop events.   
Several methods have been used to identify currency crashes19. We employ the 
widely used approach as suggested by Frankel and Rose (1996), who define a 
currency crash as an annual nominal depreciation of at least 25 percent of the 
currency which is also at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation. 
However, instead of using the bilateral US dollar exchange rate, we use the SDR 
exchange rate to mitigate the influence of the US dollar on currency fluctuations (see 
also Rose and Spiegel 2011, and Gagnon, 2009).  
                                                 
 
19
 For instance, Gagnon (2010) qualifies an exchange rate depreciation exceeding 15 percent in four 
quarters as a currency crash provided the depreciation does not exceed 15 percent in any of the 
previous four quarters, while Fratzscher et al. (2011) identify a currency crash by using the criterion 
that the annual rate of depreciation of the real effective exchange rate exceeds 10 percent. 
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We use monthly data for the January 1980 to December 2008 period from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. We construct net capital flows by netting out 
the trade balance from changes in foreign reserves. For 85 economies we have data 
on capital flows for at least 5 years. We find that there are 158 occasions of sudden 
stops in these economies (see Appendix 3.A). Thus, on average, in the past thirty 
years, each economy has experienced about two sudden stops. Since we have to 
identify whether there is a currency crash during the 36 months following a sudden 
stop, we use data on currency crashes from January 1980 to December 2010. We 
employ changes in the end-of-period monthly home currency per SDR to identify 
currency crashes. For 16 out of the 158 sudden stops we lack appropriate data. 
Among the remaining 142 sudden stops, 52 are followed by currency crashes in the 
following 36 months, and 90 of them are not followed by currency crashes. Thus, in 
our sample, 36.6 percent of the sudden stops precede currency crashes. These 
findings are similar to those of Efremidze et al. (2011) and Bordo et al. (2010).  
Using the criteria of the IMF to classify economies, there are 23 advanced 
economies in our sample (see notes in Appendix 3.A for the classification). These 
economies have 47 sudden stops in the 1980-2008 periods (see Table 3.1). However, 
there are only eight sudden stops with currency crashes in this subsample. Thus, the 
ratio of advanced economies having sudden stops with currency crashes is 17 percent. 
This is significantly lower than the ratio for less advanced economies (46.3 percent). 
These characteristics are in line with the findings of Catão (2007). They are also 
consistent with the consensus view that less advanced economies are more vulnerable 
to a financial crisis because of mutually reinforcing structural weaknesses 
(Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012), such as faulty governance structures, overregulated 
markets, extensive dollarization of domestic and external liabilities, and “fear of 
floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). According to Cowan et al. (2008), a country’s 
ability to absorb shocks due to lower capital inflows depends on its level of financial 
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development and its stock of gross international assets. The more advanced 
economies are in a better position to deal with financial shocks along both 
dimensions.  
 
Table 3.1 Sudden stops with/without currency crash in advanced and less 
advanced economies 
Sudden stops:  Advanced economies Less advanced 
economies 
Total 
followed by currency crash 8 (17%) 44 (46.3%) 52 (36.6%) 
not followed by currency crash  39 (83%) 51 (53.7%) 90 (63.4%) 
Total 47 95 142 
Note: Advanced economies are listed in the note of Appendix 3.A. 
 
Table 3.2 compares the frequency of sudden stops with and sudden stops without 
a currency crash in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the most recent decade, the 
frequency of sudden stops with a currency crash is 4.8 percent, which is significantly 
lower than that in the 1980s and 1990s (59.6 and 37.2 percent, respectively).  
 
Table 3.2 Sudden stops with/without currency crash in different decades 
Sudden stops:  1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008 1980-2008 
followed by currency crash 34 (59.6%) 16 (37.2%) 2 (4.8%) 52 (36.6%) 
not followed by currency crash  23 (40.4%) 27 (62.8%) 40 (95.2%) 90 (63.4%) 
Total 57 43 42 142 
Note: 1980-1989 and 1990-1999 include data for 10 years; 2000-2008 include data for 9 years. 
 
As we want to examine whether there are systematic differences across countries 
having a different exchange rate regime, we need to classify countries according to 
the exchange rate regime in place. The classification of exchange rate regimes is a 
controversial issue in international economics. For many years, empirical studies on 
52                                                                                   Chapter 3 
 
 
exchange rate regimes relied on the IMF’s de jure classification. However, Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) find that, in practice, many exchange rate regimes did not function 
according to the de jure rules. Consequently, several authors have proposed de facto 
classifications20. We use the approach suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as 
updated by Ilzetzki et al. (2011), which covers data from 1946 until 2010. This 
approach is based on market determined exchange rates rather than official exchange 
rates. There are six categories of exchange rate regimes in this classification scheme 
(see Appendix 3.B for details). We leave out two categories, namely Freely falling 
and Dual market in which parallel market data is missing, as these are not relevant21 
in our sample. 
The frequency of sudden stops with a currency crash under a hard peg, other pegs, 
intermediate regimes (i.e. category 3 in Appendix 3.B) and freely floating exchange 
rate regimes are 24.5, 36.7, 20.4 and 20.0 percent, respectively (see Table 3.3). This 
suggests that countries belonging to the other peg regimes category are most fragile 
to currency crashes in the face of sudden stops. These results seem to support the 
“bipolar” view (Fischer, 2001; Eichengreen, 1994), according to which in a world of 
increasing trade openness and international capital mobility, only the two extreme 
exchange regimes (hard pegs, such as dollarization, currency boards and monetary 
unions) or freely floating exchange rates will survive.  
 
  
                                                 
 
20According to Alesina and Wagner (2006), the three most commonly used methods in classifying 
exchange regimes are those from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
and Shambaugh (2004). 
21
 Freely falling is a category for countries with annual inflation rates above 40%. Dual market in 
which parallel market data is missing is a category with data not available. 
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Table 3.3 Sudden stops with/without a currency crash in different exchange rate 
regimes 




















not followed by 












Total 42 39 38 5 7 131 
Note: de facto exchange rate regimes before the year of sudden stops (see Appendix 3.B). 
 
Based on the studies discussed in Section 3.2, we identify nine potential 
determinants of sudden stops with and without currency crashes (see Appendix 3.C 
for details). Trade to GDP and exports to GDP relate to trade openness.22 We also 
include the current account to GDP and financial openness as provided by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The inflation rate is our monetary policy indicator, while 
claims on central government as a share of GDP is our indicator of fiscal policy. The 
proxies for financial sector development are the ratio of M2 to GDP and domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP. The international 
reserves indicator used is total reserves in months of imports.  
3.4 Event study approach 
In this section, we compare the behavior of these nine variables before and after each 
of the two types of crises we defined above. Following Gourinchas and Obstfeld 
(2012) and Balteanu and Fernandez (2011), we use an event study approach, which 
allows us to control for country characteristics. We estimate the conditional 
                                                 
 
22
 We also considered the black market premium as a variable for the overvalued exchange rate 
(Caporale and Cerrato, 2008), but due to lack of sufficient data we could not include it in the analysis. 
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expectation of yit as a function of the temporal distance from the crisis, relative to a 
“tranquil times” baseline. yit is the variable of interest and subscript i refers to the 
country and subscript t to the period. Our estimation considers two types of crisis: 
sudden stops without currency crashes and sudden stops with currency crashes. The 
fixed-effects panel specification is as follows: 
yit = Įij + ȕsoįso + ȕswįsw + İit                                      (3.1) 
where įsj denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 when country i is s periods away 
from a crisis of type j in period t. The index j denotes the crisis type, i.e. a sudden 
stop without a currency crash (j=o) and a sudden stop with a currency crash (j=w). 
We follow Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and set the crisis window to 11 years (5 
years before and 5 years after) so as to allow for the adjustment following a crisis. 
The regression also allows for country fixed effects Įi. The error term İit captures all 
the remaining variation. 
The coefficients ȕsj measures to what extent the variable y behaves differently 
during a crisis of type j relative to “tranquil times” over the event window − 5  s  5. 
Since the “tranquil time” baseline is common to both types of crisis, we are 
measuring the impact of both crises relative to a common level. It shows how the 
variables we are interested in evolve over different crisis episodes. In particular, a 
comparison of the ȕ coefficients for both types of crisis shows to what extent the 
behavior of a variable differs across the two types of crisis. In order to minimize the 
effect of heterogeneity across countries and to deal with extreme observations, we 
normalize our variables by subtracting the population mean from the individual raw 
data and then divide the difference by the population standard deviation. Due to 
missing data, we have to drop 10 economies. The estimation results are shown in 
Figures 3.1-3.9. 
The results for trade openness, i.e. trade and exports both as share of GDP, are 
presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. The beginning of a crisis is indicated 
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by t. Figures 3.1-3.2 show that in the years preceding sudden stops without currency 
crashes, trade openness tends to be higher than in tranquil times. In addition, trade 
openness is moving upwards before crises. By contrast, in the run up to sudden stops 
with currency crashes, trade openness is lower relative to tranquil times. The patterns 
are consistent with the view of Calvo (1998) and Cowan et al. (2008), who argue that 
the effect of a sudden stop on the real exchange rate will be larger in economies with 
less openness.  
As shown in Figure 3.3, there is a significant improvement in the current account 
before a sudden stop without a currency crash. In contrast, economies experiencing a 
sudden stop with a currency crash were mostly running higher current account 
deficits relative to tranquil times.  
The results for financial sector indicators, which include financial openness, M2 
as percentage of GDP and domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a 
percentage of GDP, are plotted in Figures 3.4-3.6. Figures 3.4-3.6 suggest that 
economies experiencing sudden stops with a currency crash have lower financial 
openness and a lower financial development level than economies experiencing a 
sudden stop without a currency crash. Additionally, both types of crisis are associated 
with significant prior build-ups in credit relative to GDP, M2 to GDP and financial 
openness. As such, our results suggest that a booming financial sector is a common 
feature of both types of crisis. Furthermore, we find that financial development and 
financial openness are comparatively low in samples with sudden stops followed by 
currency crashes.  
Figure 3.7 reports our findings for inflation. The inflation rate in the case of 
sudden stops with currency crashes is higher than in sudden stops without currency 
crashes. Moreover, the inflation rate appears elevated, relative to tranquil times, until 
three years ahead of sudden stops with currency crashes. However, it is depressed 
compared to tranquil times, before sudden stops without currency crashes.  
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Figure 3.8 reports our results for claims on central government as percentage of 
GDP. The public finance situation is worse (compared to tranquil times) in both types 
of crisis. However, the public finance position is deteriorating before sudden stops 
with currency crashes, whereas it is ameliorating before sudden stops without 
currency crashes.  
Figure 3.9 shows our findings for reserves. It is clear that the level of reserves is 
higher in sudden stops without currency crashes compared to sudden stops with 
currency crashes. In addition, reserves are increasing before sudden stops without 
currency crashes, but decreasing before sudden stops with currency crashes. This 
result is in line with the expectation that if a country cannot draw on official foreign 
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Figure 3.3 Current account 
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Figure 3.4 Financial openness 
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Note: SO = a sudden stop without a currency crash; SW = a sudden stop with a currency crash. 
 
To summarize our findings so far, we observe clear differences in the 
developments of various indicators between countries which had a sudden stop 
followed by a currency crash and those which had a sudden stop which was not 
followed by a currency crash. The latter had a higher level of trade openness, a higher 
current account surplus, a higher level of financial development and financial 
openness, less expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, and they had more 
international reserves.  
As explained in Section 3.2, the exchange rate regime may also affect the factors 
which influence whether or not a sudden stop is followed by a currency crash. In the 
remainder of this section, we therefore examine developments under different 
exchange rate regimes.  
For three types of exchange rate regimes, we examine whether our variables of 
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currency crash and in the run-up to a sudden stop without a currency crash compared 
to tranquil periods. The category of freely floating exchange rates is dropped in our 
analysis because of data limitations. In total, we have 27 figures (9 variables for three 
categories of exchange rate regime). Here we only show the results for the four 
variables for which the results show the largest differences across the three exchange 
rate regimes considered, i.e. trade to GDP, M2 as percentage of GDP, claims on 
central government as percentage of GDP, and total reserves in months of imports 
(The results for the other five variables are shown in Appendix 3.D). Figures 
3.10-3.12 show the results for trade of GDP for hard pegs, other pegs and 
intermediate regimes separately, Figures 3.13-3.15 give the results for M2 as 
percentage of GDP, Figures 3.16-3.18 report the outcomes for claims on central 
government as percentage of GDP, while Figures 3.19-3.21 provide our findings for 
total reserves in months of imports.  
Figures 3.10-3.12 show clear differences between two types of crisis in hard pegs 
and other pegs; however, this difference does not show up in intermediate regimes. In 
hard pegs, sudden stops followed by a currency crash have a high level of trade 
openness, but trade openness declines before the crisis. In the category of other pegs, 
a sudden stop with a currency crash coincides with low trade openness.  
The results for M2 as percentage of GDP are shown in Figures 3.13-3.15. There 
is no markedly dissimilar pattern for hard pegs and other pegs with respect to the 
level of financial development. However, in intermediate regimes countries facing a 
sudden stop with a currency crash have shallow financial markets.  
Figures 3.15-3.18 show the results for claims on government as percentage of 
GDP. In hard pegs, a deterioration of the government’s fiscal position is observed 
three years ahead of a crisis. However, in the categories of other pegs and 
intermediate regime, the government’s fiscal position is not different in both types of 
crisis.  
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The results for reserves are provided in Figures 3.19-3.21. In hard pegs, reserves 
are much lower compared to tranquil times in both types of crisis, although this effect 
seems stronger in sudden stops with a currency crash compared to sudden stops 
without a currency crash. This pattern is not visible in other pegs and intermediate 
regimes. It is clear that lack of sufficient reserves marks currency crashes in hard 
pegs unlike the categories of other pegs and intermediate regimes. 
These results are in line with our expectations. Under a hard peg, trade openness 
seems poisonous especially when reserves are limited and fiscal policy is 
expansionary. Under a more flexible exchange rate regime, shallow financial markets 
create vulnerabilities. The channels through which fiscal imbalances affect the 
exchange rate have been explained in the first generation currency crisis models 
which assumes a fixed exchange rate regime (Krugman, 1979). Countries are prone to 
currency crisis when government expenditures grow faster than the government 
revenue during reserve losses and real exchange rate appreciations, the latter is more 
often when the trade openness is less. Economies with deeper financial markets 
typically have a smoother broad money multiplier and can manage to maintain a 
consistently higher backing of domestic bank liabilities or paper money. These 
economies were the ones that managed to overcome the sudden stop shock while 
keeping their currency stable. This evidence verifies Whale (1937) and Ford (1962) 
of the importance of the domestic financial imperfections in propagating capital 
account shocks and accounting for cross-country differences in macroeconomic 
adjustment. 
 








t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5







t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5








t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5






t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Figure 3.13 Money and quasi 
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The event study approach as presented in this section has two limitations. First, 
this approach is based on bivariate models. Second, this approach does not allow us to 
assess statistical significance. We therefore also estimate panel discrete-choice 
models.  
3.5 Logit model estimates    
In this section, we estimate panel logit models with country fixed effects. We assume 
that there exists an unobservable variable yit* that indicates whether economy i has a 
sudden stop with a currency crash or not between periods t + 1 and t + k. We vary k 
between one and three years (Bussière and Fratzscher, 2006; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 
2012). This unobservable indicator yit* is a linear function of a vector of n exogenous 
determinants, xit, a constant a and a random error term İit. xit stands for the factors 
which might be related to whether a sudden stop with a currency crash or a sudden 
stop without a currency crash takes place. We assume that a country has a sudden stop 
with a currency crash if the unobservable indicator is greater than zero. 
 
    ݀௜௧ ൌ  ൜ͳ݂݅ݕ௜௧ ൐ ͲͲ݂݅ݕ௜௧ ൑ Ͳ      
 
Thus, the probability of observing a sudden stop with a currency crash between 
periods t + 1 and t + k, i.e. the probability that dit =1, is  
 
ሺ݀௜௧ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ሺݕ௜௧כ ൐ Ͳሻ ൌ ሺܽ ൅ ܾᇱݔ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ ൐ Ͳሻ ൌ ሺߝ௜௧ ൐
െܽ െ ܾᇱݔ௜௧ሻ. 
 
Using the logistic distribution function, the probability of a sudden stop with a 
currency crash is as follows: 
 
ሺ݀௜௧ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ሺߝ௜௧ ൏ ܽ ൅ ܾᇱݔ௜௧ሻ ൌ
ሺߙ ൅ ߚᇱݔ௜௧ሻ
ͳ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ߚᇱݔ௜௧ሻ 
where Į is a constant, ȕ is a vector of parameters. The dependent variable is a dummy 
which is one if a sudden stop is followed by a currency crash and zero if a sudden stop 
is not followed by a currency crash.  




The high correlation between the potential determinants as shown in Table 3.4 
restricts us from using them in a logit model simultaneously. In order to deal with this 
problem, we employ factor analysis. Factor analysis provides a convenient method of 
rank reduction. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO = 0.56) index and Bartlett’s test (p = 
0.000) suggest that factor analysis is applicable in our sample. Therefore, we use 
factors derived from the factor analysis as explanatory variables in our logit models. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There is no single “best” criterion for dropping the least important factors (Jacobs 
et al., 2008). Previous studies depend on one or more of the following criteria to 
determine how many factors to retain. The Kaiser criterion drops all factors with 
eigenvalues below one. The Cattell scree test suggests selecting the number of factors 
that corresponds to the curve (the eigenvalues are plotted on the vertical axis and the 
factors on the horizontal axis) where the smooth decrease of eigenvalues appears to 
level off to the right of the plot. The parallel analysis is based on the Monte Carlo 
simulation. Essentially, the procedure first creates a random dataset with the same 
numbers of observations and variables as the original data. Secondly, a correlation 
matrix is computed from the randomly generated dataset and then the eigenvalues of 
the correlation matrix are computed. If the eigenvalues from the random data are 
larger than the eigenvalues from the factor analysis, we know that the components or 
factors are mostly random noise. In general, the scree test provides a lower bound on 
the number of factors, while the Kaiser Criterion offers a higher bound (Jacobs et al., 
2008). We use parallel analysis since Hayton et al. (2004) present evidence that 
parallel analysis is one of the most accurate factor retention methods.. This indicates 
that there are at least four factors (See Appendix 3.F). Table 3.D.1 provides 
eigenvalues and shows the cumulative variance explained. Table 3.D.2 shows the 
factor loadings and unique variance of the variables used. Table 3.D.3 lists rotated 
factor loadings and unique variances.23 Table 3.D.3 shows that the first factor 
captures trade openness, as trade and exports have high loadings. The second factor 
captures financial development, as the following variables have high loadings: 
financial openness, money and quasi money (M2) as percentage of GDP and domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector (as percentage of GDP). The third factor takes up 
the current account, while the fourth factor is public finance, with high loadings of 
claims on central government and total reserves in months of imports. We arrive at 
four factors according to the rotated factor loadings in Table 3.D.3 that are used as 
explanatory variables in the logit model to derive our base model. Table 3.D.4 shows 
the correlation between each factor. 
                                                 
 
23
 The varimax rotation keeps the axes orthogonal to one another and moves them into a position 
where each variable loads onto one factor as highly as possible while loading onto the second factor as 
low as possible. 




We test the null hypothesis that all coefficients (except for the constant) are equal 
to zero using likelihood ratio statistics. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2000) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), we drop crisis observations and the 
post-crisis observations for five years afterward, so as to avoid the post-crisis bias 
discussed in Bussière and Fratzscher (2006). The results of the panel logit model are 
shown in Table 3.5. The likelihood ratio suggests that our models as a whole are 
statistically significant. The entries in the table present the marginal effects on the 
probability of a sudden stop followed by a currency crash (expressed in percentage 
points), evaluated at the mean of the data. The associated z-statistics, which test the 
null hypothesis of no effect for each factor are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.5 Logit model: marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 k=1 k=2 k=3 
 SO SW SO SW SO SW 
Openness 
 
0.170*** -0.229*** 0.153*** -0.232*** 0.139*** -0.212*** 
 (3.52) (-3.71) (4.25) (-4.95) (4.46) (-5.20) 
Financial 
development 
0.195*** 0.006 0.205*** -0.014 0.188*** -0.042 
 (3.47) (0.09) (4.87) (-0.28) (5.23) (-0.98) 
Current 
account 
0.362*** -0.072 0.306*** -0.108 0.267*** -0.103* 
 (5.29) (-1.03) (5.85) (-1.88) (5.85) (-1.99) 
Public 
finance 
0.012 0.070 -0.006 0.064 -0.033 0.068 
 (0.18) (1.02) (-0.11) (1.18) (-0.68) (1.41) 
N 500 392 567 427 624 455 
Log 
likelihood 
-97.968*** -72.551*** -171.834*** -119.402*** -229.201*** -153.187*** 
Note: The dependent variable is a sudden stop with/without a currency crash. SO = 1 when a sudden 
stop is not followed by a currency crash between periods t + 1 and t + k, while SW = 1 when a sudden 
stop is followed by a currency crash between periods t + 1 and t + k. z statistics for each variable are in 
parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Marginal effect is for 
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, the coefficients refer to marginal effects at mean.  
 
The panel logit estimates yield statistically and economically significant effects 
of our key variables. The results are consistent with the outcomes of our event study 
approach and indicate that several of the indicators behave differently before the two 
types of crisis, notably trade openness, financial development and current account 
imbalances. An increase in trade openness significantly increases the chances of a 
sudden stop without a currency crash, but it decreases the chance of a sudden stop 




with a currency crash. The marginal effect is sizable: If openness increases by 1%, the 
probability of a sudden stop without a currency crash increases by 0.14-0.17 percent. 
If openness increases by 1%, the probability of a sudden stop with a currency crash 
decreases by 0.21-0.23 percent. The coefficients for current account imbalances are 
smaller. A 1 percent improvement of the current account balance decreases the 
probability of a sudden stop followed by a currency crash by 0.1 percent. The sign of 
financial development is in line with our expectations. A well-developed financial 
sector increases the probability of a sudden stop without a currency crash. It appears 
that our indicator of public finances is not significant.  
To wrap up, in the logit model, trade openness, financial development and current 
account imbalances are significantly related to whether or not sudden stops are 
followed by currency crashes.  
As shown in Section 3.4, the exchange rate regime may affect the factors which 
influence whether or not a sudden stop is followed by a currency crash. We therefore 
examine developments under different exchange rate regimes in logit models as 
shown in Table 3.6.  
 
  




Table 3.6 Logit model: marginal effects in various exchange rate regimes 
Exchange 
rate regime 
 k=1 k=2 k=3 
 crisis type SO SW SO SW SO SW 
Hard pegs Trade openness -0.0001 -0.438 0.023 -0.365*** -0.024* -0.278*** 
 (-0.00) (-1.13) (0.28) (-3.37) (-0.37) (-2.35) 
Financial 
development 
0.190 0.249 0.201 0.206 0.159 0.058 
 (1.39) (1.05) (1.98) (1.45) (1.90) (0.47) 
Current account  0.096 -0.380 0.054 -0.410*** -0.022* -0.261** 
 (0.57) (-1.17) (0.42) (-3.33) (-0.22) (-2.02) 
Public finance 0.045 -0.334 0.149 -0.246 0.033 -0.323** 
 (0.24) (-1.12) (1.24) (-1.61) (0.32) (-1.88) 
Number of 
Observations 
74 45 87 53 100 58 
Log likelihood -16.283 -4.510*** -28.544 -14.714*** -39.547 -21.213** 
Other pegs Trade openness 0.333** -0.324 0.516*** -0.239 0.454*** -0.117 
 (2.46) (-1.17) (4.98) (-1.19) (5.23) (-0.68) 
Financial 
development 
0.210*** -0.048 0.197** -0.056 0.253*** -0.046 
 (2.77) (-0.38) (1.81) (-0.53) (2.72) (-0.46) 
Current account  0.411** 0.091 0.459*** 0.112 0.419*** 0.076 
 (2.58) (0.54) (4.35) (0.72) (4.21) (0.52) 
Public finance 0.042 -0.165 0.105 -0.305 0.068 -0.267 
 (0.49) (-0.62) (0.97) (-1.29) (0.69) (-1.32) 
Number of 
Observations 
126 49 157 57 207 63 
Log likelihood -6.738*** -12.742 -28.775*** -20.847 -49.510*** -26.580 
Intermediate Trade openness -0.041  -0.008  0.053  
 (-0.36)  (-0.09)  (0.72)  
Financial 
development 
0.194  0.270**  0.315***  
 (1.36)  (2.30)  (2.94)  
Current account  0.471***  0.515***    
 (2.59)  (2.92)  (2.76)  
Public finance 0.026  0.541  0.056  
 (0.15)  (0.40)  (0.46)  
Number of 
Observations 
63   94   103   
Log likelihood -17.026*** -25.794*** -25.794*** 
Note: The dependent variable is a sudden stop with/without a currency crash. SO = 1 when a sudden 
stop is not followed by a currency crash between periods t + 1 and t + k, while SW = 1 when a sudden 
stop is followed by a currency crash between periods t + 1 and t + k. z statistics for each variable are in 
parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Marginal effect is for 
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, the coefficients refer to marginal effects at mean. 
 
The results for the hard peg regime show that low trade openness, current account 
and budget deficits increase the probability of a sudden stop with a currency crash. 




The results for the other pegs category indicate that the probability of having a sudden 
stop with a currency crash increases when trade openness is low, the current account 
is in deficit and the financial sector is shallow. In intermediate regimes, financial 
development and current account imbalances appear as significant factors associated 
with sudden stops followed by currency crashes.  
Some of the multivariate models for a specific exchange rate regime are not 
significant which is probably due to the small sample size. Still, most results are in 
line with the findings of the event study approach.  
3.6 Conclusions 
We investigate what determines whether or not a sudden stop, i.e. a decrease in 
international capital inflows, is followed by a currency crash, i.e. a large drop in the 
nominal exchange rate accompanied by an increasing rate of depreciation. Sometimes 
sudden stops occur simultaneously with currency crashes, but on other occasions the 
exchange rate does not respond to a sudden stop at all. We employ a sample of 85 
countries in the period 1980-2012, yielding a total of 158 sudden stops. In our sample, 
about one third of the sudden stops were followed by a currency crash and most of 
these took place in less advanced economies. The frequency of sudden stops with 
currency crashes is smaller in the 21st century than in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Our results are based on the event study approach and logit estimates. The results 
of both approaches are fairly similar. We observe that economies with low trade 
openness, a shallow financial sector, and current account imbalances are most prone 
to sudden stops with currency crashes. As such, we complement the existing research 
of Catão (2007), Efremidze and Tomohara (2011) and Efremidze et al. (2011). We 
also find that the exchange rate regime in place affects which factors determine 
whether or not a sudden stop is followed by a currency crash. Our results suggest that 
in order to reduce the likelihood that a sudden stop is followed by a currency crash 
trade openness should be higher and fiscal policy should be prudent under hard pegs; 
trade openness should be high and the financial sector should be well-developed 
under other pegs, while financial development is important under intermediate 
exchange rate regimes. Our results confirm the view of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2012) that the impact of a sudden stop differs across exchange rate regimes. 






3.A Sudden stops with/without currency crashes (1980-2008) 
Countries Periods   
Albania 1994 Jan - 1994 Jun 
1995 Jan - 1995 May 
1996 Jul - 1997 Aug 




Argentina 1980 Jan - 2008Dec 1980 Mar Y 
Aruba 1986 Jan - 1988 Dec 
1995 Jan – 2008 Dec 
2003 Apr N 
Austria 
 














Belgium 1993 Jan - 2008Dec 1998 Dec Not available 
Bolivia 
 
1980 Jan - 1992 Jun 
1994 Oct - 2008 Dec 
1980 Jan Y 
Botswana 
 
1980 Jan - 1998 May 





Brazil 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1980 Jan Y 
Bulgaria 1995 Jan – 2008 Dec 1995 Jul Y 
Burundi 
 














China, P.R.: Hong Kong 
 
1990 Dec - 1991 Jan 
1991 Dec - 1992 Jan 
1992 Dec - 1993 Jan 
1993 Dec - 1994 Jan 
1994 Mar - 1994 Apr 
1994 Jun - 1994 Jul 
1994 Sep - 1994 Oct 
1994 Dec - 1995 Jan 
1995 Mar - 1995 Apr 
1995 Jun - 1995 Jul 
1995 Sep - 1995 Oct 
1995 Dec - 1996 Jan 
1996 Mar - 1996 Apr 
1996 Jun - 1996 Jul 
1996 Sep - 1996 Oct 






Colombia 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1984 Jan Y 
Congo, DR 
 
1980 Jan - 1988 Dec 
1989 Jul - 1991 Apr 
1991 Jun - 1993 Aug 




Cote d'Ivoire 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1985 Oct N 
Croatia 1992 Dec - 1994 Jun 1993 Apr Not available 




1994 Aug - 2008 Dec 
Cyprus 1980 Jan - 2008Dec 2008 Jan Not available 














Dominica 1993 Jan - 2008 Dec 2003 Aug N 


















Estonia 1994 Jan – 2008 Dec 2007 Aug N 
Fiji 1980 Jan - 1997 Jun 
1997 Sep - 1998 Mar 

























1980 Jan - 1992 Feb 
1992 Oct - 1996 Feb 
1997 Jan - 1999 Dec 





Georgia 1995 Oct - 2008 Dec 1999 Feb Y 
Greece 1980 Jan - 1994 Aug 





Guatemala 1980 Jan - 1989 Jul 





Haiti 1980 Jan - 1981 Sep 
1985 Oct - 1991 Dec 
1994 Mar - 2008 Dec 
1988 Oct Y 
Honduras 1980 Jan - 1983 Nov 
1984 Nov - 1987 Nov 







Hungary 1983 Dec - 1984 Jan 
1984 Dec - 1985 Jan 
1985 Dec - 1986 Jan 
1986 Dec - 1987 Jan 
1987 Mar - 1987 Apr 
1987 Jun - 1987 Jul 
1987 Sep - 1987 Oct 
1987 Dec - 1987 Jan 
1988 Mar - 1988 Apr 
1988 Jun - 1988 Jul 
1988 Sep - 1988 Oct 
1988 Dec – 1989 Jan 
1989 Mar - 1989 Apr 






India 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 2008 Oct N 
Indonesia 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1980 Feb Y 








Italy 1980 Jan - 1985 Jan 




Jamaica 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1980 Feb N 












Kazakhstan 1995 Sep - 2008 Dec 2006 Jun N 










Kuwait 1980 Jan - 1984 Mar 













Kyrgyz Republic 1997 Jan 
1997 Mar - 1997 Apr 
1997 Jun - 1997 Jul 




Latvia 1993 Jul - 2008 Dec 2008 Nov N 
Lithuania 1994 Jan - 1994 May 




Macedonia, FYR 1993 Dec - 2008 Dec 2006 Jan N 
Malawi 1980 Jan -1997 Jan 










Malta 1980 Jan - 2003 Oct 





Mexico 1980 Jan - 2011 Dec 1981 Sep Y 
Mongolia 1992 Dec - 1994 Dec 
1996 Jan - 1997 May 
1999 Jul - 1999 Dec 




Morocco 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 2008 Oct N 
















Netherlands Antilles 1980 Jan - 1980 Dec 
1981 Jul - 1981 Dec 
1983 Jan - 1984 Dec 










1989 Jun - 1994 Dec 
Nigeria 1980 Jan - 1994 Dec 
1995 Feb - 1995 Apr 
1995 Jun - 1995 Nov 
1996 Jan - 1999 Jun 
















Panama 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1997 Jun N 
Paraguay 1980 Jan - 1994 Dec 
1998 Jan - 1998 Apr 




Peru 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1980 Jan Y 








Russian Federation 1993 Dec - 1994 Jan 
1994 Mar - 1994 Apr 
1994 Jun - 1994 Jul 
1994 Sep - 1994 Oct 










Serbia 2004 Jan - 2008 Dec 2008 Oct Y 












Slovenia 1991 Dec - 2008 Dec 2007 Jan Not available 
Solomon Islands 1980 Jan - 1984 Sep 
1985 Jan - 1987 Mar 












Sri Lanka 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 2000 Mar N 
























Togo 1980 Jan - 1980 Dec 1980 Aug Y 




1982 Jan - 1983 Sep 
1984 Jan - 1984 Sep 
1995 Aug - 1997 Dec 
1999 Jan - 1999 Jul 










Uruguay 1980 Jan - 2008 Dec 1982 Jan Y 
Venezuela 1980 Jan - 1998 Feb 
1998 Apr 
1998 Jul - 1998 Aug 





Note: Sources of data: IFS. The second column shows the period for which we have data on capital 
flows. The third column shows the sudden stops identified. The fourth column shows whether sudden 
stops are followed by currency crashes in 36 months using the definition of currency crashes from 
Frankel and Rose (1996). “N” denotes sudden stop without currency crash. “Y” denotes sudden stop 
with currency crash. In our sample, advanced economies include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.  
 
  




3.B Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) classification of exchange regimes 
1 No separate legal tender 
1 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 
1 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to ±2% 
1 De facto peg 
2 Pre announced crawling peg 
2 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2% 
2 De facto crawling peg 
2 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2% 
3 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to ±2% 
3 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±5% 
3 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and 
depreciation over time) 
3 Managed floating 
4 Freely floating 
5 Freely falling 
6 Dual market in which parallel market data is missing 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 




3.C Definitions and sources of variables 
Variables Data Source Reference 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI Calvo, 1998 
Claims on central government (% GDP) WDI Flood and Jeanne, 2005; 
Catão, 2007 
Money and quasi money (M2) as % of 
GDP
WDI Calderón and Liu, 2003 
Trade (% of GDP) WDI Calvo, 1998; Cowan et al., 
2008 
Financial openness Lane and Milesi-Ferretti  
(2007) 
Calvo, 1998; Cowan et al., 
2008 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI Calvo, 1998; Cowan et al., 
2008 
Current account balance (% of GDP) WDI Calvo, 1998 & 2004 
Total reserves in months of imports WDI Catão, 2007 
Domestic credit provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP) 
WDI Catão 2007 
Note: Financial openness comes from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) who have updated their data 
until 2010.  
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Figure 3.D.1 Exports of goods 
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Figure 3.D.2 Exports of goods 
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Figure 3.D.3 Exports of goods 
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Figure 3.D.4 Current account 
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Figure 3.D.5 Current account 






t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Figure 3.D.6 Current account 
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Figure 3.D.8 Financial openness
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Figure 3.D.10 Domestic credit 
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Figure 3.D.11 Domestic credit 
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Figure 3.D.12 Domestic credit 
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3.E Factor analysis 
Table 3.E.1 Eigenvalues and cumulative variance explained 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 2.47938 1.3294 0.6078 0.6078 
Factor2 1.14998 0.40778 0.2819 0.8897 
Factor3 0.74219 0.45182 0.182 1.0717 
Factor4 0.29037 0.31391 0.0712 1.1429 
Factor5 -0.02355 0.03327 -0.0058 1.1371 
Factor6 -0.05682 0.03836 -0.0139 1.1232 
Factor7 -0.09518 0.08097 -0.0233 1.0998 
Factor8 -0.17615 0.05498 -0.0432 1.0567 
Factor9 -0.23113  -0.0567 1 
Note: LR test: independent vs. saturated model: chi2 (36) = 6933.23, Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. 
 
Table 3.E.2 Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.8064 -0.2904 -0.3562 -0.1255 0.1228 
Total reserves in months of imports 0.138 -0.1887 0.5121 -0.0499 0.6806 
Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP 0.6388 0.395 0.257 -0.1627 0.3434 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.2289 -0.0989 -0.2002 0.0565 0.8946 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.8314 -0.4026 -0.186 0.1055 0.101 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 0.4486 0.6727 -0.0392 0.048 0.3424 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.2675 -0.2537 0.3541 0.3686 0.6028 
Claims on central government (% of GDP) 0.0491 0.4172 -0.2475 0.3052 0.6691 
Financial openness 0.619 0.106 0.1555 0.0034 0.5814 
 
  




Table 3.E.3 Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variance 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.9205 0.139 -0.1009 -0.0206 0.1228 
Total reserves in months of imports 0.0075 0.0803 0.3655 -0.4235 0.6806 
Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP 0.2487 0.7526 0.0736 -0.1514 0.3434 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.068 -0.2667 -0.1075 0.1346 0.8946 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.9226 0.0821 0.2026 -0.0062 0.101 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (%) 0.0748 0.7505 -0.0705 0.2895 0.3424 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.191 0.0002 0.5969 -0.0665 0.6028 
Claims on central government (% of GDP -0.0628 0.2387 -0.0359 0.5183 0.6691 
Financial openness 0.3967 0.4672 0.1904 -0.0822 0.5814 
 
Table 3.E.4 Factor rotation matrix 
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Factor1 0.8115 0.5529 0.1828 -0.0489 
Factor2 -0.45 0.773 -0.2393 0.3777 
Factor3 -0.3721 0.2793 0.6447 -0.6065 
Factor4 -0.023 -0.137 0.7026 0.6979 
Note: correlation matrix between each factor. 
 
 




3.F Parallel Analysis 
Note: We use factors before rotation to arrive at this figure. The figure with factors after rotation also 






Leading Indicators of Currency Crises: Are They the 
Same in Different Exchange Rate Regimes? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis renewed interest in studying leading indicators of such 
crises. At its London summit of April 2009, the G20 called for the newly 
established Financial Stability Board and the IMF “to provide early warning of 
macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address them”24. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) distinguish five types of financial crises: external 
default, domestic default, banking crises, currency crises, and inflation outbursts. 
We focus on currency crises because a large number of studies concentrate on 
currency crises and Corsetti et al. (1999) and Corbett and Vines (1999) use 
currency crisis and financial crisis interchangeably. 
After 2008, the number of currency crises increased (see Figure 4.1). Frankel 
and Saravelos (2012) find that countries with a floating exchange rate regime 
were quite vulnerable in the 2008–2009 global financial crises. In the past, 
however, almost all currency crises occurred in fixed and semi-fixed exchange 
rate regimes. The most prominent examples include the Latin American currency 
crises in the 1980s, the ERM crisis in 1992, and the Asian crisis in 1997. Indeed, 
Falcetti and Tudela (2006) find that countries with a fixed exchange rate regime 
are more vulnerable than countries with a flexible exchange rate regime. Still, 
                                                 
 
24
 Point 15, p3 of Final CommuniquéG-20 Summit April 2, 2009, available at  
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf. See also Declaration on Strengthening 
the Financial System 
(http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf) 
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during the recent financial crisis all types of exchange rate regimes seemed to be 
vulnerable, as pointed out by Fratzscher (2009). We therefore examine whether 
different leading indicators have the same predictive power for currency crises in 
different exchange rate regimes. 
Currency crises have a strong impact on the real economy. Hutchison and 
Noy (2002) use a panel data set over the 1975-1997 period covering 24 emerging 
economies and find that currency crises reduce output by about 5-8 percent over 
a two-three year period. In recent decades, the consequences of currency crises 
have probably worsened due to externalities caused by increased international 
trade and capital flows. This has encouraged research on leading indicators of 
currency crises. There is already a wide range of studies in this field, which vary 
in terms of coverage of countries and time. Most studies on currency crises use 
either the probit/logit approach proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996) or the 
signal approach developed by Kaminsky et al. (1998). Previous research comes 
to diverging conclusions with respect to the predictive power of indicators for 
currency crises. Most previous studies pool countries and periods. But the 
disadvantage of pooling data is that it gives various indicators the same weight in 
potentially different types of currency crises. We try to find out whether there are 
common patterns in currency crises along various exchange rate regimes.  
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Figure 4.1 The frequency of currency crises 
 
 Note: See Appendix 4.A for the list of countries. Horizontal axis is time. 
 
Using the probit models and the method suggested by Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
for 88 countries in the 1981-2010 period, our results suggest that countries with 
the same exchange rate regime tend to share common characteristics before a 
currency crisis occurs. In fixed exchange rate regimes external economic 
indicators, such as deviations of the real exchange rate from Hodrick–Prescott 
filter (HP) trend and growth of international reserves, have the strongest 
predictive power. In floating exchange rate regimes, monetary policy and 
credibility indicators, such as domestic credit growth and inflation, are the best 
indicators of currency crises. Both external economic indicators and credibility 
indicators have predictive power in intermediate exchange rate regimes. These 
results suggest that the predictive power of early warning indicators differs 
across exchange rate regimes, thereby offering some guidance in identifying the 
vulnerability of countries to a currency crisis. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 reviews theoretical 
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4.4 defines the variables used in our analysis. Section 4.5 reports the results and 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review  
4.2.1 Theoretical models 
In this section, we review arguments that have been put forward why the causes 
of a currency crisis may differ across exchange rate regimes. 
According to the “bipolar” view (Fischer, 2001; Crockett, 1994; Eichengreen, 
1994), in a world of increasing trade openness and international capital mobility, 
only two extreme exchange rate regimes, i.e., hard pegs (such as dollarization, 
currency boards and monetary unions) or freely floating exchange rates, will be 
able to avoid currency crises and to maintain stability. Intermediate exchange 
rate regimes (such as conventional pegs, basket pegs, crawling pegs, bands, or 
managed floating) with open capital accounts are vulnerable to speculative 
attacks. According to Bordo (2004), the instability of intermediate exchange rate 
regimes can be explained by the so-called impossible trinity (Mundell, 1963), i.e. 
the impossibility to have fixed exchange rates, free capital movements and 
independent monetary policy at the same time. Only a system aiming for two out 
of three objectives is credible.  
Thus, the credibility of the exchange rate regimes is an important factor in 
triggering currency crises in intermediate exchange rate regimes. There are 
several empirical studies investigating the link between the fundamentals and the 
credibility of exchange rate regimes. Rose and Svensson (1994) show that a 
lower inflation could improve credibility. Ozkan and Sutherland (1998) 
emphasize the role of high interest rates in generating (or prolonging) a negative 
demand shock. Such a shock gives rise to expectations in financial markets of the 
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate, which in turn further increases domestic 
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nominal interest rates and therefore accelerates the collapse. The lack of 
credibility may result in a self-fulfilling speculation.  
Both first- and second-generation currency crisis models offer useful insights. 
The first-generation models (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984) start from 
the assumption of a small economy that fixes its exchange rate while its domestic 
price level moves in accordance with the foreign price level. The domestic 
money supply is backed by domestic credit and international reserves. If the 
government budget deficit grows at a constant rate, the economy will run out of 
reserves eventually and the fixed exchange rate will break down. So a higher 
stock of reserves and a lower budget deficit reduce the probability that a fixed 
exchange rate regime will collapse.  
In addition, in this type of models, expansionary policies lead to higher 
domestic demand for both traded and non-traded goods. The former leads to a 
deterioration of the trade balance while the latter leads to a real appreciation of 
the currency. Thus, the real exchange rate can also be used as leading indicator of 
currency crises according to first-generation models. 
Second-generation models, such as the one presented by Obstfeld (1994), 
rely on different mechanisms. In these models, the government decides whether 
or not to defend a pegged exchange rate by making a tradeoff between short-run 
macroeconomic flexibility and longer-term credibility. Doubts about whether the 
government can maintain its pegged exchange rate lead to multiple equilibria. 
The crisis arises when defending parity becomes expensive and markets believe 
that such a defense will ultimately fail. A speculative attack on a currency can be 
either the result of a predicted future deterioration in fundamentals, or a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, in the second-generation currency crisis models, 
the (expected) deterioration of various economic fundamentals are key indicators 
of an impending currency crisis.  
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The third-generation models link financial intermediaries and asset prices to 
the emergence of a currency crisis. Hausmann et al. (1999) suggest that financial 
crises in developing and emerging markets have their root in the so-called 
“original sin” of financial markets. On the one hand, domestic enterprises cannot 
borrow domestic currency in international capital markets. On the other hand, the 
financial sector is reluctant to grant long-term loans. This leads domestic 
investors to face either currency mismatches or maturity mismatches. The 
currency or maturity mismatches in floating exchange rate regimes may bring 
about bankruptcy since a depreciation restricts the firms to repay the debts, while 
in fixed exchange rate regimes currency or maturity mismatches make an 
economy particularly sensitive to a sovereign default as a result of exhausted 
reserves.  
Aghion et al. (2001) argue that currency crises occur both under fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes since the primary source of a crisis is the 
deteriorating balance sheet of private firms. If nominal prices are ‘sticky’, an 
initial currency depreciation leads to an increase in the foreign currency debt 
repayment obligations of firms, and thus to a fall in their profits. This reduces 
firms’ borrowing capacity and therefore investment and output in a 
credit-constrained economy. In turn, this reduces the demand for the domestic 
currency and leads to a currency crisis. In the models of Hausmann et al. (1999) 
and Aghion et al. (2001), foreign currency debt is an important indicator of 
currency crises.  
Chang and Velasco (2001) argue that currency crises can be regarded as a 
byproduct of a bank run as described in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where a 
self-fulfilling loss of confidence forces financial intermediaries to liquidate their 
investments prematurely. Hence, indicators of banking system vulnerability can 
be used as early warning signals for currency crises. 
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4.2.2 Empirical studies 
Two methods have been widely used in empirical studies on leading indicators of 
currency crises, namely a probit model from Frankel and Rose (1996) and the 
KLR method from Kaminsky et al. (1998). Frankel and Rose (1996) were the 
first to employ probit models. Using annual data for 105 developing countries for 
the 1971-1992 period, they find that crises tend to occur when output growth is 
low and domestic credit growth and foreign interest rates are high. A low ratio of 
FDI to debt is also associated with a high likelihood of a currency crisis. Several 
subsequent studies also use probit (or logit) models. For example, Kruger et al. 
(2000) use annual data for 19 developing countries spanning the 1977-1997 
period. They report that the current account deficit is the only variable that can 
be consistently linked to currency crises. Kumar et al. (2003) use logit models for 
32 developing countries for the 1985-1999 period. They conclude that declining 
reserves, exports, and weakening real activity are the most important explanatory 
variables for currency crashes. Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) examine the 
causes of currency crises in 31 emerging market countries during 1980–2001 in a 
probit model. They conclude that traditional variables, such as unemployment 
and inflation, as well as indicators of indebtedness, such as private sector 
liabilities and foreign liabilities of banks, explain crises quite well. Jacobs et al. 
(2008) apply factor analysis to combine indicators in a logit model. They find 
that money growth, national savings, and import growth result in currency crises. 
The second widely used method has been proposed by Kaminsky et al. 
(1998), henceforth KLR, who examine 76 currency crises in a sample of 15 
developing and 5 industrial countries during the 1970-1995 period. In this 
method, every indicator receives an optimal threshold value, derived from 
historical data, minimizing the noise-to-signal ratio (see section 4.3 for details). 
Variables that these authors report to have the best track record include exports, 
deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, the ratio of broad money to gross 
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international reserves, output, and equity prices. The KLR method has been 
applied in several subsequent studies as well. For instance, Brüggemann and 
Linne (2002) analyze the vulnerability of Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey 
and Russia from January 1993 to September 2001 to currency crisis. They find 
that the overvaluation of the real exchange rate, weak exports, and dwindling 
currency reserves have predictive power to assess crisis vulnerability. Likewise, 
Edison (2003) examines crises in twenty developed and emerging market 
economies. He finds the following indicators of crisis vulnerability: a marked 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, a high ratio of short-term debt to reserves, 
a high ratio of M2 to reserves, substantial losses of foreign exchange reserves, 
and sharply declining equity prices.  
The conclusions of these empirical studies regarding the leading indicators 
of currency crises differ, which may be due to the presence of different sets of 
explanatory variables, different data frequency, and different models employed. 
Most previous empirical studies on leading indicators of currency crises pool the 
data. An exception is Berg et al. (2008), who question the implicit assumption 
that crises are homogenously caused by identical factors. These authors estimate 
different logit models using data for 13 countries from South America and 
South-East Asia for the 1985-2004 period. Their results suggest that the 
assumption that all countries can be pooled has to be rejected. In addition, Kamin 
(2001) and Edison (2003) find some differences across regions, also questioning 
the homogeneity assumption.  
Previous empirical studies have not considered the impact of exchange rate 
regimes although the theoretical models discussed in section 4.2.1 suggest that 
the mechanisms leading to currency crises may depend on the exchange rate 
regime in place. However, as far as we know, this issue has not been 
systematically examined in previous studies.  




As discussed in the previous section, there are two widely used methods for 
identifying leading indicators of currency crises, namely probit (or logit) models 
and the KLR method. To ensure that our results are not driven by the choice of 
one particular method, we will use them both. As will be discussed below, both 
methods have advantages and disadvantages and by using both methods we aim 
to come up with robust results. This section explains both approaches in more 
detail. 
We first estimate probit models in which the dependent variable Y is a 
dummy which is unity if a currency crisis takes place and zero if not. 
Pr (Y = 1ŇX) = ĭ (X’ȕ + İ) 
where Pr is probability, X corresponds to the set of indicators, and ȕ is a 
vector of maximum likelihood estimates. The probit model assumes that the 
probability distribution function (Y conditional on X) follows the normal 
distribution. 
Secondly, we use the method proposed by Kaminsky et al. (1998) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) in which every indicator receives an optimal 
threshold value, derived from historical data, minimizing the noise-to-signal ratio. 
The definition of the noise-to-signal ratio can be illustrated by the following 
matrix: 
 
Table 4.1 Noise-to-signal ratio matrix 
 Crisis occurs in the following 
24 months 
No crisis occurs in the following 
24 months 
Indicator issues a signal A B 
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If an indicator issues a signal and a crisis occurs in the following 24 months 
(cell A), the signal is considered to be accurate. The same holds in cell D where 
the indicator does not give a signal and a crisis does not occur. If the indicator 
issues a signal but no crisis occurs in the following 24 months (cell B), the signal 
is considered to be a false alarm or noise. Likewise in cell C, a crisis occurs even 
though the indicator does not give a signal. Hence, the noise-to-signal ratio for 
the indicator is given by [B/ (B+D)]/ [A/ (A+C)]. The optimal threshold for a 
certain indicator is determined where the noise-to-signal ratio is the lowest. The 
lower the noise-to-signal ratio, the higher the ability of the indicator is to forecast 
currency crises.25  
The disadvantage of probit models is that the number of crises is usually 
small in comparison with the number of tranquil periods. As a result, the 
statistical properties of limited dependent regressions are often poor. A drawback 
of the Kaminsky et al. (1998) method is that it does not allow assessing statistical 
significance. Furthermore, probit models are generally based on annual data, but 
in the Kaminsky et al. (1998) method generally monthly data are employed. 
While annual data are available for a larger set of indicators, monthly data may 
better capture the variability of indicators. We therefore use both methods and 
data frequencies in our research. 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Currency crises 
A variety of approaches have been used to identify currency crises. We follow 
Frankel and Rose (1996), since it is one of the most widely used ways to define 
currency crises. These authors consider that a currency crisis occurs if a currency 
                                                 
 
25
 See Candelon et al. (2012) for a discussion of how to weight type I and type II errors. 
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depreciates by at least 25 percent annually while there is also at least a 10 
percent-point increase in the rate of depreciation.26 However, instead of using 
the US dollar exchange rate, we use the change in the SDR exchange rate to 
mitigate the influence from the US Dollar on currency fluctuations (see also Rose 
and Spiegel, 2009, 2011 and Gagnon, 2009). We exclude crises which occurred 
within 3 years of the preceding crisis to avoid counting the same crisis twice as 
suggested by Frankel and Rose (1996) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000). 
4.4.2 Exchange rate regimes 
Several empirical studies on exchange rate regimes use the IMF’s de jure 
classification of exchange rate regimes. However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
find that, in practice, many exchange rate regimes differ from their de jure 
classification. We therefore use the de facto classification of exchange rate 
regimes as suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and updated by Ilzetzki et al. 
(2011), which covers data from 1946 until 2010. It is based on market 
determined exchange rates rather than official exchange rates. The authors 
distinguish six categories of exchange rate regimes. The first category includes 
no separate legal tender, pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, 
pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%, and de 
facto peg. The second category includes the pre-announced crawling peg, the 
pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%, the de facto 
crawling peg, and the de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
±2%. The third category covers the following regimes: pre-announced crawling 
band that is wider than or equal to ±2%, de facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to ±5%, moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%, and 
                                                 
 
26
 We also use 5%, 10% and 15% monthly depreciation to identify currency crises (Kumar et al., 
2003). These tests give similar results as in our main text. 
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managed floating. The fourth category includes freely floating exchange rates, 
while the fifth one captures freely falling exchange rates (inflation is more than 
40%). The final category is the regime with a dual market in which parallel 
market data is missing. We exclude the fifth and sixth category and divide the 
remaining four categories into three regimes: fixed, intermediate and floating 
regimes. The fixed exchange rate regimes are those in the first category of 
Ilzetzki et al. (2011). The intermediate exchange rate regimes include the second 
and third categories, while the floating exchange rate regimes are those in the 
fourth category.  
We use data of 88 countries for the 1981-2010 period. The countries are 
listed in Appendix 4.A. For these countries, the data is available for the period 
under consideration. Our sample contains 218 currency crises of which 31, 118 
and 18 occurred in fixed, intermediate and floating regimes, respectively (on 51 
occasions, the exchange rate regime is not available, see Appendix 4.A for 
details). 
4.4.3 Explanatory variables 
Based on the literature review in section 4.2, we have selected several early 
warning indicators. 
The first-generation currency crisis models emphasize the instability of the 
fixed exchange rate when the government follows expansionary fiscal policies 
and foreign reserves are deficient. The indicators considered include the 
government budget deficit (Eichengreen, 1995; Kruger, 2000) and the growth 
rate of foreign reserves (Eichengreen et al., 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
We use the change of general government debt to GDP as an indicator of the 
government’s budget deficit (see also Roubini and Sachs, 1989). We expect that 
the sign of the budget deficit is positive and that of the growth of foreign reserves 
is negative.  
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The second-generation currency crisis models focus on the decision-making 
of the government, which has to weigh the costs and benefits of maintaining a 
fixed exchange rate regime. The indicators we select include unemployment 
(Eichengreen et al., 1995; Krugman, 1996), exports (Eichengreen et al., 1995; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Edison, 2003; Kumar et al., 2003), deviation of 
real exchange rate from trend (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Kruger, 2000), 
interest rate differential (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Komulainen and Lukkarila, 
2003), GDP growth or industrial output growth (Eichengreen et al., 1995; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Kumar et al., 2003; Lau and Yan, 2005) and 
inflation (Eichengreen et al., 1995; Krugman, 1996).  
The expected sign of unemployment is positive. Higher unemployment 
pressures the government to depreciate in order to create job opportunities. The 
effect of the growth rate of exports is expected to be negative. A higher growth 
rate of exports may reflect more competitiveness which, in turn, reduces the 
probability of a currency crisis. The impact of the deviation of the real exchange 
rate from its trend (determined by a Hodrick–Prescott filter, see Goldfajn and 
Valdes, 1998) is expected to be negative. An appreciation results in declining 
competitiveness which may lead to pressure on the currency. A high interest rate 
differential signifies a higher risk premium which may increase the probability of 
a currency crisis. The expected sign of the GDP growth rate is negative, as a 
better economic performance will reduce the likelihood of a currency crisis. A 
higher inflation is associated with higher realignment expectations. The expected 
sign of inflation is therefore positive. 
The third-generation currency crisis models relate to several theories, 
namely ‘original sin’ theory, balance sheet theory, moral hazard models, and 
twin crises theory (Eichengreen et al., 2003). In line with the ‘original sin’ theory 
and balance sheet theory from Aghion et al. (2001), we include total external 
debt to exports and short-term debt to foreign reserves, which are both indicators 
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of currency mismatch. The higher these indicators, the higher the probability of a 
currency crisis will be. 
The moral hazard models of the third-generation currency crisis models 
emphasizes the variability of domestic prices and interest rates in floating 
regimes. The variability of domestic prices and interest rates are related to 
monetary policy. The indicators inspired by this model are M2 growth (Aziz, 
2000; Glick and Hutchison, 2001), and domestic credit growth (Eichengreen et 
al., 1995; Kruger, 2000). The expected sign of these indicators is positive.  
The US interest rate is chosen to capture the role of high interest rates in the 
center country as mentioned in Ozkan and Sutherland (1998). The effect of the 
US interest rate is expected to be positive. A high interest rate in the center 
country may generate (or prolong) a negative demand shock in the domestic 
economy. 
In addition, banking system vulnerability is important in some third- 
generation currency crisis models (for example, Chang and Velasco, 2001). To 
capture this, we follow Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Edison (2003) and 
include the lending rate to deposit rate. It is an indicator of the profitability of 
the banking system (Cerra and Saxena, 2002).  
All in all, we have 14 indicators; Appendix 4.B provides details and data 
sources. These indicators can be categorized as follows: external indicators (real 
exchange rate, growth of exports, foreign reserves, the US interest rate, external 
debt and short-term foreign debt), real sector indicators (GDP growth, 
unemployment and the government budget deficit), credibility indicators 
(inflation and interest rate differential), monetary policy indicators (domestic 
credit and M2 growth) and banking sector vulnerability (lending to deposit rate). 
The correlation matrixes for the indicators are shown in Appendix 4.C (both 
monthly and annual data). 
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4.5 Empirical results 
As data availability would diminish the number of observations in multivariate 
models drastically, we focus on simple bivariate probit models in the main text. 
The dependent variable is a dummy which is 1 in case a currency crisis occurs 
according to the definition of Frankel and Rose (1996). The explanatory 
variables have been explained in the previous section. Table 4.2 shows the results 
of the bivariate regressions for different exchange rate regimes. The number of 
observations differs for each model, depending on data availability.  
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Table 4.2 Marginal effects in bivariate probit models for different exchange 
rate regimes 
  Fixed  No. obs. Intermediate  No. obs. Floating  No. obs. 
Deviation of real exchange 
rate from trend 
0.0016*** 452 0.0011*** 737 -0.0006** 137 
(5.29)  (2.87)  (-2.40)  
Interest rate differential 0.0035*** 402 0.0055** 552 0.0084** 120 
(3.83)  (4.73)  (2.57)  
GDP growth 
  
-0.0034*** 961 -0.0030 1182 0.0006 160 
(-3.32)  (-1.34)  (0.16)  
External debt to export 0.0001*** 712 0.0001*** 860 -0.0003 62 
(3.10)  (3.28)  (-0.90)  
Lending rate to deposit 
rate  
-0.0086*** 728 -0.0219** 971 -0.0148 115 
(-2.81)  (-2.41)  (-0.79)  
Foreign reserves growth 
  
-0.0237*** 956 -0.0914*** 1201 0.0020 155 
(-2.63)  (-3.69)  (0.10)  
Export growth 
  
-0.2495* 124 -0.0579 585 0.3984 102 
(-1.93)  (-0.62)  (1.54)  
Government budget 
deficit to GDP 
0.0007* 273 -0.0002 427 0.0010* 101 
(1.70)  (-0.17)  (1.66)  
Domestic credit growth -0.0312 924 0.0323* 1171 0.2465** 125 
(-1.15)  (1.83)  (2.5)  
Unemployment -0.0015 216 0.0006 626 0.0054** 102 
(-0.69)  (0.32)  (2.30)  
US interest rate 
  
-0.0010 981 0.0052** 1242 0.0082 160 
(-0.59)  (2.04)  (0.89)  
Short-term foreign debt to 
foreign reserves 
3.48e-07 746 0.00002* 847 4.91e-07 74 
(0.53)  (1.96)  (0.85)  
M2 growth 
  
-0.0002 962 0.0020*** 1168 0.0051*** 131 
(-0.51)  (3.79)  (3.29)  
Inflation 
  
0.00007 880 0.0040*** 1198 0.0007* 156 
(0.38)  (5.42)  (1.74)  
Note: The standard error for each variable is shown in parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** 
signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. The entries refer to marginal effects at the mean.  
 
The results of the bivariate regressions for different exchange rate regimes in 
Table 4.2 suggest that several drivers of currency crises are different among the 
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exchange rate regimes. Looking across the various variables, the real exchange 
rate and the interest rate differential appear statistically significant independent 
of the exchange rate regime in place. The relationship between the real exchange 
rate deviation and the probability of having a currency crisis is significantly 
positive in fixed and intermediate regimes, but significantly negative in floating 
regimes. The latter finding is also reported by Mussa (1986) who claims that the 
variability of real exchange rates is largely accounted for by the variability of 
nominal exchange rates in floating regimes. Thus the real exchange rate is 
expected to move in the same direction as the nominal exchange rate in floating 
exchange rate regimes. But in fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes, a 
real exchange rate appreciation decreases a country’s competitiveness. Therefore, 
it increases the probability of a currency crisis. The interest rate differential has 
the anticipated sign across all regimes: a higher interest rate differential is 
associated with higher crisis incidence. 
Apart from the real exchange rate, the external sector indicators include the 
growth of exports, foreign reserves, the US interest rate, external debt and 
short-term foreign debt. The probability of a currency crisis is negatively 
associated with export growth in fixed regimes, positively associated with the US 
interest rate in intermediate regimes, and negatively associated with foreign 
reserves in both fixed and intermediate regimes as we expected. In addition, both 
external debt to export and short-term foreign debt to foreign reserve appear as 
useful leading indicator in fixed and intermediate regimes and in intermediate 
regimes respectively. In all, none of the external sector indicators is significant in 
floating regimes, except for the real exchange rate.  
The real sector indicators consist of GDP growth, unemployment and the 
government budget deficit to GDP. The probability of a currency crisis is 
associated with a fall in GDP growth and an increase in both unemployment and 
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the government budget deficit. A decline in real sector activity is significant in 
both fixed and floating regimes, but is insignificant in the intermediate regimes.  
The credibility indicators include inflation and the interest rate differential. 
Both are significant in the intermediate and the floating regimes.  
The monetary policy indicators are domestic credit and M2 growth. A rise in 
credit is associated with greater probability of currency crises in intermediate and 
floating regimes.  
The lending to deposit rate is an indicator of banking sector profitability. It is 
significant in both fixed and intermediate regimes. The results suggest that an 
increase of the lending rate to deposit rate decreases the probability of a currency 
crisis. 
To examine whether our results are different in a multivariate context, we 
also have estimated multivariate probit models using the general-to-specific 
method (Ericsson et al., 1991 and Pagan, 1987). The results of the multivariate 
probit models are shown in Appendix 4.D.  
In sum, the results above are in line with the findings of previous studies that 
the real exchange rate is one of the most useful leading indicators of currency 
crises. The interest rate differential is also useful for predicting currency crises. 
Our results suggest that the exchange rate regime in place matters. The external 
indicators are found to be helpful in explaining currency crises in fixed and 
intermediate regimes (Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld, 1994). High credit growth and 
lack of credibility are associated with a higher incidence of currency crisis in 
intermediate and floating regimes (Bordo, 2004; Hausmann et al., 1999; Chang 
and Velasco, 2001). The multivariate models using the general-to-specific 
method (shown in Appendix 4.D) confirm these results.  
Finally, we follow the Kaminsky et al. (1998) approach to confirm the 
validity of our findings. We use monthly data for 88 countries. Unfortunately, 
monthly data are not available for all variables considered. Since GDP is not 
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available at a monthly frequency, we use industrial production instead. We also 
lack monthly data for the short-term debt to foreign reserves, external debt to 
exports, government deficits and unemployment. For these variables we could 
not find reasonable substitutes. The results of the KLR method are shown in 
Table 4.3. 
 










Indicators: Ratio Threshold Ratio Threshold Ratio Threshold 
Deviation of real exchange 
rate from trend 
0.48 0.79 0.38 0.90 0.65 0.10 
Interest rate differential 0.37 0.61 0.56 0.72 0.60 0.58 
Industrial production 
growth 
0.64 0.30 0.50 0.16 0.82 0.37 
Lending rate to deposit rate 0.50 0.31 Na 0.25 0.35 0.18 
Foreign reserves growth 0.48 0.28 0.59 0.18 0.25 0.09 
Export growth 0.84 0.44 0.49 0.08 0.54 0.18 
Domestic credit growth 0.88 0.40 0.55 0.70 0.26 0.74 
US interest rate 0.80 0.40 0.56 0.65 0.11 0.80 
M2 growth 0.59 0.71 0.51 0.75 0.55 0.69 
Inflation 0.30 0.82 0.36 0.88 0.43 0.78 
Note: Ratio is the noise-to-signal ratio. Na signifies that data are deficient.  
 
Reviewing the results in Table 4.3, it appears that the inflation has a 
noise-to-signal ratio less than 0.5 (the threshold with 0.5 is derived from Lin et 
al., 2008) in all regimes. The lower the noise-to-signal ratio is, the more useful of 
an indicator in forecasting crisis. Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Berg and Pattillo 
(1999) use a noise-to-signal ratio less than 1. Hence, our criterion is more strict. 
The results in column (1) show that there are four indicators with low 
noise-to-signal ratio in fixed exchange rate regimes: the deviation of the real 
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exchange rate from trend, interest rate differential, foreign reserves and inflation. 
The currency crises in fixed regimes are strongly associated with an appreciation 
of the real effective exchange rate, an increasing interest rate differential, an 
exhaustion of foreign reserves and rising inflation. These results are consistent 
with the probit results according to which notably the external indicators are 
significant in the models for fixed exchange rate regimes.  
Column (2) in Table 4.3 shows that there are three indicators with low 
noise-to-signal ratio in the intermediate exchange rate regimes: the deviation of 
the real exchange rate from trend, exports and inflation. These results are broadly 
in line with the probit results. Inflation seems to be one of the most reliable early 
warning indicators of a currency crisis in intermediate regimes. This is in line 
with Rose and Svensson (1994), who claim that lower inflation improves 
credibility, which decreases the probability of having a currency crisis.  
There are five indicators that successfully warn for currency crises in 
floating exchange rate regimes according to the KLR model: lending to deposit 
rate, reserves growth, domestic credit growth, US interest rate, and inflation 
(column 3 of Table 4.3). The inflation and domestic credit were also significant 
in the probit model. In other words, both approaches suggest that the decrease of 
credibility and the expansion of monetary policy are main drivers of currency 
crises in floating exchange rate regimes. The empirical findings for the floating 
regimes suggest that a currency crisis in this type of regime were not so much 
associated with a deterioration of the external sector; also a slowdown in GDP is 
not a good leading indicator.  
Comparing the results of the KLR approach and those of the probit analysis 
(see Table 4.4, the variables for which we lack monthly data are notified by “
”), the real exchange rate stands out as a useful leading indicator in fixed and 
intermediate exchange rate regimes. This result is in line with the findings of 
most previous studies (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Brüggemann and Linne; 2002; 
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Edison, 2003; Klein and Marion, 1994; Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten, 2004; 
Feridun, 2004).  
The results for the interest rate differential in both models are consistent, i.e. 
the indicator is useful in explaining currency crises in fixed regimes. Likewise, 
inflation is always significant in explaining currency crises in intermediate and 
floating regimes. Also foreign reserves in fixed regimes and domestic credit 
growth in floating regimes are robust to the choice of a particular methodology. 
Still, there are some differences between both approaches. For instance, GDP 
growth, exports and the US interest rate are significant in fixed regimes, the 
interest rate differential is significant in intermediate and floating exchange rate 
regimes, and M2 growth is significant in floating regimes when we use probit 
models. Inflation has a low noise-to-signal ratio in fixed regimes, export has a 
low noise-to-signal ratio in intermediate regimes, and reserves, the US interest 
rate and the lending to deposit rate have low noise-to-signal ratios in floating 
regimes in the KLR models.  
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Table 4.4 Summary results of probit models and KLR models 






  Probit KLR Probit KLR Probit KLR 
Deviation of real exchange 
rate from trend 
*** ***** *** ** **   
Interest rate differential *** ** **  **  
Inflation   ** *** ** * * 
Foreign reserves growth *** * ***     *** 
GDP growth/Industrial 
production growth 
***        
Lending rate to deposit rate ***  *** **   ** 
Export growth *    *    
M2 growth    ***  ***  
US interest rate    **     **** 
Domestic credit growth   *  ** *** 
External debt to export *** —— *** ——  —— 
Government budget deficit  * ——  —— * —— 
Short-term foreign debt to 
foreign reserves 
 —— * ——  —— 
Note: In probit model: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. In KLR method: 
***** signifies noise-to-signal ratios <0.1, **** signifies 0.1<noise-to-signal ratios <0.2, *** signifies 
0.2<noise-to-signal ratios <0.3, ** signifies 0.3<noise-to-signal ratios <0.4, * signifies 0.4<noise-to-signal 
ratios <0.5, —— signifies no data available. 
 
So it appears that the choice of methodology matters, as they do not yield 
exactly the same outcomes. Nevertheless, the importance of certain factors seems 
to be robust across different methodologies. Our results suggest that external 
economic indicators (and fiscal deficits) are key leading indicators of currency 
crises under fixed exchange rate regimes, while monetary policy indicators are 
not significant in fixed regimes. The reason is that expansionary monetary 
policies may not immediately lead to currency crises as long as foreign reserves 
are sufficient in the fixed exchange rate regimes (Connolly, 1986). In floating 
exchange rate regimes monetary policy and credibility indicators are the best 
leading indicators of currency crises. Both credibility and external economic 
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indicators have predictive power in intermediate exchange rate regimes. Our 
results confirm Burnside et al., (2001), who show that the presence of 
government guarantees (fixed exchange rate) and the associated fiscal 
implications of bank bailouts lead to the possibility of self-fulling currency 
crises. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we extend previous studies by analyzing the extent to which 
currency crises share common characteristics in fixed, intermediate and floating 
regimes. The most important finding of this chapter is that both probit models 
and the approach suggested by Kaminsky et al. (1998) suggest that the leading 
indicators of currency crises differ across exchange rate regimes. In fixed 
exchange rate regimes, there is a marked deterioration in external indicators, 
such as deviations of the real exchange rate from trend and the growth of 
international reserves, before currency crises. Indicators that prove to be useful in 
anticipating crises in floating exchange rate regimes are credibility and monetary 
policies indicators, such as inflation and domestic credit growth. Both credibility 
and external economic indicators have predictive power in intermediate 
exchange rate regimes.  
Our study has some limitations. Even though we have considered several 
indicators, we may have omitted some relevant variables, such as political and 
institutional indicators (see Glick and Hutchison (2005) for a detailed discussion). 
We exclusively concentrate on economic indicators. In addition, we focus on 
these indicators in isolation, while it is possible that some combinations of 
variables may cause higher vulnerability to currency crises (Garcia and 
Valpassos, 1998).  
The variation in the early warming indicators for different exchange rate 
regimes suggests that future research into the causes of currency crises, and into 
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the leading indicators of predicting future crises, should keep differences in 
exchange rate regimes in mind. One suggestion for future research is to examine 
whether this also holds for banking and sovereign debt crises. 
  




4.A Currency crises and exchange rate regimes 
Country 
 
Currency crisis Country Currency crisis Country Currency crisis 
Algeria 1994 Jun(2) Guatemala 1990 Feb() New  
Zealand 
2008 Nov(2) 
1991 Jun(2) 1986 Jun() 1998 Jun(2) 
1988 Jun(2) Guinea 2008 May(2) 1984 Aug(2) 
Argentina 2009 Sep(2) 2004 Aug(2) Niger 1994 Jan(1) 
2002 Jan(1) 1998 Jul(2) Nigeria 2009 Aug(2) 
1987 Jul() 1992 Apr(2) 1999 Jan(2) 
1984 Jul() 1986 Jan() 1992 Mar() 
1981 Apr(2) Haiti 2003 Sep(1) 1989 Jan(3) 
Australia 2008 Oct(3) 2000 Sep(3) 1985 Oct() 
1985 Apr(3) 1994 Sep() Paraguay 2009 Sep(2) 
Benin 1994 Jan(1) 1991 Sep(2) 2001 Sep(2) 
Bolivia 1990 May(2) Honduras 1994 Feb(2) 1998 Apr(2) 
1985 Dec() 1990 Mar(2) 1992 Aug(2) 
1982 Dec() Iceland 2008 May(2) 1987 Jun(2) 
Botswana 2008 Oct(2) 2001 May(2) 1984 Jun(2) 
1998 Sep(2) 1993 Jul(2) Peru 1993 Oct() 
1993 Jun(2) 1989 Jan(2) 1990 Oct() 
1985 Jan(2) 1985 May(2) 1987 Oct() 
Brazil 2008 Dec(2) 1981 Feb() 1983 Oct() 
2002 Nov(2) India 1991 Jul(2) Philippines 1997 Dec(1) 
1999 Jan(2) Indonesia 2001 Feb(2) 1990 Sep(2) 
1992 Mar() 1997 Oct(2) 1986 Jul(2) 
1988 Apr() 1986 Sep(2) 1983 Jul(2) 
1985 Apr() 1983 Apr(2) Senegal 1994 Jan(1) 
1981 Dec() Iran 2002 Mar(2) South 
Africa 
2008 Oct(3) 
Burkina Faso 1994 Jan(1) 1993 Mar(2) 2001 Nov(3) 
Cameroon 1994 Jan(1) Israel 1984 Jan() 1998 Jul(3) 
Central 
African  
1994 Jan(1) 1981 Jan() 1984 Jul(2) 
Chad 1994 Jan(1) Jamaica 2009 Oct(2) Surinam 2003 Jan(1) 
Chile 2008 Dec(2) 2003 Mar(2) 1999 Feb() 
1990 Nov(2) 1993 Nov() 1994 Jan() 
1985 Aug(2) 1990 Feb(2) Swaziland 2008 Oct(1) 
1982 Aug(1) 1983 Dec(1) 2001 Nov(1) 
Hong Kong 1983 Sep(2) Jordan 1992 Nov(2) 1998 Jul(1) 
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Columbia 2002 Oct(2) Kenya 1999 Aug(2) 1984 Jul(1) 
1998 Apr(2) 1995 Oct(2) Sweden 2009 Feb(2) 
1990 Jan(2) 1992 Sep(2) 1993 Feb(2) 




2009 Jan(3) Korea 2008 Oct(2) Tanzania 1992 Sep(2) 
2004 Dec(3) 1997 Dec(2) 1989 Sep(2) 
2001 Oct(3) Lebanon 1990 May() 1986 Jul(2) 
1998 Oct() 1986 Dec() 1983 Jul(2) 
1995 Jan() 1983 Dec(2) Thailand 1997 Sep(1) 
1992 Jan() Liberia 2004 Nov(3) Togo 1994 Jan(1) 
1989 Jan() 2001 Jul(3) Tunisia 1986 Sep(2) 
1985 Oct() 1998 Jan() Turkey 2008 Nov(3) 
1982 Mar() Libya 2002 Jan() 2001 Apr(2) 
Republic of 
the Congo 
1994 Jan(1) 1994 Oct(2) 1998 Jan() 
Costa Rica 1995 Apr(2) 1986 Mar(2) 1995 Jan() 
1990 Sep(2) Madagascar 2004 Mar(2) 1992 Jan() 
 1986 Jan(2) 1997 Aug(2) 1989 Jan() 
 1981 Jan(1) 1994 Jun(2) 1986 Jan() 
Dominican 
Republic 
2002 Nov(2) 1991 Jun(2) 1982 Feb(2) 
1991 Jan() 1986 Aug(2) Uganda 2009 May(2) 
1988 Jan(2) 1982 Sep(1) 1990 Jul(1) 
1985 Jan(2) Malawi 2004 Jul(2) 1987 Jun() 
Egypt 2003 Feb(1) 2001 Jun(2) 1984 Jun(3) 
1989 Aug(2) 1998 Jun(1) 1981 Jun(2) 
El Salvador 1990 May(2) 1995 Jun() United 
Kingdom 
2008 Nov(2) 
1986 Jan(2) 1992 Jun(3) 1993 Aug(1) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
1994 Jan(1) 1985 Apr(3) Uruguay 2002 Apr(2) 
Gabon 1994 Jan(1) Malaysia 1997 Nov(2) 1995 Jul() 
Gambia 2002 Jun(2) Mali 1994 Jan(1) 1992 Jul(2) 
1984 Apr() Mexico 2009 Feb(2) 1989 Jul() 
Ghana 2009 Feb(2) 2003 Jan(2) 1985 Dec() 
2003 Jan(2) 1998 Sep(2) 1982 Dec(2) 
1999 Nov(2) 1994 Dec(1) Venezuela 2010 Feb(1) 
1996 Jan() 1990 Sep(2) 2002 Mar(2) 
1993 Jan(2) 1985 Jul() 1996 Mar() 
1990 Jan(3) 1982 Mar(2) 1993 Mar(2) 
1986 Oct(3) Morocco 1981 Jul(2) 1990 Mar(2) 
1983 Oct() Nepal 1991 Jul(2) 1987 Mar(2) 
  1985 Dec(2) 1984 Mar(2) 
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Note: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Grenada, Japan, Mauritius, Myanmar, Norway, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Switzerland, and United States did not have a currency 
crisis in the periods 1981-2009. (1) signifies fixed exchange rate regime, (2) is intermediate 
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4.B Data description 
 Source:  
Real exchange rate 
deviation 
IFS Deviation from Hodrick–Prescott filter (HP) 
GDP growth WDI GDP growth (annual %) 
Export growth IFS Goods, volume of exports (Percent change over 
corresponding period of previous year) 
Lending rate to deposit rate IFS Lending rate divided by deposit rate 
Foreign reserve growth IFS Official reserve assets (Percent change over 
corresponding period of previous year) 
External debt to export WDI External debt stocks (% of exports of goods, services 
and primary income) 
Short-term foreign debt to 
foreign reserve 
WDI Short-term debt (% of total reserves) 
General government debt to 
GDP 
WDI Annual change of general government net debt 
Unemployment IFS Unemployment rate 
US interest rate IFS Government securities, treasury bills 
Interest rate differential IFS Government securities, treasury bills minus 
Government securities, treasury bills in US 
M2 growth IFS Money plus quasi-money (Percent change over 
corresponding period of previous year) 
Inflation IFS Consumer prices, all items (Percent change over 
corresponding period of previous year) 
Domestic credit growth IFS Claims on private sector (Percent change over 
corresponding period of previous year) 
Industrial production IFS Percent change over corresponding period of previous 
year 
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4.D Marginal effects of multivariate probit models for different 
exchange rate regimes 
  Fixed exchange rate 
regimes 
Intermediate exchange rate 
regimes 
Floating exchange rate 
regimes 



























Sample 368 820 136 
Log likelihood -30.7744 -263.1908 -41.3303 
Note: This table shows multivariate probit models of currency crises; model specification determined 




The elationship between the Renminbi uture pot 
eturn and the orward iscount ate 
 
5.1 Introduction 
China is playing an increasingly important role in the international monetary and 
financial arena. Therefore, its foreign exchange policy is of increasing interest. In this 
chapter, we specifically analyze the relationship between the Renminbi’s future spot 
return and its forward discount rate. Several studies have examined the relationship 
between future spot returns and forward discount rates (see the survey by Engel (1996) 
for early studies and Pippenger (2011) for an overview of more recent studies). Most 
studies report a forward discount bias, i.e. the slope coefficient in the regression of the 
change in the future spot rate on the current forward discount is significantly negative 
instead of being unity. This outcome rejects the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis 
(FRUH).  This hypothesis holds that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the 
future spot rate (Bai and Mollick, 2010). Landon and Smith (2003) argue that the 
rejection of the FRUH could occur because market behavior is inconsistent with 
rational expectations or because of a risk premium. Frankel and Poonawala (2010) 
report that the forward discount rates in emerging markets are less biased than those 
in more advanced countries. 
In this chapter, we complement Frankel and Poonawala (2010) and examine the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the relationship between the future spot return 
and the forward discount rate in China. While previous studies have focused on the 
major currencies of industrialized countries, this chapter examines the forward 
discount for China. To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between future spot 
returns and forward discount rates has not been investigated for China before. The 
reason probably has been the de facto peg of the Renminbi to the US dollar (Xin, 
2004). However, in July 2005 the currency regime was reformed with the result that a 
foreign exchange market could develop (Colavecchio and Funke, 2008). The Chinese 
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currency offers a very interesting case to examine the unbiasedness hypothesis, as 
there are differences in the exchange rate regime in the period under consideration. 
It is useful to focus on the Chinese currency developments during the recent 
global financial crisis, as the volatility of financial markets during a crisis “raises the 
stakes for financial markets and central banks; it also may provide a more statistically 
powerful test” (Flood and Rose, 2002, p. 253). There are few papers that investigate 
the impact of financial crises on the foreign exchange market. Jeon and Seo (2003) 
analyze the effect of the Asian financial crisis on foreign exchange market efficiency 
in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea. Using pre-determined breakpoints, they 
partition the full sample into a crisis and a non-crisis period and conclude that, in 
contrast to the full sample period, the foreign exchange markets are not efficient in the 
post-crisis period.  
Hansen (1992) and Hansen and Johansen (1999) criticize the use of 
predetermined breakpoints. Several tests have been developed to determine 
breakpoints, like those of Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
Bai and Mollick (2010) investigate the effect of the Asian crisis of 1997 and the 
Turkish crisis of 2000 on the forward discount bias in fourteen emerging economies 
using endogenous multiple structural models. Bai and Mollick (2010) differentiate the 
crisis periods from the non-crisis periods by endogenous multiple structural breaks 
tests as suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) and conclude that the financial 
crisis has affected the forward discount bias.  
In this chapter, we extend the existing literature by presenting empirical evidence 
about the impact of the recent financial crisis on the relationship between future spot 
returns and forward discount rates in China. In line with Hansen and Johansen (1999), 
Rangvid and Sørensen (2002) and Kutan and Zhou (2003), we use rolling 
cointegration tests to examine the time-varying relationship between the future spot 
return and the forward discount rather than OLS regressions as used in Bai and 
Mollick (2010). We find that there were different regimes after this reform and that 
the financial crisis has affected the relationship between the future spot return and the 
forward discount rate in China. The unbiasedness hypothesis that the forward rate is 
an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate requires cointegration and a unity 
coefficient for the forward discount. We conclude that the unbiased forward rate 
hypothesis only holds in Spring 2009, when the spot exchange rate was almost 
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invariant because the Chinese authorities had returned to pegging the Renminbi to the 
US dollar to overcome the turmoil caused by the global financial crisis 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief 
introduction to recent developments in the Chinese foreign exchange market and 
offers a selective overview of the literature on the unbiased forward rate hypothesis. 
Section 5.3 introduces the methodology and the data. Section 5.4 reports and 
discusses the results of the relationship between future spot return and forward 
discount rates in China. The final section concludes. 
5.2 Background information 
In 1994, the Chinese authorities decided to peg the Renminbi (RMB; Yuan is the unit 
of RMB) to the US dollar. This forced the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) into large 
Forex operations. The PBOC sterilized the impact of Forex interventions on domestic 
money supply by offsetting sales/purchases of domestic bonds. However, on July 21, 
2005, China announced the abolition of its fixed nominal exchange rate to the US 
dollar. The same day, the Renminbi spot exchange with respect to the US dollar 
appreciated from 8.27 to 8.11. From then on, the PBOC manages the Renminbi 
against a basket of currencies of China's main trading partners. After this hallmark, 
the bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar gradually appreciated until the financial 
crisis of 2008 (see Figure 5.1).27 But during the financial crisis, in fact in July 2008, 
the central bank returned to pegging the Renminbi to the US dollar. The Chinese 
authorities motivated their decision as part of an effort to overcome the temporary 
interruption to the reform process that was caused by the global financial crisis. On 
June 19, 2010 the PBOC announced the return to a managed floating exchange rate 
regime under which the spot exchange rate can move intraday with at most ±0.5 
percent from the central parity. This parity is determined at the opening of the trading 
day by a truncated weighted average of primary dealers’ offer rates and is announced 
by the China Foreign Exchange Trading System. The central parity itself has not 
moved by more than ±0.5 percent each day. By the end of 2010, the exchange rate to 
                                                 
 
27
 Unless indicated otherwise, all data used in this chapter is derived from Thomson Reuter’s 
Datastream. 
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the dollar stood around 6.6. This implies that the Renminbi has appreciated by about 
17.5% since the initial reform of July 2005. 
 
Figure 5.1 The RMB spot exchange rate to the US Dollar 
 
 
After the exchange rate reform, in tandem with the enormous growth of 
international trade, foreign exchange trading in China has been booming. Foreign 
exchange trading in China is carried out by a number of banks and foreign exchange 
trading agencies. The daily average turnover of foreign exchange market in China has 
increased from US dollar 1 billion in 2004 to 20 billion in 2010 (BIS, 2010). Figure 
5.2 presents the future spot return and one-month forward discount rate from July 21, 
2005 to December 31, 2010. It shows that the volatility of the future spot returns and 
forward discount rate is time varying. The future spot return and the forward discount 
rate are quite volatile throughout 2007 and 2008. However, between early 2009 until 
Spring 2010 they hardly move. In the last three quarters of 2010, especially the future 
spot return becomes volatile again. Figure 5.3 shows the difference between the future 
spot return and the one-month forward discount rate. This differential reflects the 
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Figure 5.2 The future spot return and forward discount rate 
 
Note: St+1 is the future spot rate; St is the spot rate; Ft is the forward rate; St+1- St  is the future spot 
return; Ft- St  is the forward discount rate. 
 
Figure 5.3 The difference between future spot return and forward discount rate 
 
 
Two methods are widely used to test whether the forward discount predicts the 
future spot return. First, Ordinary Least Squares regressions have been used to test 
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agents are risk neutral and can use all available information rationally (Frenkel, 1976, 
1977, 1979; Cornell, 1997). Second, cointegration tests have been employed to 
examine whether the forward discount and future spot return move together (Hakkio 
and Rush, 1989). The first approach has been abandoned because of the 
non-stationary properties of future spot returns and forward discounts (Engle and 
Granger, 1987).  
The cointegration tests yield mixed results. Some studies (Hakkio and Rush, 1989; 
Baillie and Bollerslev, 1989; Barnhart and Szakmary, 1991; Naka and Whitney, 1995; 
Hai et al., 1997) support the unbiased forward rate hypothesis. Other studies (Lai and 
Lai, 1991; Luintel and Paudyal, 1998) find no support for this hypothesis. Barnhart 
and Szakmary (1991) demonstrate that the conflicting results depend upon the 
econometric specification as well as upon differences in the estimation period. Engel 
(1996) argues that different properties of the various test statistics employed may play 
a role too. In order to deal with these issues, Hansen and Johansen (1999) and 
Rangvid and Sørensen (2002) suggest using rolling cointegration tests (we will 
elaborate on this method in Section 5.3). Kutan and Zhou (2003) apply this method to 
test for the time varying relationship between the spot and forward exchange rate for 
the German mark, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc with respect to the US dollar. 
The merit of rolling cointegration is that it allows for potential changes in the 
data-generating process. In view of the changes in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market and the occurrence of the financial crisis, we will therefore also use rolling 
cointegration to investigate the Chinese foreign exchange market.  
5.3 Data and Methodology 
We use the daily28 mid-price spot and (one month) forward exchange rates for the 
July 2005 – December 2010 period. In total, we have 1,422 daily observations. The 
data are derived from Datastream.  
As most standard tests are not applicable when a time series has breakpoints 
(Kutan and Zhou, 2003), we need to investigate whether there are breakpoints in our 
                                                 
 
28
 Breuer and Wohar (1996) identify two issues that may lead to potential errors in measuring the 
appropriate delivery date for a spot rate: end-of period overlapping data problem and the end-of period 
clumping problem.  
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series. It appears that this indeed is the case and, therefore, we use rolling 
cointegration tests. In order to test whether time series have a unit root with a 
breakpoint, we employ the test of Zivot and Andrews (1992), while the test developed 
by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) is used to find out whether there are multiple 
breakpoints in the series. Zivot and Andrews (1992) argue that financial crises can 
lead to misleading inferences when testing the unbiasedness hypothesis. We use their 
test to examine whether a time series has a unit root with a breakpoint. The null 
hypothesis in this test is that a series  has a unit root with drift and an 
exogenous structural break occurs at TB, where . The alternative hypothesis 
is that the series is stationary with a deterministic time trend and an exogenous change 
in the trend function at . There are three alternative models to test the hypothesis: 
Model A allows for a one-time shift in the intercept, Model B allows for a break in the 
slope of the trend function, while Model C is a hybrid of A and B. The null 
hypotheses are:  
 
Model (A): yt = ȝ + dD(TB)t + yt-1 + et                                              (5.1) 
Model (B): yt = ȝ + yt-1 + (ȝ2 – ȝ1)DUt  + et                                       (5.2) 
Model (C): yt = ȝ + yt-1 + dD(TB)t + (ȝ2 – ȝ1)DUt  + et                          (5.3) 
 
where  if , and 0 otherwise, while  if , and 0 
otherwise. The alternative hypotheses are: 
 
Model (A): yt = ȝ + ȕt + (ȝ2 – ȝ1)DUt  + et                                        (5.4) 
Model (B): yt = ȝ + ȕ1t + (ȕ2 – ȕ 1)DTt*  + et                                      (5.5) 
Model (C): yt = ȝ + ȕ1t + (ȝ2 – ȝ1)DUt  + (ȕ2 – ȕ 1)DTt*  + et                   (5.6) 
 
These tests can be used to examine whether the series is stationary or not with 
one breakpoint. However, these tests do not rule out the possibility that there are 
multiple breakpoints in the series. Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) evaluate which 
breakpoint achieves a global minimum sum of squared residuals and then sequentially 
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SSR ({Tm,t}) = min (mh < j < T-h) [SSR ({Tm-1,j}) + SSR (j+1, t)]              (5.7) 
 
where h is the minimum distance between each break, m is the number of breaks, 
T is the total number of observations, and SSR is the sum of squared residuals 
associated with the optimal partition containing m breaks. The procedure starts by 
evaluating the optimal one-break partition for subsamples and stores this breakpoint 
and its sum of squared residuals. Then it searches for optimal partitions with two 
breaks by examining which partitions can achieve a minimum sum of squared 
residuals, etc. Finally, the procedure evaluates which of the optimal break partitions 
yields a minimum sum of squared residuals. The essence of the Bai and Perron test is 
that the sum of squared errors can have a global minimum among all breaks in the 
case of multiple structural breaks. Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is 
used for selecting the optimal number of breakpoints. Wang (2006) demonstrates that 
the BIC performs consistently better for various model specifications than other 
information criteria, like the modified version of BIC proposed by Liu et al. (1997) 
and the Hannan and Quinn (1979) criterion.  
The breakpoint tests of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) can establish whether there 
are any breakpoints in a relationship. However, these tests cannot reveal whether the 
relationship becomes stronger or weaker. We use rolling cointegration to establish the 
time-varying relationship between the future spot return and forward discount rate of 
the Renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar. Cointegration between (St+1-St) and (Ft-St) is a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the FRUH to hold. If (St+1-St) and (Ft-St) 
are not cointegrated, they tend to deviate apart without any boundaries so that (Ft-St) 
has little predictive power regarding the movement of (St+1-St). This is inconsistent 
with the unbiased forward rate hypothesis. 
With cointegration, a time series is integrated of order d ⎯ denoted as I (d) ⎯ if 
the series can become stationary after differencing d times. An I (0) series is 
stationary, whereas an I (1) series contains a unit root and is non-stationary. When the 
future spot return (St+1-St) and the forward discount (Ft-St) are both I (1), the linear 
combination is generally also I (1). However, if there exist parameters a and b such 
that Z is stationary, then (St+1-St) and (Ft-St) are cointegrated. The relationship 
between the two is as follows:  
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Zt = (St+1 – St) – a – b (Ft – St)                       (5.8) 
 
where Zt represents the equilibrium error. For cointegration tests, two methods 
are widely used, namely the Engle and Granger (1987) test and the Johansen (1991) 
test. The Johansen test permits more than one cointegration relationship. As such, it is 
more generally applicable than the Engle–Granger test, which is based on the 
(augmented) Dickey–Fuller test for unit roots in the residuals from a single (estimated) 
cointegration relationship. 
The Johansen test is based on the VAR model estimation. Consider the VAR (p) 
model for the k ×1 vector Yt 
 
Yt = Ȇ1 Yt-1 + … + Ȇp Yt-p + ȝt t = 1, …, T                (5.9) 
 
where IN (0, ). Since the level of time series Yt might be non-stationary, 
Equation (5.3) needs to be transformed into a dynamic form, a vector error correction 
model (VECM) 
 
ǻYt = Ȇ1 Yt-1 + ī1ǻ Yt-1 + … + īp-1ǻ Yt-p+1 + ȝt t = 1, …, T        (5.10) 
 
where  and , k=1, p-1. If Yt contains 
non-stationary I time series components, Yt−1 has to be stationary in order to get a 
stationary error term . Therefore, Yt−1 must contain r<k cointegration relations. If 
the VAR(p) process has unit roots then Π
 
has a reduced rank r<k. Effectively, 
testing for cointegration is equivalent to assessing the rank of the matrix. If r=k, then 
time series in Y are stationary, if the rank of the matrix is zero then there are no 
cointegration relationships. If 0<r<k Yt is I with r linearly independent cointegrating 
vectors and k − r non-stationary vectors. 
In order to determine the number of cointegrating vectors, we first test H0: r0=0 
against the alternative H1: r0 >0. If this null is not rejected, we conclude that there are 
no cointegrating vectors among the k variables in Yt. If H0: r0=0 is rejected, then there 
is at least one cointegrating vector. In this case we should test H0: r0<=1 against H1: 
tμ
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r0 >1. If this null is not rejected then there is only one cointegrating vector. If the null 
is rejected then there are at least two cointegrating vectors. The tests are performed on 
H0: r0<=2 and so on, until the null hypothesis is not rejected. Cointegration is only 
one of the two necessary conditions for the unbiased forward rate hypothesis to hold. 
If the cointegration holds, we have to further test the second condition which requires 
that a=0 and b=1 in equation (5.8). If this condition does not hold, (Ft-St) is not an 
unbiased predictor of (St+1-St), even if the two move together in time. Hence, a test of 
the FRUH also involves testing for the restrictions on the parameters, notably that 
b=1. We also perform this test on the rolling cointegration vector. 
5.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we report the results of our analysis of the Renminbi – US dollar 
exchange rate. The results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests are shown 
in Table 5.1. The test statistics in all three models clearly reject the null hypothesis. 
However, on the basis of these tests, only one structural breakpoint can be identified. 
In order to test whether there are multiple breakpoints, we use the tests of Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003) which sequentially search for endogenous multiple breakpoints 
based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals in all sub-samples. Table 5.2 
reports the breakpoints identified by the Bai and Perron tests. From the minimum BIC 
criterion, we derive that there are four breakpoints in the series: August 2, 2006; 
August 9, 2007; June 26, 2008; and March 9, 2010.  
According to Annual Balance of Payment Report for China, the Renminbi-Pound 
interbank trade was launched in the China Foreign Exchange Trading System on 
August 1, 2006, which may explain the first break point. On August 17, 2007, the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange announced that the Renminbi foreign 
exchange swap transaction would soon start, which was around the second break 
point. After the Renminbi foreign exchange swap transaction was launched at the end 
of 2007, there were neither announcements nor actions from any authorities related to 
the exchange market until February 2010. However, as pointed out by Ma and 
McCauley (2011), in mid-2008 the ﬁnancial crisis interrupted the appreciation of the 
Renminbi. President Zhou of the PBOC described the policy reversion to closely link 
the Renminbi to the dollar during the global ﬁnancial crisis as a “special measure” 
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(Financial Times, 8 March 2010). Therefore, we interpret the breakpoint in Summer 
2008 as the impact of the global financial crisis on the Chinese foreign exchange 
market.  
As suggested by one of the referees, we also examine the variation of the interest 
rate differential between China and the United States in this particular period. Flood 
and Rose (2002) suggest that interest rate hikes typically accompanied defenses of 
fixed exchange rate regimes in crisis periods. Under this view, more volatility in 
interest rates at home (compared to foreign interest rates) may help to observe the 
FRUH more often: Investors demand higher interest rates on currencies expected to 
fall in value (Sarno, 2005). We notice that in July 2008, the interest rate differential 
between China and the United States shifts from negative to positive, suggesting that 
investors no longer expect the Renminbi to appreciate in line with the objective to peg 
the Chinese currency.  
In February 2010, the authorities decided to raise the maximum position of 
exchange settlement and exchange sales for nationwide banks. Meanwhile, the 
positions of exchange settlement and sales for small banks also were allowed to 
increase. These developments may be held responsible for the fourth breakpoint in 
March 2010. 
 
Table 5.1 Zivot-Andrews unit root tests 
 A B C 
St+1 - St -7.7193*** -6.1074*** -7.8672*** 
 
[June 17, 2008] [Oct 9, 2007] [June 17, 2008] 
Ft - St -7.3935*** -5.0818*** -7.5966** 
 
[April 18, 2008] [Nov 7, 2005] [April 18, 2008] 
Note: Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests with an endogenously determined breakpoint. A, B, C 
denote model types and correspond to the three models in the main text. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical 
values are -5.34/-4.80/-4.58, -4.93/-4.42/-4.11 and -5.57/-5.08/-4.82 for models A, B and C, 
respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated structural break dates. *** Rejection of the 
null hypothesis at the 1% level. The null hypothesis is that a series has a unit root with drift and an 
exogenous structural break. 
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Table 5.2 Bai and Perron test results 
Numbers Break Times BIC 
M = 0  -5983.119 
M = 1 Aug 2, 2006 -6104.114 
M = 2 Aug 9, 2007 -6383.262 
 
Jun 26, 2008  
M = 3 Aug 9, 2007 -6504.174 
 
Jun 26, 2008  
 
Mar 9, 2010  
M = 4 Aug 2, 2006 -6610.446 
 
Aug 9, 2007  
 
Jun 26, 2008  
 
Mar 9, 2010  
M = 5 Aug 2, 2006 -6589.463 
 
Aug 9, 2007  
 
Jun 26, 2008  
 
Apr 21, 2009  
 
Mar 9, 2010  
Note: Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) multiple breakpoints tests. The minimum Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) criterion is used for selecting the best break points.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 The real interest rate differential between China and the United 
States 
 
Note: Data source: IFS. The interest rate in China is the annual deposit rate. The interest rate in the 
United States is the one-year US Treasury rate. The real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate 
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As the Bai and Perron tests suggest multiple breakpoints in the relationship 
between the future spot return and the forward discount, we will use rolling 
cointegration to test the relative strength of the cointegration relation. We calculate 
the Johansen trace test statistics for a rolling, fixed-length window of 261 
observations (i.e. the number of trading days in one calendar year). The Schwartz 
information criterion is used to determine the optimal lag length of 1. The null 
hypothesis of r=0 against r>0 is tested. The test statistics are calculated for a rolling 
window by adding one observation to the end and removing the first observation. That 
is, starting with observations [1–261], we calculate the first trace test statistics. Then, 
we calculate the trace tests for observations [2–262], [3–263], etc. The trace test 
statistics are divided by their 5% critical values and shown in Figure 5.5. A value of 
the scaled test statistic above one means that the corresponding null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 5% level for that period.  
 
Figure 5.5 Rolling cointegration test (r=0) 
 
Note: The figure shows rolling cointegration tests scaled by their critical values (at 95 percent 
confidence level) from VAR models. A level above 1 suggests rejection of the hypothesis of 
respectively r  0, that is, rejection of no cointegration. The r signifies the rank of the matrix Π . 
 
Rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration suggests that the spot future 
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suggest a time-varying link between the future spot return and the forward discount of 
the Renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar. The existence of a cointegration relationship 
between the future spot return and the one–month forward discount rate before March 
2008 cannot be rejected. The breakpoint of March 2008 is close to the breakpoint in 
June 2008 as identified by the Bai and Perron tests. As shown in Figure 5.1, since 
June 2008, the spot rate stopped appreciating against the dollar. The Spring 2008 
breakpoint can be regarded as the moment at which the Chinese foreign exchange 
market was hit by the global financial crisis. Figure 5.5 suggests that the future spot 
return and forward discount are not cointegrated between March 2008 and February 
2009. However, the cointegration relationship gained ground again after February 
2009 until about June 2010. After June 2010, the test statistics for cointegration are 
around the 5% critical values. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the Chinese government 
continued its exchange rate policy of gradual appreciation in June 2010. After this 
period, cointegration only sporadically occurs. 
In all, we establish that since the change in China´s exchange rate regime in July 
2005, four different sub-periods can be identified on the basis of our cointegration 
analysis regarding the future spot return and the forward discount rate. First, there is 
cointegration before the financial crisis (July 2005 - Spring 2008). Second, there is no 
cointegration in the early stages of the crisis (Spring 2008-Spring 2009), i.e. when the 
financial crisis spread from the US to the rest of the world. Arguably, the 
cointegration relationship is weak because the trend of the Renminbi with respect to 
the dollar was very hard to predict. Third, there again is a cointegration relationship in 
the later stage of the global crisis (Spring 2009-Spring 2010). In this period the spot 
exchange rate is virtually constant. Apparently, when the financial crisis spread, the 
expectations from market participants became more uniform, namely that the 
Renminbi-dollar rate will stop appreciating for a while, until the impact of the crisis is 
clear. It was easier for market participants to anticipate the exchange rate in the later 
stages of the crisis. Fourth, there is no cointegration after the Chinese government 
continued its policy of gradual appreciation (Summer 2010 – Winter 2010).  
As explained in Section 5.2, cointegration is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the FRUH. For (Ft-St) to be an unbiased predictor of (St+1-St), the 
cointegration vector coefficient should also be unity in equation (5.8). For those 
periods for which we find cointegration, we test the rolling cointegration coefficients 
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of (St+1-St) and (Ft-St). If -b in equation (5.8) is -1 when there is cointegration, the 
unbiased hypothesis holds. If the coefficients –b are far from -1, the unbiased 
hypothesis does not hold even when there is cointegration. Figure 5.6 shows the 
time-varying cointegration coefficients. It shows that hardly fluctuated until summer 
2010. However, they fluctuate vehemently in the second half of 2010. Therefore, we 
reject the unbiased forward rate hypothesis for this period.  
 










































































































































Note: The figure shows rolling cointegration coefficients, which is the coefficient –b in (5.8). If the 
coefficient is -1, the unbiased hypothesis holds. 
 
Figures 5.A in the Appendix show the rolling cointegration coefficient for the 
five sub-periods identified on the basis of the Bai and Perron tests and the rolling 
cointegration tests. The first breakpoint identified in the Bai and Perron test is within 
one month from July 21, 2005. However, the rolling cointegration test in this period 
does not display a significant difference before and after this point. Therefore, we will 
set the end of the first sub-period in August 2007, which is the second breakpoint 
identified in the Bai and Perron test. The second sub-period lasts to March 2008 when 
the cointegration relation breaks down. This is around the third breakpoint identified 
by the Bai and Perron test. The third sub-period lasts until February 2009, when the 
cointegration relation recovers. The fourth sub-period lasts to March 2010, which is 
the fourth breakpoint in the Bai and Perron test. After March 2010 is the fifth period. 
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Figure 5.A.1 and 5.A.2 show that the coefficients of the cointegration vector are 
far from -1, so the unbiasedness hypothesis does not hold in the first and second 
sub-periods. Figure 5.A.3 and 5.A.4 show that sometimes the coefficient of the 
cointegration vector is -1 in the third and fourth sub-periods. However, as the 
cointegration relationship in the third period is rejected, so is the FRUH. In contrast, 
the unbiasedness hypothesis holds in the fourth sub-period, albeit that the evidence is 
not always very strong. Figure 5.A.5 shows that in the fifth sub-period b deviates 
from unity. On the whole, the cointegration coefficients –b in (5.8) are less than 0 in 
the crisis period and greater than 0 in the non-crisis period. This result confirms the 
empirical evidence that the slope coefficient b is significantly less than unity and 
mostly negative in non-crisis periods. In Table 5.3, we summarize our results for the 
five sub-periods.  
 
Table 5.3 Summary of results 
Period Cointegration Test Unity Cointegration Vector Coefficient 
July 2005 – Autumn 2007 ¥ × 
Autumn 2007 – Spring 2008 ¥ × 
Spring 2008 – Spring 2009  × —— 
Spring 2009 – Spring 2010 ¥ ¥ × 
Spring 2010 – End 2010 × —— 
 
Note: ¥ means hold, × means does not hold, ¥× means sometimes hold, sometimes does not hold, and 
— means that cointegration does not hold; we do not test the cointegration vector coefficient.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
We examine the relationship between the future spot return and the forward discount 
rate in China by employing breakpoint tests and rolling cointegration. We 
complement Frankel and Poonawala (2010) and examine the impact of the global 
financial crisis on the relationship between the future spot return and the forward 
discount rate in China. We find that the cointegration relationship between the future 
spot return and the forward discount rate is time-varying. This dynamic relationship 
may reflect divergence in the market expectations regarding the exchange rate of the 
Renminbi.  
We conclude that cointegration between future spot returns and forward discount 
rates in China broke down in the early stages of the financial crisis. However, 
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cointegration cannot be rejected for later stages of the financial crisis. The global 
financial crisis had considerable impact on the forward discount bias and upheld the 
forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis by reverting the negative sign into positive. This 
result is in line with the findings from Jeon and Seo (2003) who conclude that market 
efficiency appears to have become weaker immediately after a crisis, but that it 
recovers quickly. We find that the unbiased hypothesis does only hold in Spring 2009 
when both the spot and forward exchange rate are almost invariant. The result is 
congruent with previous studies that conclude that the unbiased hypothesis tends to 
hold in times of crisis (Bai and Mollick, 2010).  
 
  




5.A Rolling cointegration coefficients for Sub-periods 

































































































































































Note: The figure shows rolling cointegration coefficients, which is the coefficient –b in (5.8). If the 
coefficient is -1, the unbiased hypothesis holds. 
 
 
















































































































































Note: The figure shows rolling cointegration coefficients, which is the coefficient –b in (5.8). If the 
coefficient is -1, the unbiased hypothesis holds. 




































































































































Note: The figure shows rolling cointegration coefficients, which is the coefficient –b in (5.8). If the 
coefficient is -1, the unbiased hypothesis holds. 
  
 












































































































































Note: The figure shows rolling cointegration coefficients, which is the coefficient –b in (5.8). If the 
coefficient is -1, the unbiased hypothesis holds. 
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Note: The figure shows rolling cointegration coefficients, which is the coefficient –b in (5.8). If the 
coefficient is -1, the unbiased hypothesis holds. 
  
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The linkages between international capital flows, currency crises and exchange 
rate regimes are relevant for global financial stability in an increasingly integrated 
world. This dissertation contributes to the literature both methodologically and 
empirically. The research questions addressed in this dissertation are:  
(1)  Are Chinese hot money flows related to developments in the real estate and the 
stock markets, the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the US, the expected 
exchange rate appreciation, and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index (VIX)? Does their effect depend on structural reforms and new 
regulations as well as the recent financial crisis? Are results affected by the 
choice of a particular measure for hot money? 
(2)  Which factors determine whether a sudden stop is followed by a currency crisis 
or not? Does the exchange rate regime play a role here? 
(3)  Are leading indicators of currency crises different in different exchange rate 
regimes? If so, which indicators are useful for different exchange rate regimes? 
(4)  What is the relationship between the Renminbi future spot return and the 
forward discount rate? Does the unbiased forward exchange rate hypothesis 
hold in China? What is the influence of the recent financial crisis on this 
relationship? 
Sections 6.1-6.4 consecutively will answer these four questions. 
6.1 The dynamics of hot money in China 
We study the empirical determinants of China’s hot money using Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) models from Pesaran et al. (1999). We use four alternative 
measures of hot money in the period January 2000 to December 2012. Furthermore, 
we examine the impact of the qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) 
regulation of July 2003, the exchange rate reform of July 2005, the new regulation of 
foreign investments in the real estate market in July 2006, and the global financial 
crisis. Our explanatory variables include global macroeconomic factors and domestic 
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macroeconomic factors that are commonly considered in the literature. The global 
factors are the interest rate differential between China and the United States and 
market volatility as proxied by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index (VIX). The domestic factors consist of the expected exchange rate 
appreciation and proxies for developments at the stock and real estate markets. Our 
findings are largely in accordance with the results of previous studies: an expected 
appreciation significantly encourages hot money flows into China. Our results also 
suggest that the significance of the VIX, the stock market index and the real estate 
climate index depend on the way in which we measure hot money. Specifically, our 
first measure of hot money (found by subtracting the trade surplus and net foreign 
direct investment (FDI) from the change in official foreign reserves) is significantly 
affected by the VIX, while our second and third measures of hot money are 
significantly affected by the stock market index and the real estate climate index. The 
second measure uses adjusted foreign reserves instead of official foreign reserves. The 
third measure adds a rough estimation of hot money in trade invoicing. Thus, the 
relevance of the factors depends on the choice of a specific hot money measure. The 
alternative measures offer consistent results regarding the significance of QFII and of 
the exchange rate reform: they are not effective. But the regulation of foreign 
investment in the real estate market and the financial crisis has a significant effect. 
It might be worthwhile for policy makers to entertain the idea that the factors 
driving hot money flows in China depend on the measures of hot money, however, the 
expected exchange rate is a robust driver. Thus a stable exchange rate policy is 
essential in reducing Chinese hot money flows.  
6.2 Sudden stops and currency crashes 
The second question addressed in this dissertation is why sudden stops are 
accompanied by currency crashes in some countries but not in others. We use a 
sample of 85 economies in the period 1980-2010. In line with theoretical models 
(Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld, 1994; McKinnon and Pill, 1999; Hausmann et al., 1999; 
Aghion et al., 2001), the explanatory variables we consider include trade to GDP, 
exports to GDP, current account to GDP, financial openness, inflation rate, claims on 
central government as a share of GDP, the ratio of M2 to GDP, domestic credit 
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provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP, and total reserves in months 
of imports. We rely on an event study approach and probit regressions. Both 
approaches suggest that low trade openness, shallow financial markets, and current 
account imbalances raise the likelihood of sudden stops with currency crashes. 
Furthermore, the sub sample regressions show that the exchange rate regime plays a 
significant role. More specifically, the current account plays a crucial role in the three 
types of exchange rate regime that we distinguish (i.e. hard pegs, other pegs and 
intermediate regimes). A surplus current account decreases the probability of having 
sudden stops with currency crashes. Higher budget deficits significantly increase the 
likelihood of sudden stops with currency crashes in the case of hard pegs. Higher 
trade openness significantly decreases the likelihood of sudden stops with currency 
crashes in both hard and other pegs. A deeper financial system significantly decreases 
the probability of sudden stops with currency crashes in both other pegs and 
intermediate regimes.  
Our results indicate that sudden stops need not automatically translate into 
currency crashes. In order to minimize this risk, an open trade sector, a balanced 
external sector and a deeper financial market is required. We suggest ways for 
maintaining financial stability under alternative exchange rate regimes. Economies 
with a hard peg should aim for balanced government budgets and open up their trade 
sector. Economies with other pegs should develop their financial sector and open up 
their trade sector, while economies with an intermediate regime should develop their 
financial sector. 
6.3 Leading indicators of currency crises 
We identify which variables indicate that a country is vulnerable to a currency 
crisis in alternative exchange rate regimes. The indicators are evaluated on the basis 
of their in-sample performance using both probit model and the threshold model of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) for 88 economies in the period 1980-2010. The variables we 
incorporate are: external indicators (real exchange rate, growth of exports, foreign 
reserves, the US interest rate, external debt and short-term foreign debt), real sector 
indicators (GDP growth, unemployment and the government budget deficit), 
credibility indicators (inflation and interest rate differential), monetary policy 
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indicators (domestic credit and M2 growth), and banking sector vulnerability (lending 
to deposit rate). We find several interesting differences across exchange rate regimes. 
In particular, our results suggest that in fixed exchange regimes a marked appreciation 
of the real exchange rate (relative to trend) and a substantial loss of foreign exchange 
reserves are good indicators of vulnerability. Under floating exchange rate regimes, 
monetary policy and credibility indicators, such as domestic credit growth and 
inflation, are the best leading indicators of currency crises. Both credibility and 
external economic indicators have predictive power in intermediate exchange rate 
regimes. 
On the basis of our analysis, we speculate that the single early warning model 
will be displaced by multiple models in the world of mobile capital and more 
deregulated financial markets. It is useful to explore alternative early warning systems 
for different exchange rate regimes. 
6.4 The relationship between the Renminbi future spot return and 
the forward discount rate 
We investigate the unbiased forward exchange rate hypothesis (according to 
which, given conditions of rational expectations and risk neutrality, the forward 
exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate) in the 
presence of unknown structural breaks by applying rolling cointegration tests. We use 
the daily Renminbi - US dollar exchange rate from 21 July 2005 to 31 December 
2010 to test the relationship between the future spot return and the forward discount 
rate. This is the period after the exchange rate policy reform in 2005. We first 
investigate whether there are breakpoints in our series since most standard tests are 
not applicable when a time series has breakpoints. The timing of each break is 
selected using the tests suggested by Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Bai and Perron 
(1998, 2003). The selected structural breaks coincide with the launch of the 
Renminbi-Pound sterling interbank market, the announcement of the Renminbi 
foreign exchange swap transaction, the start of the global financial crisis and the 
decision of the Chinese central bank to raise the maximum position of exchange 
settlement and exchange sales for nationwide banks. Furthermore, we apply rolling 
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cointegration tests for the future spot return and the forward discount rate. Four 
different sub-periods can be identified on the basis of our cointegration analysis. First, 
there is cointegration before the financial crisis (July 2005–Spring 2008). Second, 
there is no cointegration in the early stages of the crisis (Spring 2008–Spring 2009). 
Arguably, the trend of the Renminbi with respect to the dollar was very hard to 
predict. Third, there again is a cointegration relationship in the later stage of the 
global crisis (Spring 2009–Spring 2010). In this period, the spot exchange rate is 
virtually constant. Apparently, when the financial crisis spread, market participants 
expected that the Renminbi - US dollar exchange rate would stop appreciating. Fourth, 
there is no cointegration after the Chinese government continued its policy of gradual 
appreciation (Summer 2010–Winter 2010). Moreover, we find that the unbiased 
forward exchange rate hypothesis does hold in Spring 2009, when the Chinese 
authorities returned to peg the Renminbi to the US dollar to overcome the turmoil of 
the global financial crisis. We conclude that cointegration between future spot returns 
and forward discount rates in China broke down in the early stages of the financial 
crisis. However, cointegration cannot be rejected for later stages of the financial 
crisis.  
Our results suggest that in the early period of the crisis, market efficiency appears 
to become weaker immediately, but that it recovers quickly. In the case of China, the 
market efficiency tightly relates to the transformation of exchange rate regimes. These 
results suggest that the forward market for the Renminbi is inefficient. 
6.5 Limitations 
This dissertation has some limitations.  
In Chapter 2, neither the direct method nor the indirect method can is able to 
record hot money flows precisely. We give rough estimations of Chinese hot money 
flows.  
In chapter 3, additional explanatory variables can be considered. Examples of 
some additional variables are political and institutional indicators (Acemoglu et al., 
2003). We leave this for future research. 
In chapter 4, , we focus on currency crises. Other types of crisis, particularly bank 
and debt crises, are also very frequent. Therefore, we can expand our idea to other 
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types of crisis in order to develop a full view of financial crises. Especially, the 
suggestion to construct different indicators for alternative exchange rate regimes can 
be applied to debt and bank crises. Furthermore, one line of future research includes 
analyzing the recent currency crisis which has several new characteristic. What 
accounts for diversity is food for future research. For example, the crisis took place in 
both advanced and less advanced economies after 2008. However, the mechanism of 
crisis in advanced and less advanced economies could be different. This is a line of 
research that can also be expanded. 
In chapter 5, we use Bai and Perron (2003) to determinate break points. However, 
the limitation of this method is that it precludes integrated variables with an 
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In een steeds meer geïntegreerde wereld is de koppeling tussen internationale 
kapitaalstromen, valutacrises en wisselkoersregimes van belang voor de mondiale 
financiële stabiliteit. Dit proefschrift draagt, zowel methodologisch als empirisch, bij 
aan de literatuur. De onderzoeksvragen die in dit proefschrift aan bod komen zijn: 
(1) Is Chinees vluchtkapitaal (“hot money”) gerelateerd aan ontwikkelingen in de 
vastgoed- en de aandelenmarkten, het renteverschil ten opzichte van de VS, de 
verwachte appreciatie van de wisselkoers en de Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX)? Hangen deze relaties af van 
structurele hervormingen en nieuwe regelgeving en van de recente financiële 
crisis? Worden de resultaten beïnvloed door de keuze van een bepaalde maatstaf 
van vluchtkapitaal? 
(2) Welke factoren bepalen of een plotselinge ingrijpende vermindering van 
internationale kapitaalstromen wordt gevolgd door een valutacrisis of niet? 
Speelt de wisselkoers – en met name het wisselkoersregime – hierbij een rol? 
(3) Zijn leidende indicatoren van valutacrises verschillend in verschillende 
wisselkoersstelsels? Zo ja, welke indicatoren zijn bruikbaar bij verschillende 
wisselkoersstelsels? 
(4) Wat is de relatie tussen het toekomstige contante koers rendement (“future spot 
return”) van de renminbi en het agio op de termijnkoers (“forward discount 
rate”)? Geldt de “unbiased forward rate” hypothese in China? Wat is de invloed 
van de recente financiële crisis op deze relatie?         
We geven achtereenvolgens antwoord op deze vier vragen. 
We bestuderen de empirische determinanten van China’s vluchtkapitaal met 
behulp van “Autoregressieve Distributed Lag” (ARDL) modellen zoals ontwikkeld 
door Pesaran et al. (1999). We gebruiken vier alternatieve maatstaven van 
vluchtkapitaal in de periode van januari 2000 tot december 2012. Verder onderzoeken 
we de invloed van de gekwalificeerde buitenlandse institutionele beleggers (QFII) 
regeling van juli 2003, de wisselkoershervorming van juli 2005, de nieuwe 
verordening voor buitenlandse investeringen in onroerend goed van juli 2006 en de 
wereldwijde financiële crisis. Onze verklarende variabelen zijn wereldwijde 
macro-economische factoren en binnenlandse macro-economische factoren die 




gewoonlijk ook in de literatuur worden beschouwd. De mondiale factoren zijn het 
renteverschil tussen China en de Verenigde Staten en de marktvolatiliteit zoals 
weergegeven door de Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index 
(VIX). De binnenlandse factoren bestaan uit de verwachte appreciatie van de 
wisselkoers en maatstaven voor ontwikkelingen op de aandelen- en vastgoedmarkten. 
Onze bevindingen zijn grotendeels in overeenstemming met de resultaten van eerdere 
studies: een verwachte waardestijging stimuleert vluchtkapitaal naar China. Onze 
resultaten suggereren ook dat de significantie van de VIX, de beursindex en de 
onroerend goed klimaat-index afhankelijk is van de wijze waarop we vluchtkapitaal 
meten. Onze eerste maatstaf voor vluchtkapitaal (gevonden door het handelsoverschot 
en de netto buitenlandse directe investeringen (FDI) af te trekken van de verandering 
in de officiële externe reserves) wordt significant beïnvloed door de VIX, terwijl onze 
tweede en derde maatstaven van vluchtkapitaal significant worden beïnvloed door de 
beursindex en de onroerend goed klimaat-index. De tweede maatstaf maakt gebruik 
van aangepaste buitenlandse reserves in plaats van de officiële externe reserves. De 
derde maatstaf voegt een ruwe schatting van vluchtkapitaal in de handelsfacturering 
toe. De relevantie van de factoren hangt dus af van de keuze voor een specifieke 
maatstaf voor vluchtkapitaal. De alternatieve maatstaven bieden consistente resultaten 
met betrekking tot de betekenis van QFII en de wisselkoershervorming: ze zijn niet 
effectief. We vinden dat de regelgeving ten aanzien van buitenlandse investeringen in 
onroerend goed en de financiële crisis een significante invloed hebben op het 
vluchtkapitaal, maar de resultaten zijn onafhankelijk van de keuze voor een bepaalde 
maatstaf. 
De tweede vraag die in dit proefschrift aan bod komt is waarom plotselinge 
substantiële verminderingen van internationale kapitaalstromen (zogenaamde ‘sudden 
stops’) worden vergezeld van valutacrises in sommige landen, maar juist niet in 
andere landen. We maken hiertoe gebruik van een steekproef van 85 landen in de 
periode 1980-2010. In overeenstemming met theoretische modellen beschouwen wij 
als verklarende variabelen onder meer de handel als aandeel van het BNP, de lopende 
rekening, financiële openheid, inflatie, vorderingen op de centrale overheid, de 
verhouding van M2, de binnenlandse kredietverlening door het bankwezen en de 
totale reserves gerekend in maanden import. De variabelen worden waar nodig 




geschaald in relatie tot de omvang van het BNP. Wij baseren ons op een “event study” 
benadering en op probit regressies. Beide benaderingen suggereren dat geringe 
openheid voor handel, ondiepe financiële markten en onevenwichtigheid op de 
lopende rekening de kans op plotselinge stops met valutacrashes verhoogt. Bovendien 
blijkt uit deelregressies dat het wisselkoersregime een belangrijke rol speelt. Meer 
specifiek speelt de lopende rekening een cruciale rol in de drie soorten 
wisselkoersregimes die we onderscheiden (vaste wisselkoers, andere koppelingen en 
tussenliggende regimes): Een overschot op de lopende rekening vermindert de kans 
op plotselinge stops met valutacrashes. In een vast wisselkoers regime verhoogt een 
stijging van het begrotingstekort de kans op plotselinge stops met valutacrashes. Meer 
openheid in de handel vermindert de kans op plotselinge stops met valutacrashes bij 
zowel vaste wisselkoersen als in andere regimes. Een diepere financiële ontwikkeling 
vermindert de kans op plotselinge stops met valutacrashes in tussenliggende regimes. 
De bovengenoemde verschillen suggereren manieren voor de autoriteiten om 
financiële stabiliteit onder alternatieve wisselkoersstelsels te behouden. Economieën 
met een vast wisselkoersregime zouden in dat geval moeten streven naar 
evenwichtige begrotingen en openstelling van hun handelssector. Landen met andere 
koppelingen zouden hun financiële sector moeten ontwikkelen en hun handelssector 
openstellen, terwijl economieën met een tussenliggend regime hun financiële sector 
moeten ontwikkelen. 
Als antwoord op de derde vraag gaan we voor verschillende wisselkoersstelsels 
na welke variabelen erop wijzen dat een land kwetsbaar is voor een valutacrisis. De 
indicatoren worden voor 88 economieën in de periode 1980-2010 geëvalueerd op 
basis van hun in-sample” prestaties met zowel probit modellen als de benadering 
van Kaminsky et al. (1998). Wij gebruiken de volgende variabelen: externe 
indicatoren (reële wisselkoers, de groei van de export, de buitenlandse reserves, de 
Amerikaanse rente, de buitenlandse schuld en de kortlopende buitenlandse schuld), 
reële sector indicatoren (BNP-groei, de werkloosheid en het tekort op de 
overheidsbegroting), geloofwaardigheid indicatoren (inflatie en renteverschil), 
indicatoren voor monetair beleid (binnenlands krediet en groei van M2), en de 
kwetsbaarheid van de banksector (kredietverlening versus depositorente). We vinden 




een aantal interessante verschillen tussen de onderscheiden wisselkoersstelsels. In het 
bijzonder suggereren onze resultaten dat bij vaste wisselkoersregimes een duidelijke 
appreciatie van de reële wisselkoers (ten opzichte van de trend) en een aanzienlijk 
verlies van de deviezenreserves goede indicatoren van kwetsbaarheid zijn. In 
zwevende wisselkoersregimes zijn het monetaire beleid en 
geloofwaardigheidsindicatoren, zoals de binnenlandse kredietgroei en inflatie, de 
beste indicatoren van valutacrises. Zowel geloofwaardigheids- als externe 
economische indicatoren hebben voorspellende kracht in tussenliggende 
wisselkoersstelsels. 
We onderzoeken de vierde onderzoeksvraag over de “unbiased forward rate” 
hypothese (volgens welke, gegeven voorwaarden van rationele verwachtingen en 
risico-neutraliteit, de termijnkoers een zuivere voorspeller van de toekomstige 
contante wisselkoers is) door voortschrijdende coïntegratie testen (“rolling 
cointegration”) toe te passen. Om de relatie tussen het toekomstige koersrendement en 
het agio op de termijnkoers te testen gebruiken we de dagelijkse renminbi - US 
dollarkoers van 21 juli 2005 tot 31 december 2010. Dit is de periode na de 
hervorming van het Chinese wisselkoersregime in 2005. We onderzoeken eerst of er 
breekpunten zijn onze reeks, aangezien de meeste standaardtesten niet van toepassing 
zijn wanneer een tijdreeks breekpunten heeft. De datering van elke breuk wordt 
geselecteerd met testen zoals ontwikkeld door Zivot en Andrews (1992) en Bai en 
Perron (1998, 2003). De geselecteerde structurele breuken vallen samen met de 
lancering van de renminbi – Britse pond interbancaire markt, de toestemming voor 
renminbi valutaswap transacties, het begin van de wereldwijde financiële crisis en de 
beslissing van de Chinese centrale bank om de maximale positie en omzet bij het 
wisselen van valuta te verhogen voor landelijk opererende banken. Verder passen we 
voortschrijdende coïntegratie testen toe op de termijnkoers en het agio op de 
termijnkoers. Vier verschillende sub-perioden kunnen aan de hand van onze 
coïntegratie analyse worden onderscheiden. Ten eerste is er coïntegratie vóór de 
financiële crisis (juli 2005 - voorjaar 2008). Ten tweede, er is geen co-integratie in de 
vroege stadia van de crisis (voorjaar 2008 - voorjaar 2009). Ongetwijfeld was toen de 
trend van de renminbi ten opzichte van de dollar zeer moeilijk te voorspellen. Ten 
derde, is er een coïntegratie relatie in de latere fase van de wereldwijde crisis 




(voorjaar 2009 - voorjaar 2010). In deze periode is de contante wisselkoers vrijwel 
constant. Toen de financiële crisis zich uitbreidde, verwachtten marktpartijen 
blijkbaar dat de renminbi - dollarkoers zou stoppen met appreciëren. Ten vierde, is er 
geen coïntegratie nadat de Chinese regering haar beleid van geleidelijke appreciatie 
voortzette (zomer 2010 - winter 2010). Bovendien vinden we dat de “unbiased 
forward rate” hypothese opgeld doet in het voorjaar van 2009, toen de Chinese 
autoriteiten de renminbi opnieuw aan de dollar koppelden om de onrust van de 
wereldwijde financiële crisis te overwinnen. We concluderen dat in China de 
coïntegratie tussen toekomstige koersrendementen en agio op termijnkoersen in de 
vroege stadia van de financiële crisis ineenstortte. Echter, coïntegratie kan niet voor 
latere stadia van de financiële crisis afgewezen worden. Deze resultaten suggereren 
dat de termijnmarkt voor de renminbi inefficiënt is. 
 
